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What kind of Latvia in what kind of Europe? 
By Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga 
Of those Europeans born during the 20th century, many have 
witnessed history in the making more times than they would 
have liked. Latvians have had more than their fair share of such 
upheavals, including two World wars with front lines moving back 
and forth across their territory and all the horrors of both 
communist and Nazi occupations. When Latvia regained its 
independence in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Latvians thought that, at long last, they would experience a 
change for the better. A new era was about to dawn, full of 
freedom, hope and promise. The Iron Curtain was down, they 
had a free and democratic country, and the only thing left to do 
was to catch up to 50 years of peace and prosperity that 
Europeans on the other side of that curtain had enjoyed. To do 
that as fast as possible, integration into the European Union 
seemed the logical thing to do. Why try and reinvent the wheel, 
when other countries had already been perfecting it for 
decades? Becoming a part of the European Union thus became 
the first strategic goal for Latvia as early as 1995. 
The other major goal for Latvia was to find some model of 
security that would do a better job of protecting its sovereignty 
than its declared neutrality had done before the Second World 
War. Fortunately for Latvia, NATO was there as a major security 
umbrella and becoming a member of NATO therefore became its 
second strategic goal.   
Now, some ten years after accession to NATO and the EU in 
2004, Latvia will be taking a third step in supranational 
integration by becoming the 18th member of the euro-zone on 1 
January 2014. While the previous steps had enjoyed wide 
popular support, this time more than half of the population are 
sceptical about the wisdom of such a move. One cannot really 
blame them for feeling leery, since hardly a day goes by without 
more bad news about the financial situation of some EU country 
or another, or about massive strikes and protests against 
austerity measures in some Southern European country. 
Latvians have endured successive waves of austerity ever since 
they can remember, most recently after the banking crisis of 
2008. This time, at least, their efforts have paid off, with a 
growing economy that has largely recovered its pre-crisis levels. 
Yet the recovery has come at a serious social cost, not least an 
accelerating decrease in the population, due largely to 
emigration. 
While ten years ago most Latvians looked to the EU and 
NATO like a drowning man looks to a life-raft, this year many 
repeat the Estonian joke:  joining the euro-zone just now is much 
like buying a ticket on the “Titanic”.  Worse still, the very fabric of 
the European Union seems to be unravelling at the seams, not 
least with the United Kingdom threatening to withdraw from the 
EU altogether. Everywhere in Europe we hear complaints about 
a financial crisis that does not abate, despite billions of Euros 
spent in attempts to dampen the fires. We hear complaints about 
collective decisions being too slow, too feeble or incompetent to 
address the problems. Even before the financial and economic 
crisis, there was a spreading sense of disillusion, betrayal and 
anxiety about the future. In most of the Western world, the rich 
had been getting richer, the poor getting poorer and the middle 
class shrinking because of increasing pauperization. For the past 
several years, fears about the future of the “European project” 
have been becoming deeper, as has the gulf of confidence 
between citizens and their political leaders or elected 
representatives. Next fall, a major conference in Brussels will 
address the question “How can we reinvent Europe?” To this, 
one might well add: “Who is it, who will be able to do this?”   
Less than ten years ago, eight countries liberated from 
decades of communist oppression had hoped to join a Europe 
strong, free, prosperous and committed to social justice. Robert 
Schuman’s vision of a European continent reconciled and at 
peace, was the blueprint that had guided generations of 
European politicians towards building impressively successful 
societies. Sadly, just as we too were beginning to enjoy the 
benefits of such a strategic vision, the whole system started to 
unravel. 
In anticipation of the Euro-parliament elections next spring, 
concerned Europeans are beginning to marshal their forces to 
come up with recipes for overcoming a vast array of serious 
challenges. In Latvia, there is much more concern about the 
national parliamentary elections next fall.  With so few Euro-
parliament deputies to elect, Latvians are all too aware how little 
weight their representatives can hope to achieve in the 
overwhelming mass of deputies from other countries. Yet even in 
countries with large numbers of deputies, the popular interest in 
the European parliament and its elections is remarkably low. 
Ordinary citizens have become disillusioned about their real 
ability to influence important events.  This, needless to say, is 
extremely dangerous for the future of democracy. 
In Latvia, after 22 years of democratic governments, people 
are asking: why are we still lagging so far behind the income of 
the average European? What are our chances of survival as a 
nation, if the years of freedom have brought such a dramatic 
decrease in our population, instead of the natural growth that 
could be expected? Is our countryside doomed to becoming an 
uninhabited and uncultivated waste-land and will the 
professionals that our country continues to educate and produce 
increasingly leave us for greener pastures abroad? History 
seems to be playing with us a very nasty game of snakes and 
ladders, which requires every generation to lose what the 
preceding one had gained. 
From my own personal perspective, having gone into exile 
as a child, I still feel the thrill of seeing my country reborn after 
being wiped off the map for half a century. Independence has 
given our population a chance to become active shapers of their 
own destiny, even in the context of decisions taken in Brussels 
or upheavals in the global economy.  A lot of power still belongs 
to the people, if they make the effort to use it wisely and actively. 
Even living in a small country, one should never accept the 
defeatist notion that power always lies elsewhere and there is 
nothing we can do about it. 
Many of my compatriots have become doubtful of European 
ideals, traumatised as they have been by one crisis after 
another. We have lived through the collapse of communism. Are 
we to live through the collapse of capitalism as well? Hopefully, it 
can survive, if there is will enough for the serious overhaul that is 
needed. Europe may have discovered it has feet of clay as an 
economic giant, but it still has the chance to maintain its lead in 
social values, achieved at such cost by previous generations. As 
for Latvia – it has a tough road ahead, but it will be a road 
travelled in freedom. We may not be the “motors” of Europe, nor 
the lords of high finance, nor the owners of vast natural 
resources. We are our own resource and I believe that is no 
small thing. 
 
 
 
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga 
President of Latvia (1999-2007) 
Latvia
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Lithuanian success – from crisis towards credible European Union 
By Algirdas Butkevičius 
Lithuania was one of the fastest growing economies in the 
European Union prior to the global financial and economic 
crisis. Then, facing the world crisis, Lithuania has shown 
strength and unity in tackling challenges that swept the 
world. Radical measures were introduced to the people of 
Lithuania: salaries in public sector were cut by 20 percent 
and pensions cut by 10 percent. The adjustments were very 
harsh compared with the ones that were undertaken by the 
countries of Southern Europe but Lithuanians had to adapt to 
new reality that was brought by strict fiscal policy measures.  
Lithuania found the way from crisis without asking 
support from the International Monetary Fund, (unlike Latvia, 
where IMF played a major role in recovering countries’ 
economy) and without the devaluation of the currency. The 
prognosis of “strong deflation” never materialized either. 
Lithuania has managed to maintain confidence of the 
international credit market, increase its competitiveness and 
expand exports very rapidly. Thus, the expected long 
recession lasted just one year and in two years economy 
started growing again. 
Of course several other important factors contributed 
towards fast recovery of Lithuanian economy. Lithuania is 
known for having one of the most educated workforce in 
Europe as well as one of the leading communication 
infrastructures in the region. Not only Lithuania is 
strategically situated between the Nordic region, Western 
Europe and the CIS, but for more than twenty years the 
country was focused on education and training, technology, 
transport infrastructure, development of business-friendly 
environment as well as economic stimulus and stabilization 
programs. As a result, Lithuania boasts one of the fastest 
growing economies in the EU today. The World Bank’s 2012 
Ease of Doing Business Index, the Heritage Foundation 2012 
Index of Economic Freedom and the Wall Street Journal 
have rated Lithuania as a great place to do business. 
Lithuania is recognized as a prime transport hub of the EU 
that also boasts unrivalled Internet speed and has a 
competitive tax and salary structure. The country has one of 
the most pristine environments in Europe, and a quality of life 
that is among the highest in the world. 
 In second half of 2013 Lithuania is presiding over the EU 
Council.  Besides organizing the Presidency in an efficient 
and result-oriented manner Lithuania is focusing on three 
goals: a credible, growing and open Europe. As the 
European Union is starting to recover from the economic 
turmoil, closer cooperation between member states is 
needed more than ever to ensure growth, job creation and 
competitiveness. It is the right time for The EU to once again 
prove that it pursues credible financial and economic 
policies, is committed to growth through joint initiatives that 
increased competitiveness.  
Lithuania will focus main efforts on enhancing the EU’s 
abilities to provide an appropriate response to economic, 
financial, social and energy challenges. The primary focus 
will be to further strengthen the financial stability and 
competitiveness of Europe, as well as the implementation of 
the Growth Agenda.  
Lithuania will focus its attention on deeper EU integration 
and strengthening of the Single Market, including energy 
market in particular, where the purposeful effort of all 28 
Member States is needed. Furthermore, Lithuania advocates 
openness of the EU to new members, neighbours and trade 
partners, who not only advance EU economy, but also 
reaffirm the EU position on the development of a prosperous, 
peaceful, democratic, free and open Europe. 
One of the major priorities of the Lithuanian Presidency 
is, credible Europe. Lithuania will strive for the progress 
towards sounder public finances in the Union and strengthen 
the ground for financial stability. The efforts will be directed to 
further develop the Banking Union framework, and achieve 
progress on other legislative proposals for financial market 
reforms. The major task is to implement and enhance agreed 
reforms on economic governance and the deepening of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
The Lithuanian Presidency will build on the Europe 2020 
agenda and the European Semester, reinforced by stronger 
Single Market policy, as well as the effective implementation 
of the Compact for Growth and Jobs. The Presidency will 
work to complete the initiatives of the Single Market Act I, 
advance new initiatives under the Single Market Act II and 
facilitate the Single Market Governance. The initiatives that 
enhance confidence in the EU economy and result in a 
dynamic Digital Single Market will be prioritized. 
Furthermore, due attention on research and innovation 
issues will be paid. The Lithuania’s Presidency will pursue 
the EU’s commitments to complete the internal energy 
market by 2014, and ensure that no Member State remains 
isolated from the European energy networks after 2015. 
For the appropriate completion of the energy market it is 
important to monitor properly the implementation of already 
agreed actions and existing legal framework, especially the 
3rd Energy Package, market design, integration of renewable 
energy sources with a view to overcome the possible 
obstacles and, if needed, to initiate further follow-ups. 
Extensive efforts and strong commitment are needed to 
agree on the first Europeanwide list of projects of common 
interest and to benefit from the Connecting Europe Facility in 
order to secure its timely implementation. A solid external 
dimension of the EU energy policy is necessary prerequisite 
for the functioning of the EU internal energy market. The 
Presidency progress report prepared in line with 
Commission’s position and discussions envisaged in the 
Council will be presented for the endorsement of the 
ministers in the TTE Council in December 2013. This work 
will continue and will be based on the principles already 
agreed by the EU such as: single voice, solidarity and 
guarantees to member states vis-à-vis third countries, 
transparency and cooperation. 
 
 
 
Algirdas Butkevičius 
Prime Minister 
Lithuania
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Back to the family – two decades of military-to-military U.S.-Baltic relationship 
By Arvydas Pocius  
In the year 2014 Lithuania and the other Baltic countries will 
have lived their first decade as full-pledged members of the 
world’s strongest civil-military alliance – NATO.  
On this occasion the countries will overview all the different 
steps and conditions that have helped them to start 
reconstructing their defense systems after 50 years of 
occupation and have led their way to rejoining the family of the 
countries responsible for global security, as well as in forming 
national armed forces that met the high standards of the 
Alliance. 
Let me remind you of one of the most important factors in 
this process: the military-to-military support initiative that the U.S. 
launched twenty years ago to become one of the most important 
and complex assistance projects in support of developing the 
armed forces and defense systems of Lithuania and the other 
two Baltic States in line with western tradition. 
In the year 1993 the U.S. National Guard started the first 
state partnerships with European countries: Pennsylvania-
Lithuania, Michigan-Latvia and Maryland-Estonia. It was a 
significant step in the partnering path of the United States and 
the emerging democracies of Europe directed at the creation of 
a strong and stable defense environment in Northern and 
Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So far, 22 
state partnerships have been established in Europe, while more 
than 60 partnerships of that kind have been created worldwide. 
Let me briefly describe a few practical instruments and 
directions of partnering that have played a significant role in 
developing the Lithuanian Armed Forces in conformity with 
NATO standards. 
 
Military Liaison Team as an instrument of military-to-military 
relations. What was key to the process of providing initial 
support to the development of the National Defense Systems via 
military-to-military relations? The key to the success of the 
program was the Military Liaison Team (MLT). Three to five-
strong multi-service Military Liaison Teams deployed in a country 
are the key elements in bringing U.S. military expertise to bear 
on a wide range of issues. Over 5,300 military-to-military 
contacts, or “events”, coordinated by these teams have helped 
host nations address such fundamental issues as human rights, 
social securities for and civilian control of the military, and 
establishment of military legal codes and programs for 
developing professional non-commissioned officers and 
chaplaincies. The teams and the events they were conducting 
provided a clear example of the benefits of a U.S. style of 
military organisation while also offering American-way solutions 
to the abundant challenges the militaries of these emerging 
democracies were facing. As the foundation of all the bilateral 
U.S. programs in the region such events pave the way for 
partnering countries to participate in the Security Assistance and 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities.   
More than 60 U.S. soldiers served at the MLT in Lithuania 
during the first ten years of cooperation. All of them did a great 
job and in 2004 Lithuania and six other European countries 
joined NATO. In the period of ten years, from 1992 to 2002, over 
7,750 EUCOM-coordinated and managed military-to-military 
events were organized in order to help host nations to 
understand the U.S. approach to fundamental defense issues.    
Composition of contact teams - ethnical factor as the 
key to success. The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) was 
a military-to-military program that was first applied in Lithuania in 
April of 1993. That was the right time for it. The occupying army 
of the former Soviet Union was still deployed in Lithuania and the 
members of the JCT witnessed its withdrawal process that finally 
ended in August of 1993. The efforts of the program were 
directed at developing the host nation’s military capacity 
consistent with western standards of military operations. The 
program focused on the areas enhancing interoperability with the 
Western militaries that were assisting the host nation in the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) process. The JCTP provided such 
assistance by scheduling visits of U.S. military experts to the 
Republic of Lithuania or by arranging visits for Lithuanian military 
personnel to U.S. facilities. Varied in subject such visits focussed 
on leadership, civil-military cooperation, communications, and 
logistics, to name just a few. The JCTP arranged the assistance 
visits in close coordination with the Lithuanian Ministry of 
National Defense.  
Four out of five U.S. officers and NCOs that made up the 
original team were of Lithuanian descent. That was a very 
successful solution as they could communicate in Lithuanian 
which had positive effects on the population of the host nation – 
Lithuanians did not see them as new invaders of their 
Motherland. 
Over time the composition of the team was changed due to 
military personnel rotation policies. However, the tradition to 
have at least one member of the team of Lithuanian descent was 
kept for many years. U.S. representatives were very popular 
among the citizens of Lithuania.    
 
Active partnership in the fields of military education, 
training, and collective defense. Cooperation with the 
Pennsylvania National Guard was a vital part of the MLT 
Lithuania program. In 1993 the state of Pennsylvania was 
chosen as a partner in the state partnership program because of 
the large Lithuanian community it had. The partnership is active 
to this day. Pennsylvania and Lithuania have had numerous 
exchanges of personnel and information to assist the 
development of Lithuania’s military. Soldiers of the Pennsylvania 
National Guard participate in the largest and the most significant 
international exercises hosted by Lithuania and the Baltic region 
on a regular basis, e.g. large scale exercise SABRE STRIKE 
2013 combined efforts of U.S. and Baltic military this year. At the 
same time soldiers of Lithuania and the Pennsylvania National 
Guard served in the Lithuanian-led military unit in Ghor province 
as a part NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan. 
Two decades of successful partnership can set an example 
for future vision. Joint training events and participation in joint 
international operations has to serve as a basis for achieving an 
appropriate level of interoperability. This kind of partnership 
demonstrates that we are able to support each other exactly 
when the support is needed. 
 
 
 
Arvydas Pocius 
Lieutenant General 
Chief of Defense 
Lithuania
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The euro – the key driving force in competition to promote sustainable growth 
By Andris Vilks 
The aim joining the Eurozone on 1st January 2014 has been 
an important step for deeper economic and monetary 
integration with the European Union (EU). Looking back in 
recent history from 2008 till 2010 Latvian economy took one 
of the sharpest downturns in the world, when the fall of GDP 
reached 25%. Latvia took decisive and swift actions to 
receive the financial assistance from the international 
organizations, which in return set conditions in the 
Supplemental Memorandum of Understanding addressing 
economic policy criteria linked to each instalment and the 
reporting and monitoring conditions of the loan.  
It was a great challenge to overcome the crisis by the 
implementation of broad set of fiscal consolidation measures 
and structural reforms, because it affected the amount and 
quality of public services. In overall consolidation measures 
reached almost 17% of GDP during the time period from 
2008 until 2012. On average from 2008 until 2012 Latvia has 
performed the fiscal consolidation measures in the amount of 
3.4% of GDP per year. However, in view of significant 
changes in the economy and gradual global economic 
recovery from the financial crisis, Latvia returned to growth in 
the latter half of 2010 as a result of economic stabilization 
measures and internal devaluation, which was accompanied 
with favorable situation in external markets and increase of 
market confidence. At present Latvia continues to show rapid 
and sustainable growth and has achieved considerable 
improvement in the fiscal position. 
Latvia’s way to the Eurozone can be compared with the 
competition where participants need overcome different 
obstacles in order to win the competition. In 2010 Latvia set a 
target to introduce the euro until 2014, therefore the 
government had a strong determination to undertake 
significant additional measures to meet the Maastricht criteria 
by 2012, and achieve euro entry by 2014. Due to gained 
competitiveness GDP growth rate increased to 5.6% in 2012, 
which was the fastest rate among all EU member states. At 
the same time, starting from September 2012 Latvia has 
been able to simultaneously comply with all the Maastricht 
criteria. In addition, compliance with the Maastricht criteria 
can be regarded as a quality mark stating that the economy 
is capable of providing sustainable growth, which is an 
essential precondition to improve Latvia’s investment 
environment. 
Recent economic difficulties in the Eurozone might raise 
questions whether it is the right time for Latvia to adopt the 
euro? Besides society has fear that the country will be 
burdened with additional financial liabilities through assisting 
the Eurozone countries in trouble. Nevertheless, constructive 
and productive exchange of thoughts is welcomed, and at 
the same time any fallacies connected to misinterpretation of 
our fiscal policy aims should be refuted. One could ask, 
“What can be expected from Latvia as a new member of the 
euro area?” One aspect is distinctly clear – Latvia will not be 
a silent partner but will take an active part in policy making to 
further strengthen European integration. After the country 
becomes a full-fledged member of the Eurozone, it will be 
possible to participate in discussions and decision making 
process on the same level with other euro area member 
states.  
Both Latvia and the Eurozone have gone through 
economic difficulties that have raised questions about further 
steps how to promote economic performance. Thus, there is 
a need for closer cooperation within commitment to fiscal 
discipline and structural reforms in order to raise economic 
potential in sustainable manner. With ratification of the Fiscal 
compact, the member states have agreed to observe the 
fiscal discipline marking it as an essential factor in promoting 
further economic development in Eurozone and EU at the 
same time ensuring protection form future economic 
imbalances.  
Latvia also has learned from policy making gaps in the 
past and formulated that that strict fiscal policy is and should 
be one of the most fundamental cornerstones in economic 
policy framework in Latvia. New turning point in fiscal policy 
in Latvia has been adoption of Fiscal Discipline Law in 
beginning of 2013 which envisages stipulation of fiscal policy 
principles and provisions (in line with regulations of 
reinforced Stability and Growth Pact) which ensure balanced 
budget over the economic cycle and thus facilitating a 
sustainable state development, macroeconomic stability and 
reducing negative impact of external factors affecting 
national economy. Latvia is an example for other EU member 
states demonstrating the strong will to win the competition.  
Overall the euro is not a “wand” for all economic 
difficulties, but an instrument which can be used to contribute 
growth of the economic potential. In 2010 the euro 
introduction was set as a goal, which at the same time was 
both the crisis exit strategy and the key driving force to 
promote stability of Latvian economy and to perform 
structural reforms. Since the recession Latvia has overcome 
many obstacles and showed considerable improvement in 
competitiveness through internal devaluation but it does not 
mean that we should be lulled into complacency. It was just 
one step in the competition and the euro introduction is 
another step but not the last one. Latvia will not rest on 
laurels after the euro introduction, but as hardworking euro 
area member Latvia will take part in enforcing well-being of 
all EU. 
 
 
 
Andris Vilks 
Minister of Finance 
Latvia
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Finland prepares for increased eastern mobility and possible visa-free travel 
between EU and Russia 
By Päivi Räsänen 
This autumn there has been wide-ranging discussion in 
Finland about possible visa-free travel between the EU and 
Russia, and its national impacts, in particular.  In mid-
September, the tourist industry released a comprehensive 
survey on how visa liberalisation would influence Russian 
tourism in Finland and what advantages and disadvantages 
visa-free travel would have. During the present Government's 
term of office, a number of comprehensive studies has been 
conducted with the purpose of examining the sufficiency of 
our resources with regard to increasing eastern mobility. The 
Government has now decided to give serious consideration 
to increasing eastern mobility and possible visa-free travel. 
There has been an annual increase of about 10% in 
passenger traffic at the border between Finland and Russia. 
In 2012, the number of border crossings at the Finnish-
Russian external land border topped twelve million. At this 
pace of growth, the number of border crossings is expected 
to reach about 20 million within the next five years. The 
impacts of increased mobility are already evident in the daily 
work of the border guard, police, rescue and immigration 
authorities — all covered by the mandate of the Ministry of 
the Interior. 
Finland has already benefited from growing eastern 
mobility, with Russians being by far the largest tourist group 
in the country, and still growing. Finnish businesses, too, 
generally consider the foreseeable impacts of visa-free travel 
to be positive.  It is expected to boost demand for tourism, 
trade and services, raise the employment rate and increase 
Russian investment in Finland. 
The Ministry of the Interior's goal is to enhance people-to-
people contacts and secure the operating conditions for 
businesses, without putting Finland's or the EU's internal 
security at risk. The tourist industry is one of the biggest 
employers in the EU, and it is a key driver of economic 
growth. Therefore, the authorities responsible for border 
control, internal security and immigration are to ensure 
smooth cross-border and transit traffic at the EU's external 
borders while taking care that the EU requirements for border 
control are met. 
Visa-free travel is a common long-term objective of the 
EU and Russia set out as early as in 2003.  In 2011, the EU 
and Russia agreed on common objectives and conditions, 
‘common steps’, which need to be implemented before 
agreement can be made on visa-free travel. A dialogue on 
the conditions of visa-free travel has been conducted for a 
while now, and it is only a matter of time when the actual 
negotiations on a visa waiver agreement will be launched. 
Now is the time to discuss in Finland, too, what the impacts 
of visa-free travel will be and how we should prepare for it. 
The single most significant challenge for the authorities 
will be how to maintain internal security. As the number of 
passengers grows, the transport infrastructure and the flow 
of cross-border traffic will be put to test, in addition to which 
ordinary crime and traffic accidents are expected to increase. 
In order to maintain the throughput of the border crossing 
points and the management of cross-border traffic at a level 
required by the growing traffic volumes, we need to take 
steps to comprehensively develop the crossing points and 
improve transport routes and connections to them. 
The EU's ‘Smart Borders’ package currently under 
preparation will have an effect on smooth border traffic.  The 
package consists of the Entry/Exit System and the 
Registered Traveller Programme which will enhance security 
and facilitate border crossing in the EU. The systems should 
be in operational at the Schengen external borders before 
the possible EU-Russia visa-free travel begins.  
At the informal meeting of home affairs ministers of 
Schengen states with eastern external land borders, held in 
Finland on 13 September, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia and Finland agreed to step up their cooperation and 
establish a ministerial forum to convene on a regular basis.  
The forum aims to promote multilateral cooperation, dialogue 
and the exchange of best practices concerning the 
challenges of home affairs. Particular focus areas include the 
future EU visa liberalisations to the eastern neighbouring 
states, increasing cross-border traffic and prospects for 
cooperation at the external land borders. 
Discussions at the informal ministerial meeting in 
Lappeenranta showed that Schengen states with external 
land borders share common interests and face similar 
challenges. Closer and more regular cooperation will give us 
increased opportunities to raise issues for discussion, by 
making use of the ministerial forum of Schengen states with 
external land borders, and by working together with existing 
regional compositions, such as the Salzburg Forum. 
 
 
 
Päivi Räsänen 
Minister of the Interior 
Finland
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Like minded Baltic cultures 
By Rein Lang 
The West Sea or the East Sea (depending on one´s 
perspective) is not merely a historical trade route that once 
enriched families and cities. Culture – both spiritual and 
material – moved together with merchants. There is more 
and more evidence of close interaction already from before 
the establishment of Christianity in Estonia. Michel Rouche, 
professor at Sorbonne University, claims in his book “Clovis” 
that Clotilde, the spouse of the first French Christian king 
Clovis, was half Norwegian and half Estonian. Clotilde is 
believed to have convinced her husband to turn to 
Christianity and to let him be crowned a Christian at Reims 
Cathedral. All this happened long before Christianity reached 
Estonia.  
The merchants and nomadic monks, many of whom were 
acting as spies of the Teutonic Order, made it clear in the 
11
th
 century that Estonia was worth invading. The year 2014 
marks 800 years from when Pope Innocent III devoted 
today´s Estonia and Latvia to the Virgin Mary. This served as 
an ideological foundation for carrying out the Crusade. 
Christianity and the Western Christian cultural space were 
brought to the Land of Mary – Terra Mariana – with fire and 
sword. Along came the medieval fortresses and stone 
churches, many of which have to this day, more or less, 
preserved their original form. Cities developed, forming the 
Hanseatic League, in which similar cultural processes took 
place. 12
th
-14
th
 century feudalism and consequent allocation 
of land to German feudal landlords defined Estonia´s cultural 
development and affiliation. As an outcome of the Great 
Northern War, Estonian territories were transferred under 
Russian tsarist rule. Despite this, the land ownership 
dynamics and the Western Christian cultural beliefs 
remained intact. Although under the Romanov Dynasty, 
Russia became an important maritime power and a famous 
exploration hub, their admirals´ names were still inherently 
non-Russian – Bellingshausen, Kruzenstern, Kotzebue, 
Wrangel etc – coming from Estonian noble estates. The 
Baltic Sea cultural space, including St. Petersburg´s Russia 
until Lenin-led coup d’état, shaped Estonians´ lifestyle, 
beliefs and their cultural legacy. Through Estonia, this 
cultural space expanded to St. Petersburg, turning it into a 
cosmopolitan cultural hub. Even today, St. Petersburg is an 
oasis standing out from the rest of Russia, where Western 
and Eastern Christian cultures meet, continuing to offer 
timeless works of art to the world culture. Even the 
communist terror´s hostility towards culture, best exemplified 
by the conversion of the city´s historical name to Leningrad, 
could not break the spirit of St. Petersburg. 
Although predominantly German, this cultural space 
included elements from ethnic cultures from all around the 
Baltic Sea. Estonian cultural space was dominated by the 
Baltic German culture, which was an entirely unique 
phenomenon, and which faded due to German landlords` 
decision to raise arms against the newly created Estonian 
Republic in 1918. Baron von Goltz, who was defeated by 
Estonians under today´s Latvian town Võnnu, did not only 
compromise its people´s political and military power but also 
the unique culture that had developed over centuries.  
The fact that the angry victorious “natives” started to 
reckon with their former landlords after a successful military 
defeat is hardly a surprise. However, the cultural beliefs of 
the leaders of the newly born State should be acknowledged 
– the cultural heritage remained almost entirely unharmed in 
the process. Even the coats of arms of noble families 
remained on the walls of the Dome Church in Tallinn. And 
yet, it is only now, 20 years after the end of the communist 
rule, that we re-discover this spiritual and material cultural 
legacy that was developed here over centuries by Baltic 
German families. And this is both exciting and admirable. 
Today, we carry out seminars together with German 
researchers exploring the ties and hostility between one of 
the most productive German playwright and former landlord 
August von Kotzebue and Goethe, we study the heritage of 
Michael Sittow and try to restore the manor ensembles 
created for local barons by Italian architects, gardeners and 
artists.    
While in Southern Europe the flowering of the 
Renaissance was impeded by plague epidemics and 
quarrels between noble families, the biggest problems for 
Terra Mariana were the growing ambitions of neighboring 
Eastern rulers. More than half of the Estonian population was 
killed during the invasion of Ivan the Terrible. Estonian 
mainland was re-populated by islanders that had managed to 
survive. As the result of the Great Northern War, Estonian 
population fell below 200 000 people. The Second World 
War destroyed one third of Estonian population.     
In 1991, Estonia restored its cultural affiliation with the 
Western Christian cultural space. Despite all the historical 
destruction, more than 800 year-old examples of Gothic 
architecture have remained, together with the understanding 
of aesthetics and artistic continuity similar to that of Western 
Europe. Furthermore, our understanding of the relationship 
between individual and the state, of individual´s responsibility 
towards himself/herself and his/her loved ones, and of 
sustainable economic management is similar to that of 
Finns`, Swedes`, Germans`, Danes`, and Poles`. It seems 
not only fish and boats traverse the Baltic Sea but also ideas 
and mentalities. Even in the framework of the European 
Union, the Baltic Sea states usually think alike. It would be 
useful for us if at least some of our ideas and values were 
shared in the St. Petersburg region of Russia, and often that 
is the case.  
To conclude, I would like to stress that the Baltic Sea 
cooperation is not only necessary but unavoidable if we want 
to preserve our centuries-old lifestyle and value system. 
During peaceful times our quality of life has, despite the 
harsh climate, been high and it continues to be so. The effort 
to maintain it seems in every sense reasonable and 
necessary. This is a good reason to continue to look for 
opportunities to enhance cooperation in all areas.   
 
 
 
Rein Lang 
Minister of Culture  
Estonia
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A new transatlantic alliance must be based on shared values and shared 
objectives 
By Hannes Swoboda
The relations between the European Union and the United States 
have entered a new phase soon after the election of Barack Obama 
as President of the United states in 2008. This trend has certainly 
been consolidated by his re-election to office in October 2012. 
The Presidency of Barack Obama has marked a change of 
paradigm in the relations between the US and the world, where the 
unilateral affirmation of military power has been replaced by an 
increasing role of political diplomacy and by the promotion of US 
interests via a more proactive participation in global and multilateral 
fora.  
This trend has coincided with increased attention towards 
Europe and the European Union, both through a call to take up 
greater responsibility in conflict management and neighbourhood 
policy, and via a renewed interest in re-shaping a transatlantic 
alliance, particularly facing the rise of other more competitive global 
actors.   
At the same time, after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the European Union has emerged more and more as a 
distinct political and institutional actor in transatlantic relations. This 
shift in the EU institutional system has been clearly perceived by 
both parties in recent years on the occasion of important 
negotiations concerning counter terrorism agreements on data 
exchange and data protection (TFTP and PNR agreements), where 
the power of consent of the European Parliament significantly 
shaped negotiation dynamics, away from purely intergovernmental 
relations. 
I believe these political and institutional developments on both 
sides of the Atlantic constitute an important challenge for the EU and 
for the US for a renewed and stronger partnership based not only on 
shared objectives but on a set of shared values. 
The EU and the US need to be part of this new global dynamics 
and lead the change, not only in terms of economic and trade 
competitiveness: we have the opportunity to define together global 
standards in line with our historical heritage of democracy, freedom, 
equality, welfare and learning from the failures that the financial and 
economic crisis has dramatically brought to light. 
For this reason I have welcomed the opening of negotiations for 
a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - TTIP last July in 
Washington. 
Economic reasons supporting this choice are self evident.  
The EU is the largest economy in the world, representing 25, 1% 
of world GDP and 17% of world trad, while the US is the second 
largest economy accounting for 21, 6% of world GDP and 13, 4% of 
world trade. 
Together the EU and the US account for almost half of the world 
GDP and one third of total world trade. The transatlantic economic 
relationship is among the most open in the world and the EU and US 
markets are very integrated. Nonetheless, the relative share of 
bilateral relationship has been declining over the past decade due to 
the rapid rise of emerging economies.  
In this context, according to the European Commission's recent 
estimates, a comprehensive and ambitious agreement could 
increase the EU's GDP by 0.5% annually and the US GDP by 0.4% 
by 2027. 
But there is much more to this than just economic considerations 
and we would loos an historical opportunity if we did not use these 
negotiations to discuss also about shared values and actions 
necessary to promote them and uphold them across the Atlantic and 
at global level. 
For instance, according to estimates of the World Bank, by 2030, 
2 billion Asians will enter the middle class. Emerging countries are 
moving fast in terms of economic growth, technological 
development, job creation, production costs, boost to talent and 
creativity. But are fundamental rights and freedoms, labour rights, 
environmental standards, democracy evolving at the same pace? 
At the same time the EU and the US are now - in different ways 
and at different pace - recovering from the hardest economic and 
financial crisis since 1930, whose impact on economies, societies, 
democracies and rights has been deep and will be long lasting.  
Another example: the debate around data protection and mass 
surveillance generated across the Atlantic by leaks on US NSA 
generalised surveillance programs has highlighted the importance to 
define shared values and standards for the protection of what is 
considered by both parties a fundamental right to privacy. 
In this respect I believe there can be no trade off between 
security and freedoms, both online and offline. Cyberspace must not 
be equated to impunity. Equally, the same fundamental rights and 
principles that the EU and the US uphold offline must also apply and 
be promoted online. 
These concerns have to be addressed swiftly and credibly by our 
US friends, if TTIP negotiations are to proceed in a climate of mutual 
respect and mutual trust, as this difficult challenge deserves. The 
parallel decision to set up a bilateral EU US dialogue on intelligence, 
law enforcement and data protection goes in the right direction.  
Overall, I still believe that the extraordinary interdependence of 
our economies is a valuable opportunity in the present historical 
phase and we need to seize it, knowing that the challenge for both 
parties is to overcome obstacles to trade and investment, simplifying 
where possible the regulatory environment, but also to promote the 
values, principles, models that have made our societies thrive, not 
only in economic terms, but in terms of democracy, social protection, 
fundamental rights, consumer rights, privacy rights.  
Europe has a specific heritage in this respect. This heritage is 
that of a set of well developed welfare states, of societies that ensure 
still a high level and quality of social protection, public education, 
healthcare, services of general interest, access to culture, in spite of 
growing inequalities and growing unemployment.  
This task specifically questions the role of Progressive forces on 
both sides of the Atlantic. Socialists and Democrats in Europe and 
the Democrats in the USA have the historic chance to boost 
cooperation on a series of fundamental issues, ranging from the 
regulation of financial markets, to human and civil rights as well as 
immigration and integration of migrants.  
We should use the present opportunity to give not only Europe a 
new face and create new chances, but to construct a progressive 
cooperation across the Atlantic.  
US-EU cooperation can be the core of this alliance, that should 
be open to all other actors interested to join forces. 
Globalisation can not be stopped and should not be stopped as 
long as it is fair to all participants. But to make it fair we need a 
strong EU - US cooperation. 
Not - as was the case during the Bush era - a co-operation of 
those who are willing to intervene militarily and without UN support, 
but a real transatlantic alliance of progressive forces willing to bring 
fairness and justice into our societies.  
 
 
 
Hannes Swoboda 
President  
Alliance of Socialists & Democrats in the European Parliament
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The Silicon Sea? 
By Jouni Backman 
For a long time Finland was one of the world’s leading 
information societies. Now Estonia is about to take that 
position. Also in Russia there is a strong tradition of 
mathematical and thus also ICT sector know-how. In many 
other countries in the Baltic Sea region expertise in the 
information society is on a high level. 
This strong know-how could be a source of regional 
cooperation. Not only around business, but also around 
research, education and product development. Cooperation 
in developing the public sector would be challenging, but 
useful. 
The development of the information society is both a 
possibility and a threat. Regarding the opportunities, 
cooperation between countries is needed – regarding the 
threats, cooperation is imperative. 
To the side of traditional security threats, or even ahead 
of them, has risen the so-called cyber security. It no longer 
means just plain data security, but the safety of the whole 
electronic and networked society. 
Dependence on data networks and their uninterrupted 
operation these days concerns almost all functions of 
society. Targets of security threats are both private financial 
transactions, trade and travel, and states’ critical functions 
and public services. Uninterruption of electrical and data 
networks is an absolute prerequisite for the functions and 
safety of a society. 
Many countries are investing significantly in cyber 
security. And as with traditional security politics, it cannot be 
done only at national level, but also international cooperation 
is needed. In cyber security the cooperation between states 
is emphasized, because cyber threats are not geographically 
limited. A large part of cyber threats is also related to 
terrorism and other cross-border crime. 
The Baltic Sea region is in the core of cooperation formed 
around cyber security. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) was established in 
2008 in Estonia. The goal is to have 16 member countries by 
2016. Finland has also been persuaded to join, at least in the 
beginning through a permanent expert. Cooperation has 
already been achieved in many ways. 
Tallinn as the choice of location can be explained by 
Estonia’s good information society development. This, in 
turn, can be explained by a couple of things, at least. In 
Estonia, the construction of the information society has been 
able to take place through the so-called clean slate, which 
means that old structures and practices have not hampered 
meaningful activity. In many other countries the change 
process has been much slower and more difficult. 
Another secret to Estonia’s success was the open-
minded decision to introduce joint solutions. Some of them, 
like a digital identity card for all citizens and a common open 
technical service platform, have created the necessary 
foundations. It is noteworthy that these solutions are in use in 
both the public and private sector. Finland is about to follow 
the example of Estonia. 
ICT's potential has been utilized only to a small extent so 
far. In particular, this applies to the public sector. In many 
countries, efforts have been made only in the development 
and acquisition of ICT technologies, but not to its actual 
utilization by reforming processes, in other words practices. 
 
Also in this regard, Estonia’s example makes a good 
exception. There, courage to renew also the practices was 
shown. In Finland, this has happened, for example in 
taxation, but in many respects, Estonia is clearly ahead. One 
example is the Estonian-Russian border traffic, where it is 
possible to book for oneself, in advance and online, a time 
for border crossing. At the Finnish-Russian border this is not 
possible yet, but the only way is to wait in line for one’s turn 
at the border. 
One key difference between the two countries is the 
development of citizens’ ability to have a say and how 
transparent the society is. This is not only a question of e-
voting, even though Estonia is clearly ahead of the others in 
this area as well. 
Data is a key element of an information society. 
Transparency and the availability of data are prerequisites for 
the utilization and further processing of information. 
Promotion of the transparency of public data pools has 
started to take effect determinedly in many countries, 
including Finland.  
Good management is related to data openness. In 
particular, the public sector must take big steps towards 
modernizing their knowledge management. It does not mean 
any longer the production of information only for the 
management, but an automatic utilization of updated 
information within the entire organization. 
The most important area of development is for 
democracy. The applications of new technology would 
provide the capability to bring democracy to a whole new 
level. It does not just mean that meetings can be followed 
online openly, but it means new and real ways of influence. 
The former model country for the promotion of 
democracy, Finland, has fallen to 45th place in the UN 
statistics (2008) for e-Participation. We achieved the same 
as Honduras, but lost to Botswana. In our country, as 
elsewhere, it would be possible to open the preparation of 
issues, decision-making and follow-up in such a way that a 
genuine democracy would become a reality. After all, it 
surely cannot mean only casting a ballot once every four 
years. 
 
 
 
Jouni Backman 
Member of Parliament 
Chairman of the Social 
Democratic Parliamentary 
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Finland
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The Russian border – yesterday´s curse, today´s possibility  
By Anu Urpalainen 
Imatra stands at the outer border of European Union in 
south-east Finland. A look back in history signals that the 
border used to be a curse, but today we play the key role of 
the game called Finland and Russia economic development 
and enormous opportunities for co-operation. Recently 
region´s heavy industry has gone through challenging 
structural change but new coming of tourism has versatiled 
our economic life. To be able to understand the present, it is 
good to explore the past. 
The borough of Imatra was founded in 1948, but its 
history goes much further. The first record ever written from 
Imatra dates back to the 16th century as tax inventories 
contained references to taxes paid on salmon fishing on the 
River Vuoksi.  The official history of tourism at the 
Imatrankoski Rapids began when The Empress of All the 
Russia’s Catherine the Great visited Imatra in July 1772. 
When railway was built in 1892 it shortened the journey from 
St. Petersburg and boosted the influx of tourists.  Wealthy 
Russians from St. Petersburg started to travel to Imatra to 
admire its exotic rapids.  At the end of the 19th century 
industrial production began to increase and exploit the 
potential of the rapids of River Vuoksi. Paper mills, cellulose 
factories of Enzo-Gutzeit and growing industry on metal 
business cemented region’s status as “Ruhr of Finland”. As a 
consequence of the Second World War Finland lost Karelia 
to the Soviet Union. War closed the border, and the Ruhr of 
Finland was divided- wartime caused lasting wounds into 
people´s hearts and souls, and froze the rest of the 
international tourism. 
Over the years people started to reconsider the benefits 
of co-operation, and the border was re-opened little by little. 
In 1993 the city of Imatra and Svetogorsk made agreement 
of co-operation covering issues such as business, 
development of infrastructure, education, tourism and 
training. The concept of “Twin cities” was born. Both towns 
stand just on the other side of the border placing them in a 
unique position to gaze over the border between the 
European Union and Russia.  During the years twin cities 
have carried out several common EU-projects among which 
Imatra for example has offered expert help on infrastructural 
development initiatives. School trips, exchange student 
programmes, communal teacher´s seminars, language 
courses, youth music performances and reciprocal shopping 
visits mark the liaison between the cities. Nowadays the 
alliance lies strong and going across the border from one city 
to another is as simple as riding a bike. 
In spite of the structural changes the south-east Finland 
still has a strong centralization of wood industry when 
counting in International Paper mill located in Svetogorsk. 
Due to its location it transfers easily raw-materials and 
components to Finland without needing to put a strain on 
Russian highways. Good quality of Finnish highway 
infrastructure furthers the efficiency of the paper mill. 
Economically beneficial entrepreneur park situated at the 
gate away of European Union and Russia has attracted 
many companies to settle their operations there. The 
modernizing of the Imatra’s and Svetogorsk’s border station 
with the EU’s ENPI (European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument) -fund is an excellent proof of cross-
border collaboration by authorities on both sides.   
Today Imatra has close co-operation with St. Petersburg, 
the border guards, the customs, and with the governments’ 
of both Finland and Russia. Wounds that arose during the 
war have mostly healed; new generation is forming the global 
world. The era of looking back and closing borders is behind. 
Last year the south-east border of Finland was crossed by 10 
million passengers and Russia was Finland´s number one 
trade partner and second biggest export market after 
Sweden.  Imatra and Svetogorsk – the twin cities, represent 
an excellent example of how mutual trust and relationship 
built between small towns can open big doors and expand 
connections on many tiers of the society and country. 
On September 2013 the Finnish Parliament contributed 
10 million euros towards a new fund to support studies in 
Russian language and culture. The parliament wants to 
ensure economic development and opportunities for co-
operation in the future on governmental level. Finland is also 
willing to speed up trade and to facilitate planning and 
construction orders to ensure high quality and easily 
accessible shopping malls for the needs of increasing 
tourism. At the moment Russia and European Union are 
checking out the conditions to start the negotiations 
regarding exemption from visa. At the earliest it could be 
possible in 2018. I personally treat the idea with positive 
attitude. 
What was once started in 1993 between small towns of 
Imatra and Svetogorsk, is now being done between Finland 
and Russia. Cultural exchange, improvements of language 
skills, commercial boosting, expert help, reciprocity and 
common trust are the key elements for fruitful co-operation. 
The Russian border affords us opportunities without limits, 
we just need to accept them, roll up our sleeves and team 
up. I believe we are ready for that. 
 
 
 
Anu Urpalainen 
Member of Parliament 
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The “non-race to the Arctic” – some observations from Norway 
By Ine Eriksen Søreide 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a 
fundamental transformation in the strategic significance of 
the high north and Arctic. The historical situation, with the 
deep split between the East and West, and the area serving 
as a focal point for military buildup and activity, is well known. 
Today we face a new reality with the main focus being the 
development of natural resources and opportunities for 
commercial maritime transport, as well as the global 
challenge posed by melting sea ice and environmental 
degradation. 
In this perspective, the strategic importance remains high, 
but is much broader and more complex. However, this 
transformation does not negate the need for a security policy 
perspective, and all the Arctic states, including Norway, 
maintain a considerable military presence in the area, both 
due to issues of sovereignty and to maintain a situational 
awareness in an area of increasing importance. 
The first white paper on Norway’s stand on the high north 
was presented in 2005 by the Bondevik II government. In the 
Norwegian political landscape there has since been a broad 
and consistent consensus regarding the Norwegian policies 
in the high north. Of course there are minor differences in the 
priorities, but on the macro level the level of agreement has 
been high over time. 
On the domestic side, expectations have been set high 
as the interest in the area increases. However, exploration, 
sustainable exploitation, growth and construction of 
comprehensive infrastructure are all slow processes. I would 
argue that concrete action needs to be taken in order to 
strengthen the potential cooperation and growth in the high 
north further. For us, this also includes strengthened people-
to-people cooperation and the exchange of much needed 
labor and knowledge between Russia and Norway, for 
instance.   
Over the last years, the multilateral frameworks for 
cooperation and policy development have been 
strengthened. The increasing importance of the Arctic 
Council, with a permanent secretariat being established in 
Tromsø, and several new members being accepted as 
permanent observers serves as one example. The 
cooperation between the five circumpolar states, as 
illustrated by the Ilulissat declaration of 2008, another. 
Norway also enjoys, and wishes to maintain, a close 
bilateral relationship to all the Arctic states. This includes a 
very constructive cooperation with Russia in areas of 
common interest. Every day issues are solved in a pragmatic 
way. One longtime example is our joint management of the 
fisheries in the high north. This has shown that where we 
have common interest we can solve these pragmatically and 
successfully. Our military forces enjoy an increasingly close 
cooperation with naval and land forces having conducted 
several joint exercises. More recently the search and rescue 
exercise Barents Rescue was conducted in Norway. This 
was done with resources from Russia, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway.  
Regardless of the increasing cooperation between the 
Arctic actors, there is still a tendency, not least in the 
international media, to focus on potential tensions and 
conflicts. A much used metaphor is the so-called “Race to 
the Arctic”. I would argue that this is a clear exaggeration. 
This is not an area “up for grabs” or without international, and 
national, regulation. Boundary disputes and delamination of 
areas of responsibility on the continental shelf have been 
clarified in an increasing tempo, with all actors respecting the 
bodies of international law regulating these issues.  A huge 
diplomatic victory for both Russia and Norway took place in 
2009, when the boundaries in the arctic waters were set, and 
a long term border dispute was solved, building on decades 
of diplomatic craftsmanship. 
The future will probably bring an increase in freight 
transported through the area. The coastal states in the Arctic 
therefore have a responsibility to provide a comprehensive 
search and rescue capability, as well as capacity to handle 
environmental threats and accidents. In several areas this 
effort will be best solved in close cooperation between states. 
A strong increase in maritime freight also necessitates the 
construction of relevant infrastructure and facilities. 
Another challenge is the sustainable exploit of natural 
resources. In vulnerable areas this must be both sustainable 
and take the footprint the industry leaves in the nature 
seriously. Potential mineral resources could provide an 
opportunity to create growth and jobs in the high north. Oil 
and gas remain important, both on a commercial and 
strategic level. These industries have some of the same 
needs and policymakers have to create a framework that 
meets the expectations from important stakeholders in a 
comprehensive way. 
The complexity of the activity in the high north and the 
arctic areas demands strategic vision, close handling and 
political, commercial and diplomatic craftsmanship from 
policymakers. The opportunities are big and the stakes are 
high. The actors have chosen a responsible approach 
through cooperation. The “Race to Arctic” is in fact called off, 
and the more constructive, though perhaps not as exciting, 
process of responsible management has taken its place. 
 
 
 
Ine Eriksen Søreide 
MP for the Norwegian Conservative Party (Høyre) 
Norway
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The change of the Arctic geography 
By Olli-Pekka Heinonen 
For many years the Arctic was only known as the opposite 
end of the Antarctica, predominated by cold weather, thick 
ice, polar bears and non-navigable waterways. It was in other 
words considered a hostile ground with harsh conditions. But 
due to the climate change and the melting of the ice cap our 
perception – or should I say the mental geography – of the 
Arctic has been changing rapidly. 
 
What is the Arctic and what it’s not? 
The Arctic is in the High North. We know it’s there, but we 
disagree where it begins and where it ends. Researchers, 
scientists, politicians and even legal scholars disagree and 
have their own ways of defining the Arctic. Geographically 
the Arctic is the northern circumpolar area, the ice-covered 
ocean forming the white area at the top of our maps with no 
evident signs of human activity. And for many people this is 
how it should be now and forever.  
The Arctic also means infertile and barren coastlines, 
inhospitable and icy islands and fringes where indigenous 
people used to fish, hunt, raise their families and go on with 
their daily lives until just a few decades ago. Now there might 
be a constant search for natural resources in their back yard.  
The Arctic area is very diverse. Dozens of languages are 
spoken by people that have lived there since immemorial 
times. The Arctic is like a ring tied together by the Northern 
Polar Circle – in the middle you’ll find the ocean and ice field 
and by the edges are the icy islands, the fringes of three 
continents and eight states. Some four million people call this 
place home.  
 
What is really changing? 
The melting of the Arctic ice cap is real. A comprehensive 
satellite study show that the polar ice caps have melted fast 
in last twenty years. The melting is undeniably caused by the 
climate change – and even how undesirable this is – we 
need to address the development and take advantage of the 
new possibilities it presents. The melting of the Arctic ice-cap 
will open up the waterways and the main hype seems to 
evolve around the navigation routes along the Northern Sea 
Route (NSR).  
NSR runs along the Russian Arctic Coast from Murmansk 
in the Barents Sea along the coast of Siberia to Bering Strait 
and Asia and is approximately 3,000 nautical miles. 
Navigation season for transit passages starts approximately 
at the beginning of July and lasts through to the second half 
of November. The Northern Sea Route is approximately 10-
15 days shorter than the normal route from Asia to Europe 
through the Suez Canal. 
Commercial navigation is still very modest along the 
NSR. Only 46 cargo ships made the passage in 2012 and 
this year some 200 ships have been granted permission to 
sail the NSR. The volumes are still only a fraction of the 
annual 20 000 ships sailing through the Suez Canal. The 
trend is however very clear. The number of ships along the 
NSR will increase, which on the other hand presents both 
challenges and opportunities for all countries operating in the 
Arctic. 
 
What needs to be done? 
The Arctic environment is unique and fragile. It is also one of 
the last untouched frontiers left on planet Earth. Its 
ecosystems and species have adapted to extreme weather 
conditions and short growing periods. Any human activity 
may result in permanent changes in the Arctic region. Any 
economic activities in the Arctic need therefore to be 
developed in a sustainable manner taking into account the 
limitations imposed by the Arctic environment and indigenous 
people’s way of life and livelihood.  
 
Finland as an arctic actor 
Finland’s Arctic policy focuses on understanding the effects 
on climate change and the limitations imposed by the 
environment. It lies in the best interest of Finland and the 
entire international community to preserve the Arctic land 
and sea areas and to promote sustainable economic and 
social development.  Finland is a true Arctic country, albeit 
without a coastline in the High North. After all one third of all 
people living north of the 60
th
 parallel are Finns. Finland 
possesses the top-level expertise and the know-how it takes 
to understand, adapt and make use of the changes in the 
Arctic. The main areas of expertise in the field of arctic 
business and environment include: offshore and maritime 
industry, weather and ice information services, tourism, 
winter testing, environmental technology, cold climate 
research. The entire list is published in Finland’s Arctic 
Strategy approved by the Government in August 2013. We 
know how to make things work, regardless what comes down 
from the sky- and we do it. 
 
And then what? 
The management of the Arctic – from change to 
development, from challenges to opportunities – is a crucial 
issue not only for the eight states within the Arctic area, but 
for the rest of the world as well. We must understand the 
impacts of the changes in the Arctic have on a global scale. 
We need to seek cooperation on the Arctic issues with 
outside stakeholders as well. The climate change may slow 
down in a foreseeable future, but the Arctic will be there for a 
much longer time. Let’s take care of it! 
 
 
 
Olli-Pekka Heinonen 
State Secretary  
Prime Minister’s Office 
Finland
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Baltic maritime safety and research know-how is applicable in the Arctic 
By Petteri Taalas 
Finland is a country, which is highly dependent on sea 
transportation. About 80-90 % of the export and import takes 
place through the Baltic Sea harbours located in the coast of 
Finland. Finland is also an Arctic country, and about 40 % of 
the people living north of 60 °N latitude are Finns. Due to the 
Arctic climate there has been a need to develop icebreaking 
vessel and service know-how to enable maritime 
transportation during the winter half of the year, when the 
Finnish harbours and sea routes are frozen. Finland is well 
known for its Arctic vessel design and ice service expertise. 
Maritime safety is an essential factor in both Baltic Sea 
and in the Arctic sea areas. The Finnish Meteorological 
Institute has developed advanced weather, marine and sea 
ice services for the Baltic Sea. The weather services are 
based on meteorological forecasting models. Finland is a 
member of the European Centre for Medium Range 
Forecasting, situated in Reading in the UK. The ECMWF 
runs a global forecasting model with 15 km horizontal 
resolution and timescales ranging from one day up to three 
months. The quality of the medium range forecasts (1-15 
days) is the best in the world. Besides the ECMWF the 
cornerstone of Finnish weather forecasts in the 1-2 days 
scale is a limited area 7.5 km resolution model called 
HIRLAM, which is continuously developed as a joint venture 
of 11 European countries and run on the supercomputer of 
the FMI. FMI also runs fine mesh model with 2.5 km 
resolution for Finland for 24 hours. FMI has also developed 
models for Baltic Sea oceanography, ice services, waves, 
streams, temperature, salinity etc.  
FMI has developed an advanced weather service 
production system, which is based on ground-based, balloon, 
radar, aircraft and satellite observations, weather prediction 
models, 24/7 operational forecasting office run by 
meteorologists and oceanography experts and an automatic 
production system called SmartMet. FMI provides about 1 
million weather and marine products every day for various 
customers. These are maritime safety authorities, shipping 
companies, harbours, airline companies, winter road 
maintenance companies, railroads, cities, energy companies, 
rescue authorities, military, commerce, agriculture etc. 
According to the recently published Physical Basis Part of 
Fifth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) the rapid growth of greenhouse gas 
emissions has led to higher estimates of the global warming 
and the sea level rise scenarios by the year 2100. It has also 
been scientifically shown that the human emission induced 
climate change has led to enhanced frequency of heat waves 
and flooding. The largest change is observed in the Arctic. It 
has been shown, that since 1980 the extent of multi-year ice 
in the Arctic has diminished by more than 70 %. There has 
been also a considerable change in the amount of one-year 
ice with all-time minimum in September 2012. 
The Arctic change offers new opportunities for marine 
transportation, natural resource exploration, commerce, 
tourism etc. For example the shopping route from Europe to 
Asia would be 40 % shorter by using so-called North-Eastern 
passage instead of the Southern route. The North-Eastern 
passage was first used by Finnish scientist and Arctic 
explorer A.E. Nordenskjold in 1878-1879. One should hence 
keep in mind the limitations related to the Arctic shipping 
routes. Although the ice-free period is getting longer, the ice 
cover will still exist during the winter half of the year. The 
shallow routes do not permit the use of the largest container 
ships. There are still challenges in improving the safety 
services, which means additional investments in weather and 
sea observations from satellites and in-situ, improvement of 
telecommunication systems and development of weather, 
sea and ice forecasting models applicable in the Arctic 
conditions. 
Due to its location in the every winter frozen Baltic Sea 
Finland has developed an advance weather, marine and sea 
ice service infrastructure, models and 24/7 operational 
forecasting systems to ensure safe and economic use of the 
shipping routes in the Baltic Sea year around. This know-how 
and the methodologies are highly applicable in the Arctic Sea 
area. The Finnish Meteorological Institute has started the 
provision of weather, marine and sea ice services to the 
Arctic Sea areas. The FMI is happy to serve additional 
customers and their dedicated needs in the Arctic to ensure 
safe and economic businesses and activities in the region. 
 
 
 
Petteri Taalas 
Professor 
Director-General 
Finnish Meteorological Institute 
Finland
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Is Russia a revisionist or status quo power in the Arctic? 
By Alexander Sergunin 
Since the planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole in 
Augusts2007, resumption of strategic bomber patrols in the 
High North and the publication of the Russian Arctic strategy 
of 2008 the Western experts have often described Russia’s 
Arctic policies as expansionist and even jingoistic or return to 
a “gunboat diplomacy”. However, in contrast with the Cold 
war era when the Soviet behavior was driven by ideological 
and geopolitical factors, the current Russian policies in the 
Arctic are mainly explained by Moscow’s pragmatic interests 
such as competition for natural resources and control over 
the Northern Sea Route (NSR). According to some Western 
analysts, because of its economic weakness and 
technological backwardness Russia tends to make an 
emphasis on military-coercive instruments to protect its 
national interests in the Arctic and this will inevitably lead to 
the regional arms race, remilitarization of and military 
conflicts in the High North. On the other hand, there are 
experts (mostly from Russia itself) who argue that Moscow is 
not interested in changing the status quo in the region and 
favors international cooperation to develop the Arctic Zone of 
Russia (AZR). 
It should be noted that Russia has important economic, 
societal, environmental and military-strategic interests in the 
High North. These interests include the access, exploration 
and development of the Arctic natural resources. Russia tries 
to modernize and further develop the RAZ’s industrial base 
which makes a significant contribution to the country’s 
economy. Moscow is also interested in the NSR’s opening up 
for international commercial traffic and developing 
circumpolar air routes. Moscow is deeply concerned about 
the debilitating ecological system in the RAZ and trying to 
stop and reverse the negative trends in this sphere. Russia 
still has considerable military-strategic interests in the region. 
These have not lost their relevance with the end of the Cold 
War. This continuity can clearly be seen in Russia’s security 
perceptions of the Arctic as a region of both challenges and 
opportunities. 
Currently, Russia’s Arctic strategy represents a mixture of 
the revisionist and soft power/status quo policies. On the one 
hand, Moscow is quite assertive as regards its claims on the 
Arctic continental shelf as well as demonstration of its 
sovereignty over the ‘Russian part’ of the Arctic and military 
presence in the region. The Russian military modernization 
programs in the High North are also seen by other Arctic 
players as worrisome and destabilizing the regional strategic 
balance. The Russian international partners are also 
concerned about the lack of serious progress in Russia’s 
environmental strategies and its policies toward the 
indigenous people of the Arctic. 
However, looking at the bright side of Russia’s Arctic 
policies it is possible to identify a number of positive 
changes. As the recent Russia’s Arctic doctrine (February 
2013) demonstrates Moscow now realizes that most of 
threats and challenges to its positions in the Arctic region 
originate from inside rather than from outside of the country. 
These problems are caused by the complex of factors such 
as the degradation the Soviet-made economic, transport and 
social infrastructures in the region, the current resource-
oriented model of the Russian economy, the lack of funds 
and managerial skills to develop the RAZ, etc. Therefore, 
Russia’s strategy aims at solving existing problems by 
domestic rather than external means. Moscow understands 
that the success of its Arctic strategy to a larger extent 
depends on how effective its socio-economic policy in the 
region will be. The proclaimed course on modernization and 
innovation should move from declarations to the 
implementation phase and be substantiated by specific and 
realistic projects in the RAZ. 
To conclude, the general ‘balance sheet’ of Russia’s 
Arctic strategy is quite positive. It is safe to assume that in 
the foreseeable future Moscow’s strategy in the region will be 
predictable and pragmatic rather than aggressive or 
spontaneous. In contrast with the internationally wide-spread 
stereotype of Russia as a revisionist power in the High North, 
I believe that Moscow will continue to pursue a double-
faceted strategy in the region: On the one hand, such a 
strategy aims at defending Russia’s legitimate economic and 
political interests in the region. On the other hand, Moscow is 
open to cooperation with foreign partners that are willing to 
partake in exploiting the Arctic natural resources, developing 
sea routes and solving numerous socio-economic and 
environmental problems of the region. In doing so, Russia 
will prefer to use non-violent, diplomatic, economic and 
cultural methods as well as to act via international 
organizations and forums rather than on a unilateral basis. 
This brings the Russian behavior in the Arctic closer to the 
soft power model albeit there is still a long way to go for 
Russia to fully fit in this frame. 
 
 
 
Alexander Sergunin 
Professor of International 
Relations 
St. Petersburg State 
University 
Russia
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Managing the Arctic – challenges and opportunities 
By Jørg Willy Bronebakk 
The High North, or the Arctic as it is more commonly referred 
to here in Finland, is a region full of opportunities, moving to 
the centre of geopolitical interest. Therefore, the High North 
has been defined as Norway’s most important strategic 
priority area. Our aim is to enhance knowledge in and about 
the North, increase our activity and presence and safeguard 
the foundations for sustainable economic and social 
development in the years to come. 
The main growth industries in the Arctic are oil and gas, 
aquaculture, minerals and tourism. Northern Norway is 
currently seeing an increase in population and employment 
levels, and unemployment is low. Finland, like Norway, 
defines developments in the Arctic as an opportunity for the 
whole country – in the whole Arctic region.  
Governments can help create the framework for business 
opportunities. But the business communities themselves 
must consider them and identify concrete, profitable projects. 
Finnish companies with cold tech competence combined with 
a solid track record on health, environment and safety 
issues, should be well suited to compete for contracts 
coming up.    
Temperatures in the Arctic have been rising twice as fast 
as the global average. In September 2012, the extent of the 
Arctic sea ice was smaller than ever recorded before. The 
Arctic could be ice free in the summer much faster than 
climate models have so far predicted, perhaps only a few 
decades from now. This gives rise to opportunities. 
The Northeast Passage between Europa and Asia has 
received the most attention. Whereas only four transits of the 
Northern Sea Route were conducted in 2010, 46 were made 
last year.  This year we may be heading for another record 
season. However, most available analyses predict that this 
transport route will remain a complementary route for certain 
types of products, mainly related to oil and gas. This still 
leaves open the possibility for business development, on 
exports and imports of petroleum products and minerals, and 
on shipbuilding for Arctic conditions. 
While certain parts of the regulatory framework need to 
be strengthened, for instance in relation to shipping, the main 
legal framework for regulating activities in the Arctic is in 
place. There is no “race for the Arctic”, if this is to be 
understood as a race between states. All resources known to 
be commercially exploitable are within areas under coastal 
state jurisdiction. To the extent that overlapping claims exist, 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
provides an adequate legal framework for the settlement of 
such claims.  
We also have the political framework in a strengthened 
Arctic Council, and in regional cooperation forums like the 
Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Dimension. 
The members of the Arctic Council are the primary stewards 
of the resources and environment in the Arctic. Our 
experiences and expertise should provide the yardstick for 
further development. 
The focal point for petroleum activities on the Norwegian 
continental shelf is now moving northwards. If production and 
value creation are to be maintained on the Norwegian 
continental shelf until 2030 and beyond, there is a need for 
new areas to be opened for exploration. The Government is 
taking a step-by-step approach with a view to facilitating a 
gradual increase in petroleum activities in the Arctic.  
 
There is also a great potential for cooperation on land-
based industry. Just as Norway is a world leader in subsea 
offshore operations, Finland has long experience and 
substantial expertise in the mining sector. The Norwegian 
government presented a new strategy for the mineral sector 
in March this year. There is great potential in Norway, but we 
lag somewhat behind Finland in terms of geological mapping, 
investments and education and research. Hence, we have a 
clear interest in cooperation.  
As Nordic countries we have to join forces in developing 
the region’s potential. Today, infrastructure is a bottleneck in 
many areas. Deep-water and ice-free harbours in Northern 
Norway are ideally located for transporting Swedish and 
Finnish minerals to the markets. However, there is a need to 
develop roads and/or railroads to facilitate connections.   
The question of new rail corridors has been analysed on 
both sides. There are no simple solutions, but what is clear is 
that infrastructure development in the north has to be seen in 
connection with neighbouring countries’ plans. 
The government’s role is to provide the legal and political 
framework for value creation, but it is up to the businesses to 
position themselves to seize the opportunities. Together we 
can develop knowledge and technology, which is essential 
for making opportunities into activities. I look forward to 
seeing increased cooperation between Norwegian and 
Finnish businesses. 
 
 
 
Jørg Willy Bronebakk 
Ambassador 
Royal Norwegian Embassy 
in Finland
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Shifting the parameters of the debate on global energy challenges – investment 
needs to become the buzzword 
By Urban Rusnák  
Many contemporary practitioners of global energy policy 
have become infatuated with the “challenges” with which the 
international energy economy is presently confronted.  And it 
is fair to say that our newfound fondness for the “global 
energy challenges” concept is not without justification. 
Debates over energy security have become more acute in 
recent years, as concerns which consumer nations once had 
over access to cheap oil flows during the 1970s have 
transformed into an even more alarming politicisation of 
present-day gas supplies. Peaking demand for hydrocarbons 
has caused oil and gas prices to spiral inexorably upwards, 
as consumer-country watchdog organisations continue to 
warn us of the finite nature of fossil fuels.  
Most informed sources suggest that demand for 
hydrocarbons will continue to not only peak in the years 
ahead, but that the main source of future demand will come 
from non-traditional consumer countries, which are mostly 
located in Asia. Countries like China and India, rather than 
Europe and the United States, are already becoming the 
drivers for fossil fuel demand and this trend is only set to 
accelerate further, looking ahead. These are just some of the 
challenges which presently confront decision makers as 
global energy issues inevitably take a higher profile in the 
international arena.   
The axiomatic trend of accelerating demand for energy in 
the developing world immediately poses two further, inter-
related challenges which widen the scope of the energy 
security debate. The first of these relates to the fact that 
managing harmful CO2 emissions remains a highly complex 
task in developing countries, with nefarious implications for 
climate and the environment due to the increased 
consumption of oil, gas as well as coal. China and India, 
where energy efficiency strategies remain underutilized, are 
in the process of joining the United States in the club of the 
“world’s largest emitters”. China is, for all intensive purposes, 
already there. They may well overtake America if present 
trends continue unabated.  
Second, we need to take note of that fact that, as energy 
consumption in developing countries continues to grow, such 
states begin to stake their case for a stronger voice in 
debates on energy security within the framework of existing 
international fora. We have already seen a substantial power 
shift and commensurate wealth transfer from West to East 
over the last decade or so, as the BRICS countries become 
more prominent global actors at all levels. Further, their 
national ‘oil champions’ hold a commanding stake in existing 
oil reserves, super-ceding the original “seven sisters” (group 
of international oil companies). This trend is often seen as 
yet another challenge by mainstream energy consuming 
countries. This is particularly the case when developing 
and/or oil rich countries band together in establishing 
international organisations in order to forge “solidarity blocs” 
to uphold their own interpretation of energy security, ie, 
namely security of demand.  
While the whole landscape of contemporary global 
energy governance briefly surveyed above is, itself, 
extremely challenging, it is worth reminding both practitioners 
and policy makers that the real buzzword in international 
energy relations is, in all respects, investment. Although the 
“challenges narrative” tends to capture our imagination, it is 
investment – both in terms of concept and application – 
which is the real driver of the international energy economy. 
Little could be achieved without the realisation of adequate 
investment in the global energy economy, no matter how 
challenging the governance landscape may have become in 
recent times.  
Furthermore, the investment buzzword applies to every 
situation, at every time and in every place: economies prone 
to recession need to stimulate investment to promote growth; 
capital poor countries need to find ways of increasing 
domestic investment levels as well as attracting FDI; whilst 
capital rich countries which may themselves be net exporters 
of investment are constantly on the ‘lookout for greener 
pastures’ and new opportunities.  
As we seek to rise to many of the challenges confronting 
the global energy economy, policy makers, practitioners and 
those of us working within global energy governance 
institutions should strongly consider shifting the parameters 
of the debate in order to address the questions of how to: 1/ 
adequately protect, 2/ securitize and 3/ ultimately promote 
sufficient investment into the international energy economy. 
And if we are to have a robust discussion on investment 
protection and promotion in the global energy sector as a 
whole, the first question we need to ask is whether the 
present-day (global energy) governance landscape lends 
itself to any international investment protection frameworks 
dedicated specifically to the energy sector.  
Assuming that the answer to this first question is yes, the 
second question we need to ask is whether such frameworks 
really have any practical relevance – whether they are useful 
– in terms of stimulating investor confidence. Can multilateral 
inter-governmental investment protection frameworks imbed 
themselves as tools which are useful for securitizing and 
stimulating the deepening of investment flows in the global 
energy economy?  
While my objective in this short commentary is merely to 
raise a debate about how we should go about creating the 
conditions for stimulating investments in global energy, we 
should not negate the fact that the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), which has been in legal force since 1998, was 
designed exactly for that purpose. The core objective of the 
ECT, and the Energy Charter Process which has evolved 
around it, is the protection of energy investments in the 
territories of its 52 member countries. Furthermore, the ECT 
and the Charter Process likewise aims to promote the energy 
security of its entire constituency in an equal and unbiased 
manner. While the Charter further purports to establish a 
rules framework for the promotion of trade and transit of 
energy goods and services, the Treaty serves to protect 
investments by providing its constituency with concrete 
dispute settlement mechanisms: conciliation and arbitration 
procedures for investor-state and state-to-state disputes that 
inevitably arise now and again.  
The sceptics of multilateral treaty frameworks may argue 
that such instruments lack practical relevance since countries 
may already be signatories to bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs), or provide investors with their own domestic 
investment protection legislation. This may, to some degree, 
be true. That said, in a rapidly changing and highly dynamic 
global energy environment, which is increasingly inter-
connected as well as inter-dependant, multilateral 
frameworks provide substantial value added by promoting 
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common rules and spreading good governance. In essence, 
they help to create a uniformed and integrated market 
environment, inclusive of a level playing field for all of 
participants, whilst further leading to predictability and 
greater transparency.   
As global FDI flows and investment starts to pick up 
again following significant recessionary trends at the global 
level, energy investment projects are themselves becoming 
increasingly ambitious in nature as well as multinational in 
scope. BITs and domestic legislation are, on their own, not 
enough to securitize projects of such magnitude. In order to 
realise multi-billion dollar gas pipeline projects traversing the 
territories of multiple sovereign states, or giant electricity 
generation and distribution projects involving numerous 
countries, multilateral investment protection frameworks such 
as the Energy Charter are needed to provide the necessary 
institutional muscle in order to spur investor confidence.  
This applies, in particular, at the level of project 
governance, where political agreement between multiple 
stakeholders is every bit as necessary as agreement at the 
legal and commercial levels. I have little doubt that the 
usefulness and practical relevance of multilateral investment 
protection frameworks such as the Energy Charter will only 
increase further as the international energy environment 
becomes more integrated and calls for more robust 
instruments to stimulate investments as the penultimate 
driver for growth and sustainability in the international energy 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
Urban Rusnák  
Secretary General  
Energy Charter Secretariat
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New opportunities for cooperation with Kazakhstan  
By Galymzhan Koishybayev  
Kazakhstan has come a long way in a relatively short time; 
we have moved to a sovereign state with a market economy 
ranked as one of the five fastest growing in the world. 
Kazakhstan has very ambitious plans for growth into a 
modern, technologically advanced economy and democracy.  
At the time being Kazakhstan has begun to implement its 
strategy up to 2050. The country aims to be in the world’s top 
30 economies by 2050. We aim to produce 50% of our 
energy from renewable resources by 2050, which provides a 
massive investment opportunity for Western technology and 
innovation. Our capital, Astana has won an important bid to 
host EXPO-2017 with the theme of «Future Energy». This 
example clearly represents the Kazakhstan’s drive on 
renewable energy. Construction within the EXPO-2017 
project in Astana offers huge opportunities for Finnish 
companies and it will provide a showcase for the Finnish 
advanced clean and green technologies. 
Kazakhstan attaches great importance to bilateral 
relations with the European Union as well as with its member 
states including Finland. In recent years the state programme 
«Path to Europe» has been successfully implemented. 
Through this programme, the European Union has firmly 
occupied the position of a leading trade and investment 
partner of Kazakhstan. 
Finland is an important partner for Kazakhstan both 
politically and economically. In recent years, cooperation 
between two countries in bilateral and multilateral formats 
has been strengthened, especially during Kazakhstan’s 
OSCE Chairmanship in 2010. The establishment of the 
Embassy of Kazakhstan in Finland is a real sign of our firm 
commitment to further increase dialogue between Astana 
and Helsinki. 
Countries enjoy growing bilateral relations which we are 
keen to consolidate in the political, economic and cultural 
fields. Kazakhstan regards Finland as a model country for 
innovation, education and science. There is also an 
enormous potential for cooperation in business: Kazakhstan 
desires to develop its abundant energy resources in an 
environmental friendly way and Finland has a lot to offer in 
the energy efficiency, clean technology and mining industry.  
The state visit of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan 
Nazarbayev to Finland in March 2009 became a milestone in 
the history of our mutually beneficially relations. Over the 
past four years ties between our countries have grown 
stronger. These years passed eventfully in our relations, 
including high-level presidential visits and frequent contacts 
by ministers. 
The profound foundation for our cooperation was laid out 
during the state visit of the President of Finland Sauli Niinistö 
to Kazakhstan in April 2013. Several agreements and 
cooperation documents were approved and signed during 
the visit, including a partnership declaration on green 
economy development and modernsation together with inter-
ministry action plans on cooperation in the education sector 
and on environmental technology development. The 
sistership relations were established between Astana and 
Oulu.   
Substantive business negotiations and signed documents 
during the visit of the Minister for European Affairs and 
Foreign Trade Alexander Stubb to Kazakhstan in October 
2012 considerably enhanced development of our economic 
ties. The active participation of Team of Finland 
demonstrates significant interest in partnership with 
Kazakhstan.  
At present Finland has become Kazakhstan’s first largest 
trading partner among Nordic-Baltic countries. Bilateral trade 
volume in six months of the current year increased by 40% 
compared to the respective period of 2012. 
Cooperation in the clean and green tech sector has 
acquired more importance due to the plans of Kazakhstan to 
implement own national strategy for transition to the green 
economy. This goal is a part of the President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s broad Strategy Kazakhstan-2050 initiative, 
which was designed to modernize and diversify the nation’s 
carbon-reliant economy.  
Other promising areas of Kazakhstan-Finland include 
education and healthcare. We are keen to promote direct 
universities’ contacts and raise public awareness in 
Kazakhstan of the advantages of the Finnish education.   
In general, at the moment our relationships are 
blossoming in several areas beyond the realm of cooperation 
in energy sector. The future for Kazakhstan-Finland relations 
remains bright. Our relationships has already delivered great 
benefits for both sides, particularly in the energy and clean 
tech sectors but there are even bigger prospects in trade, 
education and health care for the future.  
Nowadays, both Kazakhstan and Finland are faced with 
the challenge to promote its national economy, where sound 
cooperation between two countries can have a great part to 
play. Therefore favorable environment shall be maintained to 
facilitate business and personal contacts.   
 
 
 
Galymzhan Koishybayev  
Ambassador 
Embassy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to the Republic 
of Finland
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Russia’s first year in the WTO – hip, hip hooray? 
By Monika Sztajerowska*
As with most birthdays and anniversaries, the marking of 
Russia’s first year in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
comes with a bitter-sweet taste of stock-taking. What has the 
WTO entry brought to-date for businesses operating or 
selling their products in the Russian market? What can it 
bring in the future? And, eventually, what it cannot do, 
regardless of how many candles will be lit on the anniversary 
cake? 
After a protracted 19 year-long negotiation, Russia’s entry 
into the WTO on 22 August 2012 was welcomed in some 
circles (not least those of trade negotiators) with a 
perceptible degree of hope and, admittedly, of relief. From 
now on, Russia would be subject to international trade rules, 
for example on maximum import tariff levels or market 
access in certain services sectors, which should have a real 
impact on business. The World Bank estimated the likely 
gains to reach 3.3% of Russia’s GDP in a few years after the 
accession, with most benefits stemming from the removal of 
restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). With this initial 
enthusiasm in mind, where do we stand one year on, and 
what has the WTO accession achieved so far? 
Reduced import tariffs on goods coming into Russia and 
removed restrictions on FDI in key services sectors have 
been among the most tangible gains from the accession. 
Import tariffs fell on average by 2.2 percentage points for 
manufactured goods (currently at 7.3%) and by 2.4 
percentage points for agricultural goods (now at 10.8%), with 
significant reductions—and thus sizable cost savings for 
foreign manufacturers—on passenger cars, civil aircraft, 
agricultural equipment, pork meat, pharmaceuticals or wine. 
In services sectors, market access was also broadened, for 
example allowing 100% foreign-owned firms to operate in 
sectors to which they did not have access to before, such as 
telecommunications, insurance and banking. More generally, 
the extensive body of WTO rules is now binding in Russia—
including on the use of subsidies in general, the maximum 
support for domestic agricultural producers (capped at USD 
9bln in 2012 and declining to USD4.4bln by 2018), non-
discrimination of foreign products and firms, and the use of 
regulatory barriers to trade (e.g. sanitary norms, licensing 
requirements), among many others. 
Still, as testified by articles that mushroomed around 
August this year, many businesses seem not to have felt 
any, or little, change to-date as a result of the accession. 
Why is that? First, Russia managed to negotiate long 
transition periods, with some extending as far as 2020. Only 
upon their expiry, when all tariff reductions and other 
concessions become effective, the markets will start 
adjusting. Pork exporters into Russia, for example, already 
saw their export and market shares increase, with tariffs 
falling immediately upon accession. Others will have to wait a 
few more years for similar effects to become visible. In 
addition, around the time of its WTO entry, Russia 
implemented a series of domestic measures that, in the short 
term, may have partially offset some of the negotiated 
concessions. Bans on live animal and meat imports and the 
imposition of a recycling fee on foreign automotive vehicles 
are a case in point. As some of these measures may be 
WTO-incompliant (one WTO case already pending), they are 
likely to be reduced over time, allowing businesses to profit 
more from the new market opportunities associated with the 
WTO entry.  
In addition, while it may be difficult for managers to see 
an immediate difference in companies’ everyday operations, 
there are signs of progress. For example, on 13 September 
this year, Russia —in line with its WTO accession 
commitments—joined the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA), bringing down tariffs on information 
technology goods covered to 0%. It has also introduced new 
measures to improve the level of IP protection in the country, 
notably through the creation of specialised IP courts and the 
introduction of limited liability of Internet Service Providers to 
help combat Internet piracy. In some cases where allegations 
of WTO-incompliant behaviour were brought forward — as in 
the case of copyright or automotive recycling levies, the 
government undertook steps to amend its legislative 
proposals. All this can be considered a novel development. 
Even in the case of contentious import bans based on 
alleged sanitary and veterinary concerns, the talks with 
affected parties are under-way. In a nutshell, while the 
machine of the international trade rules may be slow-moving, 
it is turning its wheels in the background, and firms are 
bound to profit from the ride. 
In the long run, it is through the application of the 
common rules of the game, enforceable via the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, that the WTO membership will 
strengthen the stability and predictability of Russia’s trade 
regime and thus its economy. The setting of maximum 
allowed tariff levels (i.e. binding of tariffs), for example, 
prevents a return to higher rates in the future, and the rules 
on customs procedures, technical norms, and other 
regulatory requirements help standardize the trading 
environment. Still, the WTO entry is hardly a panacea for all 
economic governance problems. For example, a quantum 
jump in the quality and transparency of the regulatory 
environment—still a significant headache for firms doing 
business in Russia—can only be achieved through a 
continuous domestic reform. This also applies to the extent 
and nature of state intervention in the economy. In addition, 
while WTO disputes provide a safeguard against WTO 
incompliant behaviour, they take time and resources, and 
there is scope for affording a certain degree of protection that 
does not breach the official rules (e.g. via trade defence 
measures).   
All in all, the WTO accession is undoubtedly a positive, 
albeit not an immediately revolutionary, development in 
Russia’s economic history — with time, it will provide a more 
stable and predictable framework for trading and doing 
business in the country but some of the most significant 
economic benefits will have to come from yet more difficult 
domestic reforms.  
 
 
Monika Sztajerowska 
Trade Policy Analyst 
OECD 
 
* The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the 
OECD or its Member States.
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Universal higher education and its social and economic impact – case of Russia 
By Yaroslav Kuzminov and Isak Froumin 
Over all the transition years Russia has been moving toward 
a policy of universal higher education. This process is 
accompanied by the explicit tendencies such as increasing 
number of higher education institutions and enrollment rates, 
which doubled since the ‘90s. The shift to the universal 
higher education is a steady trend and changed the meaning 
of tertiary education and its curriculum. Expansion of higher 
education in Russia is inspired by the idea of equality and 
opportunity, social equilibrium and promoted on the following 
grounds: demographic necessity, economic considerations 
and labour market demands for more innovative manpower 
with special competences and capacities for lifelong 
education. In the context of expanding and 
internationalization of education, Russian higher education 
faces the challenges of adaptation to financial, social and 
institutional constraints. The issues of special interest are 
cost and benefits of mass higher education system and 
challenges it has to meet. 
The impact of this great expansion in Russia still should 
be analyzed and understood. For now one can see that the 
expansion did not lead to greater equality of opportunities. It 
also did not lead to sustainable growth of the productivity of 
the labor force. One can argue that the higher education 
brought important externalities like healthier behavior or 
sophisticated consumption. Our analysis suggests that this 
expansion had greater social than economic impact because 
it was driven by social demand and not by the demands of 
growing economy.. 
On the one hand the growth of accessibility of higher 
education has triggered the process of universities 
transformation. Mass higher education is expected to 
become a sufficient basis for social mobility, upsurge in 
economic activity, innovative development and economic 
growth. Looking from another perspective, mass higher 
education brought a problem of quality on the table. Radically 
increased enrollments, “institutional trap” in the higher 
education system and diploma-hunting has become one of 
major concerns at a moment. According to expert estimates 
in 10-20 years the labour market will experience imbalances 
in a workforce, caused by the prevalence of workers with 
higher education.   
Russia’s higher education expansion in the 1990s was 
different from the other middle-income countries because it 
came from a much higher initial enrollment rate (comparable 
to Europe’s), but it was similar to the other BRICs because of 
relatively slow growth in the 1970s and 1980s and the large 
increase in enrollment beginning in the mid-1990s. 
There are several features of higher education expansion 
in Russia that are different from the earlier leaps in the 
developed countries. That higher education expansion is 
increasingly differentiated financially as it incorporates more 
students, is increasingly “rationalized” through entrance 
testing, and is increasingly financed by families paying user 
fees (tuition), whether through cost-sharing in public 
universities or through tuition payments to private universities 
and colleges. That is the sign of latent demand driven by the 
high economic returns to completing university, particularly to 
completing technical and business university training 
Not only is Russia unique among the middle-income 
countries in the massification of its higher education, it is 
unusual among all the world’s countries in another way: it 
has reached such a high level of incorporating youth into 
post-secondary institutions that for the next ten years or so a 
more general slowdown of population growth (common to 
many European countries) is resulting in an absolute decline 
of youth seeking to enter higher education.  
This, combined with the economic recession of 2008-
2009, has major implications for higher educational reform. 
The Russian government is attempting to “rationalize” the 
large number of public institutions developed during the 
Soviet era. Core strategic measures are effectiveness 
monitoring aimed to cut the “low quality” segment and “5-
100” initiative providing special support for the universities 
targeted to global rankings. The mechanism of regulation of 
public financed admission quotas is going to be the next 
stage of the struggle for quality enhancement. The tricky lock 
is in bringing the partially still Soviet higher education system 
closer to the labor market of new economy. 
Russia in the post-communist era will likely reverse the 
spatial and social equalization connected with the planned 
economy, introducing market rules to public institutional 
location and economic development.  
 We would argue that higher education expansion may 
have contributed to rising productivity, but Russia is a good 
case showing that State development policies (the politics of 
the development process) are extremely important in the 
relationship between education and economic growth. 
 
 
 
Yaroslav Kuzminov  
Rector 
National Research University – Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow 
 
Isak Froumin 
Academic Supervisor 
HSE Graduate School of Education 
National Research University – Higher School of 
Economics, Moscow 
 
Russia
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Baltic Sea market – new era, new challenges  
By Jyri Häkämies 
Trade and investment within the Baltic Sea region seldom 
raise big headlines or emotions. The globe has shrunken and 
company strategies often describe this area as expanded 
home market.  
Statistics confirm this development. Finnish Customs 
recently produced an analysis, which shows that Sweden, 
Denmark and Estonia are Finland’s leading partners in intra-
industry trade, that is, the importation and exportation of 
goods belonging to same group of articles. 
The Baltic Sea unites businesses and the importance of 
the region has not diminished although activities in BRIC 
countries and other markets have increased. Thus the 
countries around the Baltic Sea have not lost their 
importance for Finland, its companies, economy and welfare. 
Not even the current economic turmoil has reduced their 
significance for Finnish foreign trade and cross-border 
investment.  
The share of the countries around the Baltic Sea - 
Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia and Russia - remains at a very high level in Finnish 
foreign trade.  
In January-June 2013 the share of these countries in 
Finnish exports totalled 38.4 per cent. Adding to this figure 
exports to Norway and Iceland, member countries of the 
Council of the Baltic Sea states, we end at 41.6 per cent. In 
Finnish imports the corresponding figures were even more 
significant - 51.5 per cent and 53.6 per cent.    
As regards foreign direct investment we have no other 
region where investments from and to Finland were as 
numerous and versatile as in the Baltic Sea region. 
 
Never-ending need for change 
In 1996 prominent Baltic Sea business leaders asked for 
major policy revisions in the Baltic Sea countries and signed 
in Stockholm the Declaration on Growth and Development of 
the Baltic Sea region. Thereafter positive change in the 
region has been impressive and we have been able to enjoy 
a long period of rapid growth of economy and welfare, which 
ended - for the time being - with the first decade of this 
century. 
Today all countries around the Baltic Sea except Russia 
are members of the European Union. Also in Russia 
business environment is much closer to that of the rest of the 
region as a result of the reforms made to attain WTO 
membership. This unity has been of great importance for 
economic integration and reaping benefits from removal of 
trade and investment barriers for the whole region.  
Radical improvements have taken place and we have 
come a long way in 17 years. Nevertheless there is plenty of 
room for fine-tuning in practically all issues covered by the 
Stockholm 1996 recommendations and published under 
following headings: Rule of law, Less bureaucracy and better 
public administration, Integrate Europe, Stable monetary 
systems and prudent economic policies, Greater flexibility - a 
necessity for the future, Links in the Baltic Sea region - 
improve infrastructure, Development must be sustainable, 
Human capital - a natural resource. 
We must continuously address the challenges of global 
competition. The past few years have shown that we all are 
vulnerable in the economic turmoil. Thanks to liberal trade 
policy we have gained a lot from global economic integration. 
Unfortunately the integration process in the WTO framework 
has stalled and companies have faced growing protectionism 
during the last decade. 
The medicine taken is deepening bilateral economic 
integration between the EU and its trade partners. All Baltic 
Sea businesses strongly support this policy and concluding 
comprehensive free trade agreements with all major trade 
partners. Unfortunately negotiations take time and the 
agreements seldom bring quick results.  
 
Untapped potential of Baltic Sea cooperation 
The quickest and most effective medicine to regain 
competitiveness is in the hands of national governments and 
parliaments. Joint efforts by all Baltic Sea countries or a 
group of them in different areas can foster positive 
development. Such opportunity should not be neglected. 
An example of an area of common interest is labour 
mobility where the situation has improved drastically since 
the 1990s. However, progress in some issues like 
harmonisation of qualification requirements has been too 
slow.  
In the transport domain Pan-European corridors and 
TEN-projects have been important for the development of 
regional rail, road and maritime connections. A recent 
milestone in this area was reached in September, when 
Ministers of Transport of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland 
and Finland signed an agreement to establish a joint venture 
to develop Rail Baltica from Tallinn to Warsaw. Construction 
should start in a few years and be ready in 2023. 
Another area of successful regional cooperation is linking 
electricity networks of the Baltic Sea countries with each 
other. 
Significant results have also been achieved in 
environmental cooperation especially concerning the 
protection of the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately, without proper 
economic impact analysis, tightening environmental 
regulation with short transition periods may lead to undesired 
consequences. This is the case in cutting maximum sulphur 
content in marine fuel, the cost of which will be a massive 
competitive disadvantage in logistics. The realization of this 
requirement on sulphur should, however, not undermine 
Baltic Sea countries' cooperation, but, instead, remind us of 
its great importance. 
Though companies as a rule see competition all around, 
they also need each other. This is particularly true for 
countries with limited domestic markets. Instead of only 
competing, more efforts should be made to find partners and 
build clusters around the Baltic Sea. Only the sky is the limit 
– and not even that! Already today, the regional cooperation 
ranges from space research and technology to arctic 
challenges.  
 
 
 
Jyri Häkämies 
Director General 
Confederation of Finnish Industries, EK 
Finland
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S Group seeks growth from its neighbouring countries  
By Antti Sippola 
S Group is a Finnish cooperative retail company group which 
consists of the SOK Corporation with its subsidiaries and 20 
regional cooperatives. These regional cooperatives are owned 
by their customers and the cooperatives own the SOK 
Corporation. The number of S Group’s co-op members already 
exceeds two million. The purpose of S Group’s business is to 
provide the co-op members with diverse services and benefits 
they find useful and satisfying. S Group’s business model is built 
on a nation-wide chain business combined with the regional 
cooperatives’ good knowledge of local markets and customers. 
SOK’s main purpose in this business model is to centrally 
produce chain management services and joint service 
operations for regional cooperatives.  
In Finland, S Group’s business includes the grocery and 
consumer goods trade, the service station store and fuel trade, 
the travel industry and hospitality business, the automotive and 
accessories trade and the agricultural trade. In addition to the 
home market, S Group has international business as well. 
Through its subsidiaries, SOK engages in the supermarket trade 
and travel industry and hospitality business in the Baltic area and 
Russia’s St. Petersburg.   
 
S Group’s internationalization started already in the mid-
1990s 
For S Group, internationalization is not a new thing, it has 
operated abroad since the mid-1990s. The first international 
operation was CitySokos, S Group’s department store concept of 
that time, which started in Tallinn, Estonia, in 1995. In addition to 
this, S Group has also had some agri-business in Estonia and 
car business in Estonia and Latvia during the last few decades.  
When the new strategy regarding S Group’s 
internationalization was revealed in the 2000s, it started a whole 
new phase in S Group’s internationalization process.   
The two focal points of this new strategy were and still are 
supermarket trade and travel industry & hospitality business. 
Geographically, S Group sees growth potential especially in 
Finland’s neighbouring countries and therefore it operates now in 
the Baltic countries and in Russia’s St. Petersburg.   
The first implementation of this new strategic vision was the 
acquisition of Tallinn’s iconic landmark Hotel Viru in 2003. The 
next and quite natural step was to establish the first hotel in 
Russia’s vivid and rapidly evolving St. Petersburg in 2007. 
Today, S Group operates three hotels in St. Petersburg.   
S Group’s international supermarket trade concept is a 
somewhat localized version of its successful hypermarket 
concept Prisma.  
The first country S Group entered with the supermarket trade 
was again Estonia, in 2000. After that SOK started up 
supermarket trade operations also in Latvia and Lithuania. 
Today, S Group operates altogether 17 Prisma hypermarkets in 
the Baltic countries: nine in Estonia, five in Latvia and three in 
Lithuania. More stores will be opened in the near future.  
In 2008, S Group entered a new market with the 
supermarket trade when it opened the first Prisma hypermarket 
in Russia’s St. Petersburg. Today, S Group has the biggest 
growth expectations particularly in the St. Petersburg area, 
where it has grown quite rapidly and now operates 15 Prisma 
hypermarkets. S Group’s current plan is to open four to six new 
hypermarkets in 2013–2014 and in the near future there will be 
about 30 stores in total.  
Prisma’s strengths, both in Finland and abroad, are good 
sites, reliability, permanently economical prices, diverse and 
broad selection, quality and efficiency. The ease of shopping is 
important for customers and Prisma sites offer, for instance, 
enough parking spaces. Customers’ changing needs are 
carefully analysed and the concept is remodelled accordingly 
and locally when needed. 
 
Why become international? 
Growth is the key for every business and S Group makes no 
exception in this matter. In Finland, S Group is a very strong 
market leader in the grocery trade and its key promise to 
customers is to provide them with the cheapest shopping basket. 
One of the most important ways of making customers’ shopping 
baskets cheaper is to increase volume in purchasing. But for S 
Group, as a market leader, the opportunities for growth are 
nowadays very limited in Finland, and because of that our 
purchasing power cannot grow much either. However, the 
international business helps S Group to execute this with much 
bigger volumes in purchasing. As a result, the international 
business supports S Group’s price competitiveness both in 
Finland and in neighbouring markets. 
Exposing its concepts to international and local competition 
in a new business environment helps S Group to develop them 
to be even more competitive. This adaptation to new markets 
has to be agile. S Group has a great opportunity to learn from 
this process and these experiences also affect its business in 
Finland by creating an evolving learning cycle.    
Operating in Russia and in the Baltic countries also gives S 
Group valuable information regarding Russian and Baltic 
consumers. They travel quite often to Finland and Russian 
customers are especially a very important and a rapidly growing 
customer group in Finland in general and for S Group as well. 
Their importance is particularly shown in S Group’s eastern 
regional cooperatives. Understanding foreign customers and 
their habits better helps S Group to serve them better.   
 
How do we do in the neighbouring markets? 
During the last five years S Group has grown quite fast 
internationally, especially in St. Petersburg. The business itself is 
doing very well, but for the time being the investments are made 
by SOK Corporation. In the future, the investments will be 
financed by cash flow. That is already the case in Estonia with 
the latest investments.  As a whole, the investments in the 
neighbouring markets are still less than 5% of S Group’s total 
investments.   
For SOK Corporation, international business is a bright spot. 
The retail sales in neighbouring markets will exceed EUR 500 
million this year and the business grows by tens of percentage 
points each year. 
S Group will continue its investments in these rapidly 
growing markets and strongly believes they also benefit its 
customers in Finland.  
 
 
 
Antti Sippola 
CEO (acting) 
SOK 
Finland
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Jyväskylä and the Union of the Baltic Cities 
By Markku Andersson 
Why is Jyväskylä, an inland city, a member of the Union of 
the Baltic Cities organisation? This is a question that is put to 
me from time to time. 
Jyväskylä is indeed an inland city, but it is located in the 
Lakeland area of Finland at the northern end of Päijänne, the 
country’s second largest lake. Partly for this reason 
Jyväskylä has become a major hub for research and 
expertise in environmental and energy technology. Know-
how connected to the waterways around Jyväskylä has been 
exported to China among other places. What is more, the 
Union of Baltic Cities deals with many other issues than 
those involving simply the Baltic Sea. 
Jyväskylä became a member of the Union of the Baltic 
Cities in 2006 and has enjoyed two terms on the Executive 
Board commencing in 2010. The Union of the Baltic Cities, or 
UBC for short, was founded in 1991 and currently has 101 
member cities. Where the organisation scores, in my opinion, 
is the broad scope of its membership, which embraces Saint 
Petersburg, with a population in the millions, as well as 
various other big cities and a number of small ones. 
The network of cities in the Baltic countries supports and 
strengthens Jyväskylä’s existing international contacts, which 
include our twin town, ICLEI - Local Governments for 
Sustainability, LUCI -Lighting Urban Community International 
and EUROTOWNS networks. The goal of such international 
networks is to reinforce economic, social, political and 
educational cooperation, to extend the comparison of best 
practices and to help us respond to common challenges. 
Furthermore, the goal is to apply for project funding from the 
European Union for necessary joint undertakings. Joint 
projects for their part promote the mobility and availability of 
quality labour, streamline the regional economy and underpin 
member cities’ development efforts. 
The joint activities of the countries in the Baltic Sea 
Region will serve to cement the region’s competitiveness as 
partnership between Russia and the European Union 
increases.  Jyväskylä Regional Development Company 
Jykes Limited has indeed had its own office in Saint 
Petersburg for twenty years now. 
The cities in the UBC are important partners for us in a 
variety of areas. We wish to compare best practices and 
apply in in the city's functions, in relation to such issues as 
the state of the environment, healthcare, education, culture 
and well-being, matters concerning young people, municipal 
construction, and the operating conditions for companies. 
For Jyväskylä, education, international collaboration 
between institutions of higher education and companies, as 
well as the international mobility and exchange of students 
and workers are vitally important entities and turning them 
into reality is something worth tackling in the forum offered by 
the UBC, too. 
National and international dialogue is essential for the 
development of our city. It provides us with great ideas, 
which we can also offer others, creating a true win-win 
situation. We are constantly seeking to improve the 
international visibility and reputation, appeal and 
competitiveness of our city. To achieve this we need solid, 
trustworthy partners. 
The current challenges faced by European cities are 
related to the economy, employment and the sustainability 
gap. Balancing and improving these issues is at the top of 
the agenda in many cities of the UBC, also in Jyväskylä. 
However, we cannot only concentrate on stabilizing the 
existing imbalance. We must also look to the future and 
create new innovations. For Jyväskylä, this means a 
resource-wise attitude. 
Resource wisdom is a concept devised to convey a more 
positive take on sustainability issues. There is no denying 
that energy, food, transport, water and waste are quite 
serious subjects, but a shift in attitudes and a more holistic 
approach to resources can open up new opportunities and 
innovations.  
The Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
has selected five themes for the Innovative Cities 
programme, which will be launched in 2014. Administered by 
the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation 
(Tekes), the programme will run from 2014 to 2020. In 
addition to funding from cities and the state, the programme 
will use financial support from the European Structural Fund 
Programmes to strengthen innovation hubs. 
The five main themes for the national programme are 
healthcare, bioeconomy, sustainable energy solutions, smart 
cities and industrial reform, and cyber security. Jyväskylä is 
responsible for the theme of cybersecurity. According to a 
recent view put forward by Jyväskylä-based companies 
operating in this branch, cyber security is an area of business 
that is currently experiencing powerful growth. Smart 
specialisation, genuine expertise in one’s own field, has been 
seen as the response to globalisation and ever-tightening 
international competition. For the cities of the Baltic Sea 
Region, this could well be a good platform for cooperation. 
It is crucial to recognize the role of the largest cities as 
the key drivers of growth and competitiveness and to 
highlight themes important for urban regions' growth and 
development. 
Within the framework of the UBC we must clearly try to 
establish how we can turn this international and Baltic 
cooperation into more jobs, better cities, a better climate, and 
a better environment. 
I sincerely hope that what I have outlined here provides 
an answer to the question posed at the beginning. 
 
 
 
Markku Andersson 
Mayor 
City of Jyväskylä 
Finland
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West Finland coast guard district – slimming down with help of synergies and 
technical applications  
By Jukka Savolainen 
The current fiscal/financial crisis in Europe shows the 
importance of agile and lean authorities for any national 
economy. Nowhere in Europe will the state authorities face 
lazy days with increasing budgets any more. The winners will 
slim down and look for synergies and technology 
advantages. In this respect, the Finnish arrangements in the 
field of maritime safety and security are worth noting.  
The last recession, in early 1990’s, paved the way to 
synergetic solutions amongst state maritime authorities in 
Finland. A principle was agreed to save money and effort: 
three administrations should maintain their major operational 
maritime capacities and be ready to represent all other 
authorities’ interests at sea. As a result, the other authorities 
could afford to reduce their directly sea-related investments 
and costs. The sustaining three maritime authorities were 
(main line of activity in brackets): 
 
 The Coast Guard, an integral part of the Border 
Guard (law enforcement, search and rescue), 
 The Navy (all military duties) 
 The Finnish Civil Maritime Administration (for 
example water ways, charts, vessel traffic services, 
competences, licenses). Later on, this 
administration was reorganized and its main 
functions are now performed by the Finnish 
Transport Agency and the Finnish Transport Safety 
Agency. 
These three services, each falling under separate 
ministries, then started actively cooperating. Joint bases 
were founded, common communication and surveillance 
technologies were built and surveillance data was shared. 
Instead of building networks of their own, all three merged 
their efforts and gained substantial savings and an increased 
effect. This work is being continued in the daily work and in 
development projects as well.  
Another field of inter-agency cooperation also concerns 
the Coast Guard. The Police, the Customs and the Border 
Guard (including its Coast Guard districts) have been given 
the jurisdiction to assist each other and even carry out each 
other’s functions whenever this increases the promptness or 
economy of activity.  
Based on these two co-operational arrangements, the 
Coast Guard is the civil law enforcement body posing the 
major capacity to monitor and react to incidents at sea. The 
sphere of responsibility covers such duties as immigration 
controls and related surveillance of all vessel movements, 
maritime search and rescue, as well as the detection and 
sanctioning of ship-borne pollution. In addition to these main 
duties, the Coast Guard performs various functions whose 
major owner is another authority. Such duties are, inter alia, 
fisheries control, surveillance of the integrity and sovereignty 
of the state area, maritime police duties and customs control. 
The operational capacity consists of a fleet of offshore patrol 
crafts, patrol boats, helicopters and fixed wing aircrafts. In 
addition, a chain of radars and cameras is constantly 
monitoring vessel movements. The daily work is being 
carried out hand in hand with the fellow organizations with 
shared technologies and common interests. Furthermore, 
any authority not possessing maritime capacities may ask for 
and will be granted assistance by the Coast Guard. Thus, 
they can either request the Coast Guard patrols to take 
action on their behalf, or they may come onboard and join 
the patrols.  
The West Finland Coast Guard District, an integral part of 
the Finnish Border Guard, is responsible for patrolling a 
significant part of the Baltic Sea. Its area of responsibility 
covers the entire western part of Finland, including the Gulf 
of Bothnia, the Åland Islands and the Sea of Archipelago. In 
this area the boundary of Finnish territorial waters is 1074 
kilometers long which reflects the dimensions of the maritime 
and adjacent coastal areas to be monitored.  
Internally, the West Finland Coast Guard District is 
amidst a significant transformation process. The current 
number of personnel is 350 and it will be reduced to 267 by 
2017. The reduction takes advantage of modern 
communication technologies that allow two major savings in 
comparison to earlier.  Firstly, it is nowadays possible to 
supervise all the surveillance sensors of the vast sea area at 
one single point. Secondly, all 15-20 active Coast Guard 
units can be controlled, in spite of the long geographical 
distances, by one tactical commander. There is no need to 
hold several officers in 24/7 readiness any more to command 
or carry out routine radar surveillance as was performed in 
the earlier years. In line with that development, a reduction of 
managers and field workers has become possible.  
In order to slim down the organization, the West Finland 
Coast Guard District now performs both functions mentioned 
above - real time surveillance and tactical command - side by 
side in the same district command centre.  In that very 
centre, there is one more significant feature present. The 
Coast Guard and the Customs have established a joint unit 
performing criminal intelligence and analysis. This is utilized 
in an inter-agency interest: whenever need be, a thorough 
control by field patrols is arranged, often as a joint operation 
between the Customs and the Coast Guard. 
Currently, a Coast Guard command centre forms a hub 
that consists of three important elements: intelligence 
information, real time surveillance data and the authority to 
command and control. This has facilitated the necessary cuts 
in the number of our personnel. Future will show that we will 
have improved our outputs, even under diminishing funding. 
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Maritime traffic at the threshold of the new customs regime 
By Jarkko Saksa  
As known sea transport is essential to Finland´s foreign 
trade. Nearly 83% of tons is transported in vessels (export 
88%, import 79%). The correspondent percent in value is 
81.Route Finland as transit route to Russia was blooming for 
a long period, but started to decline some five years ago. 
Transit to Russia is mainly using the sea route to Finnish 
ports and then continuing with trucks across the border. At its 
best the transit route via Finland´s share of all Russia´s 
import from the EU was more than 20%.  
The transport chain, including customs procedures, 
should be as seamless and cost effective as possible to meet 
the competitiveness demands of today´s economic 
challenge. Roughly half of the import and export originates 
from the EU. Although intra community traffic is free of 
customs clearance based on the principle of free movement 
of goods, in sea transport between EU ports customs 
formalities are still in place, unless there is a certificate for 
regular shipping issued by Customs. The ratio lies in the 
need to ensure that all goods that need to be declared are 
declared and that customs control on supply chain is 
possible.  
Customs rules and demands and especially the way they 
are managed by all the parties involved in the transport chain 
form one part of the competitiveness of the delivery chain. 
EU has a very ambitious plan to modernize customs 
procedures gradually in the period already started and 
ending by the end of year 2020. First steps have already 
been taken. The legal text, the Union Customs Code has 
been approved by the Council and the Parliament. According 
to the Union Customs Code no customs clearance is needed 
for union goods transported from one EU port to another. 
This simplifies the customs procedures in the maritime 
environment.  
Lot of work is still ahead. The most significant part, 
articles of delegated and implementing acts, that practically 
constitute the customs procedures, each parties´ obligations 
and the basis for interoperable IT environment, are still to be 
drafted, understood, negotiated and decided. When starting 
the planning of the modernized customs code some 10 or 
more years ago, the main drivers were simplification and 
electronic services. Since then a lot in the environment of the 
world trade has changed. After 9/11, safety and security 
concerns have risen significantly and come to the very center 
of the customs work worldwide. Tackling new threats has 
meant new procedures had to be put in place with an extra 
price tag for all parties involved. At the starting point of 
planning the new customs legislation calculations were 
presented showing the growth in export for the whole EU as 
a consequence of cheaper and smoother processes. The 
calculation was part of the “evidence” justifying the 
investment with very rapid and high rate of return. The 
investment can be estimated to exceed one billion euros 
counting together economic operators´ and customs´ shares.  
Are we still on the right track? Do we have a crystal ball 
for right way to 2020s and beyond? Can EU with 28 member 
states reach the goal and meet the targets in a cost effective 
way? Isn´t there a danger that the EU develops something 
not quick and fit enough to compete in the global market? 
There is yet no answer to all that. It remains to be seen. 
All efforts in national customs administrations and in DG 
TAXUD are focusing on achieving the goal. In 2020 we 
should have a compatible, well-functioning IT customs 
environment serving for the facilitation as well as control 
purposes to ensure EUs competence on the world market 
and a good level of safety and security of Europe and its 
citizens.  
In Finland we are proud to have a good cooperation 
among authorities and companies operating in the area of 
sea traffic. We have already more than 10 years ago built up 
jointly a single window system to maritime transport called 
PORTNET. It already fulfills the requirements set up in the 
Ship Reporting Formalities Directive 2010/65/EU, which has 
to be implemented in each member state by 1.6.2015.  
As described, legal framework in the customs area is 
changing. There are various drivers in other policy areas 
outside customs area, such as the blue belt initiative, 
effecting the development in sea transport. It will be 
challenging to combine various demands together. The 
widely accepted goal is to reduce the administrative burden 
and build up a single window solution. The real challenge is 
how to do it. The closer we are to deadlines, the more 
evident it becomes that the key factor to success is good 
collaboration between authorities and economic operators 
nationally and inside the EU. The focus of the work and 
impact to cost and functioning of the system is development 
of data contents, ways of managing information and 
information flows and harmonization of the interface between 
economic operator and Customs EU wide. The more 
different data contents and interfaces there are the more 
cumbersome and costly it gets to the companies operating in 
different members states.  
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Finnish harbours in Russia's transit traffic 
By Juha Mutru 
The economy of Northwest Russia has grown significantly in 
recent decades and this trend will gain strength in the future, 
spurred by Russia's membership in the World Trade 
Organisation. In spite of the considerable growth of the 
harbour of Ust-Luga, Russia will continue to need the transit 
routes of the Baltic Sea in the future as well. Finland also 
needs Russia's transit traffic. 
The Finnish route works efficiently, which is attributable to 
a number of factors. The harbours have powerful expertise. 
Finnish industry and commerce have plenty of experience in 
trade with Russia. The available services linked with foreign 
trade are of high quality.  The infrastructure and the 
developed information systems support efficient international 
trade. 
Special strengths of the Finnish route also include 
stability and transparency. A comparative study by 
Transparency International in 2012 found that Finland ties 
with Denmark, as the least corrupt country in the world. The 
activities of Finnish officials, Finland’s system of justice, and 
the workings of Finnish society are extensively trusted owing 
to their predictability, and to the stability of the regulations on 
which they are based. The Finnish state has a AAA 
economic rating, putting it among the most economically 
stable in the world. 
In a comparison made by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) Finland was ranked as the third-most competitive 
country in the world in 2013.  This comparison speaks of 
Finland's long-term structural competitiveness, and of the 
good operating environment that companies have in Finland. 
In the most recent years Finnish competitiveness has been 
weaker. Russian transit traffic via Finland declined 
considerably at the end of 2008 and has not significantly 
risen since then. Finnish harbours today have plenty of 
unused capacity for transit activity. In other words, a "buyers' 
market" now prevails. 
In Finland transit traffic is powerfully focused on certain 
harbours. The greatest amount of transit goods pass through 
the ports of HaminaKotka and Kokkola. Transit traffic has 
traditionally been a key line of business for the Port of Hanko 
as well. A certain amount of transit traffic also passes 
through the harbours of Helsinki and Turku. The greatest 
amount of transit tonnage moves from east to west: ores, 
concentrates, chemicals and fertilisers. Transport from west 
to east largely involves parcelled goods in containers. In 
addition, metals and metal products go east. 
Eastbound container traffic (for instance, consumer 
goods en route to St. Petersburg) is linked in an interesting 
way to the competitiveness of Finland's forest industry. 
Empty containers are taken from St. Petersburg and sent 
back to the Port of HaminaKotka, where the containers are 
filled with products of the wood processing industry, which 
then move southward. This equilibrium in the flow of 
containers is a significant factor in the competitiveness of 
Finland's forest industry. 
Environmental regulations, which are constantly 
becoming stricter, pose a threat to the future of Finland's 
transit route. Pending environmental regulations include 
restrictions on sulphur and nitrogen emissions, as well as 
requirements for ships' energy efficiency, EU plans for trade 
in carbon dioxide emissions, washing waters for ships' holds, 
ballast waters, etc. These environmental standards threaten 
the competitiveness of the entire Baltic Sea route, and in 
many scenarios could even add to emissions if cargoes 
move away from maritime traffic to other forms of transport. 
The fact is that shipping is the cleanest of all forms of 
transport in terms of emissions per tonne of cargo. For the 
future it is important for the EU and Finland not to lose 
competitiveness for the sake of environmental protection. In 
the long term it might be said that better protection of the 
Baltic Sea environment than that which is in force of other 
seas could give transport passing through the Baltic a green 
competitive advantage. 
Both the EU and Finland currently have maritime and 
harbour policy projects pending aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of maritime transport. It is very important 
that the projects in question should achieve their goals. In 
Finland, especially the development or elimination of the 
shipping route fee would give a significant boost to transit 
traffic. Labour market organisations, for their part, also share 
responsibility for improving competitiveness. The Finnish 
Port Operators Association sees the reduction of 
disturbances to industrial peace to be a key challenge on the 
labour market.  Even one illegal industrial action is one too 
many. In addition, the working hours at harbours need to be 
made more flexible so that the service becomes available 
whenever there is demand for it.  
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A new matrix for Russia’s shipbuilding industry? Civilian-military and public-
private partnerships 
By Katri Pynnöniemi 
In late August 2013, President Vladimir Putin gave his 
approval for the rebuilding of a “super-shipyard” in the 
Russian Far East by 2018. The shipyard will be based at the 
same site as the existing Zvezda shipyard in Bolshoi Kamen, 
a state-owned enterprise established in 1946 and specialised 
in renovating and dismantling nuclear submarines. The 
Zvezda project exemplifies the challenges Russia’s 
shipbuilding industry faces in fulfilling both military and 
civilian production targets. But it also shows that Russia is 
willing to renegotiate the border between the military and 
civilian spheres in order to achieve results. 
 
Identification of problems 
Discussions about the super-shipyard surfaced in the 
Russian media after President Putin criticised the Russian 
military’s build-up programme, especially when it comes to 
shipbuilding. In a meeting held in late July, Putin listed a 
number of problems that have caused delays and budgetary 
excesses in the Russian Navy’s orders for new ships and 
submarines. At the heart of the problem is the 
dysfunctionality of the subcontracting network, which in turn 
is due to the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises – 
although this last point was not openly admitted in the 
discussions led by Putin. The deputy prime minister, Dmitry 
Rogozin, who is responsible for the coordination of both 
civilian and military shipbuilding, has adopted a two-pronged 
strategy in response to the criticism.  
First, back in spring 2013, Rogozin commissioned the 
planning of a new military procurement programme with a 
2025 timeframe. This will focus attention on future challenges 
and possibilities, and deflect it away from the problems 
related to the current programme, due in 2020. Secondly, 
Rogozin has indicated factors that have led to the present 
problems. Top of the list is the former minister of defence, 
Anatoly Serdyukov, under whose term the “governance of 
the procurement programme practically ceased to exist”, as 
Rogozin put it. The executives of Russia’s defence industry, 
in turn, are to blame for the rising prices and the low quality 
of their products. Rogozin has stated that the corruption and 
negligence of the executives amounts to treason. 
Rogozin’s criticism is targeted specifically at the United 
Shipbuilding Corporation (OSK), a wholly state-owned 
corporation established in 2007 by a presidential order. It 
currently controls 22 shipyards and nine research institutes in 
Russia. In the new strategy for OSK it is suggested that the 
Corporation will be restructured along functional rather than 
territorial principles. It is perfectly possible that plans have 
been underway to split up OSK for quite some time, and the 
criticism expressed by Putin has served to kick-start this 
process into action. However, if that is the case, the change 
does not appear to be very well coordinated. 
 
The restructuring of the shipbuilding industry is 
underway 
In late September, the Russian government’s maritime 
collegium (morskaya kollegiya), led by Deputy Prime Minister 
Rogozin, was granted new powers over federal and regional 
authorities to monitor the implementation of the federal target 
programmes for civilian shipbuilding and marine technology. 
Given Rogozin’s role as the head of the government 
commission on military procurement, this move seems quite 
logical. Yet, in keeping with media reports, it was the head of 
Rosneft, Igor Sechin, who suggested that control over the 
reconstruction of the Far East super-shipyard should be 
placed under a private consortium.  
The decision made in August 2013 means that Russia’s 
major oil company, Rosneft, is set to replace OSK as the 
company in charge of the project. Rosneft, together with 
Gazprombank and Sovcomflot, will set up a consortium that 
will assume control not just over Zvezda, but over all military 
and civilian shipyards in the Russian Far East. This situation 
leaves it unclear as to who is actually in control of the 
undertaking – state-owned companies that order the ships 
and finance them in large part, or the federal commissions 
that are supposed to coordinate the state actions in this 
sphere. Some observations on the situation can 
consequently be made. 
 
Observations rather than conclusions 
First, the debate about the super-shipyard has illuminated a 
fundamental difference of opinion over the development of 
Russia’s shipbuilding industry. Russia’s Ministry of Industry 
and Trade holds the view that decisions about shipyards 
should be made only once the prospects for Arctic energy 
projects have been confirmed. Rogozin and Economic 
Presidential Assistant Andrey Belousov, on the other hand, 
think that the shipyards must be developed swiftly in order to 
maintain the potential to build new ships in domestic 
shipyards.  
Second, participants in this debate are unanimous about 
the need for state support for Russian shipyards in the face 
of international competition. The role of foreign partners is 
acknowledged as important, yet it is made clear that they are 
expected to transfer technology and know-how in a way that 
helps Russia to rebuild its own capabilities. In the meantime, 
one option is that the supertankers will continue to be built in 
Korea, while the Zvezda shipyard will do subcontract work for 
the Koreans.  
Lastly, estimations of investments required for the 
construction of the super-shipyard are either superficial or 
completely absent from the debate. Only after the principal 
decision was made in late August was it  reported that the 
reconstruction of the shipyard is estimated to cost 111 billion 
roubles. In connection with the discussion on the new OSK 
strategy, it was announced that the total investments up to 
2030 would amount to 1 trillion roubles, of which 20 per cent 
would be covered by the state budget. What these figures tell 
us is that the modernization of Russia’s shipbuilding industry, 
and the fulfillment of the ambitious military procurement and 
civilian shipbuilding targets, poses a serious challenge for 
Russia.  
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Eurozone's model student Finland fell into a debt trap 
By Veijo Hyvönen 
Finland is known as the eurozone's model student in 
following the EU regulation for example in public debt. Now 
Finland is facing a serious debt problem of it's own. 
The financial and the euro crisis and the ongoing 
restructuring of industry have had a serious impact on 
Finland's economy. A record growth in public debt is based 
on lower tax income and increasing public costs. 
Finland's public dept grew ten billion euros in 2012 and 
exceeded one hundred billion euros for the first time in 
history. The Ministry of Finance expects that in 2014 
Finland's public debt is going to exceed 60 percent of gross 
national product, and so violates the EMU criteria. In 2015 
the public debt is estimated to be 62 percent. 
Public consumption is 57 percent of the national product, 
which is a relatively high number among European Union 
countries. It is expected to stay permanently higher than 
before the financial crisis. The current problem is how the 
growth of debt effects on Finland's credit rating. As an AAA 
country Finland gets loans at a very reasonable price. In a 
hundred billion euro loan a percentage point growth in 
interest rate means one billion euro increase in yearly costs. 
 Although Finland has a serious debt problem, the 
amount of the debt is not intolerable for now. The latest 
Eurostat's statistics show that Finland's public debt was 55 
percent of the gross national product in the end of March. 
Only three euro countries – Estonia, Luxemburg and 
Slovenia – had a smaller debt ratio. 
The other AAA countries had clearly bigger debt ratios: 
Germany 81, Austria 74 and Holland 72 percent. Eurozone's 
debt ratio was 92 and EU's 86 percent. 
The major credit rating agencies do not focus on the debt 
ratio or EMU criteria, but mainly on long term development of 
public debt. The government of Finland decided in the end of 
August on structural reforms and cost reductions. It was a 
beginning of a reform, which the credit rating agencies have 
been expected. 
German banking company Commerzbank predicted in 
August that only Finland and Germany will maintain their 
AAA status. It is generally believed that Finland maintains the 
best credit rating at least for 18–24 months. 
Finland gets loans at record low interest rates. In the 
eurozone only Germany gets cheaper loans. The cost of 
borrowing for Finland is now in its lowest in twenty years, 
although the amount of debt is record high. 
Finland has also a very good status in net debt 
comparison. Finland's public net dept was -51 percent of the 
gross national product in 2012. It means that Finland has 99 
billion euro more outstanding claims than debt. 
In Finland the labour pension paid by employers and 
employees go to pension funds. Government doesn't use the 
surplus of the pension funds to the general spending, so the 
capital on the funds grow. There is over 200 billion euros in 
the public and private pension funds. 
Finland's public net debt ratio is the best in EU. In 
Sweden the ratio is -18, in Estonia 3 and in Denmark 8 
precent. Norway, with all the oil money, has an outstanding 
net debt ratio of -166 percent. 
 Growth rate is the most worrying thing about Finnish 
public dept. The debt ratio has increased six percentage 
points in one year. Only in Slovenia, Slovakia and PIIGS 
countries has the growth been faster. 
The biggest challenge for Finland is the long term 
sustainability gap in public economy. The credit rating 
agency Fitch has estimated that if Finland won't do structural 
reforms, the public debt ratio will be 90 percent in 2030 and 
260 percent in 2060. 
It is not possible to finance public deficits by ingreasing 
debt in the long run. The effects would be too severe to the 
future generations. 
The cost of borrowing will increase when the interest 
rates come back to normal levels. The more Finland loans 
from others, the bigger the cost of borrowing is. If the credit 
rating drops, the interest rate goes further up. 
Finland can't finance deficits with the pension fund money, 
because in the future the pension funds start to diminish, as 
more and more people retire. 
European Comission has paid attention to Finland's 
structural problems and emhasizes measures that prolong 
careers. These include raising the age of retirement and 
decreasing youth and long term unemployment. 
Finnish government has decided on reforms that will 
increase taxes and decrease public costs by 21 billion euros 
in 2013–2017. 
Vice-president Olli Rehn from the European Comission 
considers these reforms to be a good start. He reminds that 
the Finnish government can't decide on its own on important 
reforms as age of retirement, labour markets and 
communities' economic efficiency. 
 The rapid growth of Finland's public dept is a matter of 
consern for the European Comission. It can damage 
Finland's reputation as a reliable country. It is also a bit 
embarrasing, because Finland has demanded strict discipline 
from the southern countries of Europe. 
International media has not been interested in Finland's 
public debt. In Finland it is an important topic, but in the rest 
of the world it is hardly noticed. 
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Latvia and euro – a window of opportunity  
By Jānis Ikstens 
On the eve of EU accession referendum in September 2003, 
Prime Minister Einārs Repše delivered a live TV address to 
the nation urging people to vote in favour of Latvia’s EU 
membership to strengthen the country’s security and to foster 
its economic development. The two considerations were 
clearly behind a solid majority of two thirds voting in favour of 
the accession the next day. Yet, many accompanying 
obligations escaped the public eye and replacing the national 
currency with euro appears to have been one of those. 
The Bank of Latvia (BoL) that had pegged Lats to euro in 
January 2005 despite limited public discontent, was keen on 
early transition. However, the post-accession economic 
boom fuelled by massive inflow of capital and inexpensive 
loans and facilitated by reckless government policies 
triggered notable inflation effectively barring Latvia from 
Eurozone. This did not preclude BoL from setting Eurozone 
membership as a major political goal at the height of the 
boom.  
The 2008 financial crisis and the resultant economic 
collapse in Latvia paradoxically presented the country with a 
chance to introduce euro. Under the premiership of Valdis 
Dombrovskis, Latvia chose internal devaluation accompanied 
by an international rescue loan as a way to economic 
recovery. A series of spending cuts and tax increases were 
introduced. Labour costs plummeted and prices shrunk to 
boost competitiveness of Latvian exports. Yet, a change in 
foreign trade balance came at a high social cost – 
unemployment stabilized in double-digit area and emigration 
of economically active persons from the already ageing 
country intensified. 
As the economic recovery in EU turned out to be slow 
and was further burdened by earlier policies of various 
Eurozone countries, technocrats of BoL seized an 
opportunity for Latvia’s accession to the common currency: 
the inflation rate was contained by internal devaluation; the 
bailout loan was issued on condition of keeping a small 
budget deficit; the government debt remained within margins 
set by convergence criteria; long-term interest rates on 
Eurozone bonds rose in reaction to default risks in several 
countries mathematically helping Latvia meet the remaining 
convergence criterion. The government steered by two 
former bank analysts enthusiastically supported BoL’s 
position and even lowered VAT rate to keep inflation at bay 
in mid-2012.  
The clever plan had only one weakness – a lack of public 
support. Although officials made nearly bi-monthly pledges to 
cut through scepticism about euro and achieve a 50% public 
support to Latvia’s accession to euro, that target was never 
met. Low popular support to accession to euro was also 
noted by the European Central Bank.  
A major source of scepticism towards euro stemmed from 
the uncertainty surrounding the common currency after 
several Eurozone countries had to accept a bailout and some 
other were on the verge of this move. Moreover, Latvians 
that were recovering from an economic collapse had 
legitimate concerns about the cost of rescue to wealthier 
Eurozone countries, debts of which had been partly written 
off. Further, Latvian Lats is at times called part of national 
identity, and adoption of euro in a EUroskeptic country would 
symbolize a further delegation of powers to Brussels. A 
group of economists and entrepreneurs asserted that giving 
up national currency would strip Latvia of any instruments of 
economic policy. Some constitutional lawyers including the 
Head of Constitutional Court pointed out that circumstances 
of EU membership had changed since 2004 and a 
referendum on euro accession could be appropriate. 
To win public support, BoL chose to focus on practical 
advantages of euro such as ease of travel within the 
Eurozone, elimination of bank fees for currency exchange, 
and absence of currency risks for persons who had taken 
loans in euro. In addition, BoL argued that Eurozone 
membership would save hundreds of millions in servicing 
government debt as Latvia’s credit ratings would improve 
after accession. Estonian experience was often cited to 
illustrate the expected influx of foreign investment. Yet, BoL 
was evasive on financial consequences of Latvia’s obligation 
to assist other members of Eurozone and was rather nervous 
in live public discussions about the currency union.  
These factors set stage for calls to hold a referendum on 
joining the Eurozone echoed by political opposition. PM 
Dombrovskis dismissed the popular vote option as 
unnecessary in view of the 2003 EU accession referendum. 
Subsequently, Harmony Centre, the largest opposition party, 
withdrew its objections after backstage negotiations with the 
Prime Minister’s party. The Central Election Commission, in 
turn, rejected a referendum petition by an anti-euro NGO on 
the grounds of anti-constitutionality and, thus, removed last 
obstacles to Latvia becoming the 18
th
 member of Eurozone.  
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Regulatory exemption for the Finnish–Baltic gas markets – the impact of an LNG 
terminal 
By Kim Talus  
The Finnish – Baltic gas markets are currently not 
competitive, not integrated and, finally, not connected to any 
other markets. They constitute what is called an “energy 
island” in the EU energy parlance. An energy island can be 
subject to a special regulatory regime under Article 49 of the 
current gas market directive. Where an EU Member State is 
not directly connected to the interconnected system of any 
other Member State and has only one main external supplier 
(meaning that one supplier has more than 75 per cent of the 
market), it may derogate from certain requirements of the 
gas market directive, including the unbundling requirements, 
the market opening requirement, and the authorization 
procedure for new gas facilities. The conditions for the 
derogation for an isolated market cease to exist if one of the 
above conditions is eliminated. Finland and the Baltic 
markets (hereinafter the “Region”) are examples of isolated 
markets and receive their gas supplies from Russia.  
Article 49 continues that: “Articles 4, 9, 37 and/or 38 shall 
not apply to Estonia, Latvia and/or Finland until any of those 
Member States is directly connected to the interconnected 
system of any Member State other than Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Finland.” 
This paper will examine the exemption and the impact of 
an LNG terminal in the Region to the continuing applicability 
of the exemption. The exemption for a State in this Region 
can expire in various situations. First, a State connects to the 
interconnected system of another EU Member State (except 
to the other Member States in the Region). Second, a State 
connects to a new gas source through a pipeline (Finland to 
Norway, for example) or an LNG terminal with sufficient 
capacity to supply more than 25 % of the national market. A 
third option is that internal connections within this Region are 
created and one of the States then proceeds with option one 
or two, though in option two, there are other factors to 
consider. These will be discussed below. Of course, there is 
also the fourth option that a country voluntarily (most likely 
for political rather than economic reasons) voluntarily decides 
to cease the application of the exemption regime, as took 
place in Estonia. This last option will not be discussed here 
as it is not connected to the regulatory regime, nor should not 
have an impact on the other States and markets in the 
Region.  
Baltic natural gas markets are connected to each other. 
While Finland is currently not connected to the Baltic natural 
gas markets, there are plans for this connection to take place 
in the future, through the Balticconnector project. If we 
assume that this connection will take place, we are in the 
situation where the above options one, two and three are all 
possible. Given that the connection to the new source 
through a pipeline is somewhat unlikely scenario in the short- 
and mid-term, a possible LNG terminal or a connection to 
Poland becomes the most likely projects that can end the 
applicability of the exemption. The connection to Poland is a 
relatively straight forward option: the exemption regime is 
clear about the connection, it does not contain capacity 
thresholds and, as such, any connection should be sufficient. 
In other words, if the Baltic States are all interconnected and 
if Finland connects to Estonia, a connection between 
Lithuania and Poland will end the application of the 
exemption. Compared to this, the LNG option is more 
complicated. It requires a comparison between the 
regasification capacity of the LNG terminal and the total 
volumes in the relevant geographical market.  
For a Member State in the Region with its own LNG 
terminal, the impact of an LNG terminal depends on the 
regasification capacity compared the size of the national 
market. Where the LNG terminal reduces the market position 
of the main supplier below 75%, the LNG terminal will end 
the applicability of the exemption regime. The situation is 
more complicated if the Region is interconnected and an 
LNG terminal is constructed to the territory of another State. 
In this situation it is necessary to consider the capacity of 
both the LNG terminal and the interconnections between 
States. An LNG terminal that has sufficient regasification 
capacity to cease the applicability of the exemption in the 
Member State where it was constructed, does not 
necessarily have that impact in the other States that are 
connected to that Member State, as Article 49 seems to refer 
to connections to ”interconnected system of any other 
Member State”, not connections to international LNG 
markets. Only if the capacity of the LNG terminal and the 
relevant interconnection are both significant enough to allow 
for alternative supplies constituting more than 25% of the 
total supplies to the Member State market, will the exemption 
cease to apply. In other words and concretely, if an LNG 
terminal is constructed to Estonia, the impact on the Finish 
markets depend on the capacity of both the LNG terminal 
and the interconnector between Finland and Estonia. Only if 
the market share of Gazprom supplies in Finland is reduced 
to less than 75%, will the exemption regime cease to apply.  
As has been examined in this short paper, the impact of 
an LNG terminal to the regulatory treatment of the Finish-
Baltic gas markets is not easy or straight forward. In addition 
to the questions raised here, there are others. Clearly, when 
dealing with EU energy regulation, the “devil lies in the 
details”. 
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The global gas revolution – why European shale might not matter 
By Joseph Dutton 
When I wrote an article on the ‘shale gale’ for BRE in 2010 
Europe was abuzz with anticipation about indigenous 
development, with the US shale sector held up as a blueprint 
for a route to energy independence and breaking Russia’s 
grip on European gas supplies. Despite the sweeping 
optimism from governments, analysts and operators alike, a 
single molecule of shale has yet to be commercially 
produced in Europe. While some have been at pains to 
stress direct comparisons with the US are not possible and 
European production is unlikely before 2020, the slow pace 
of development has frustrated the gas industry and shale 
proponents in governments. Indifferent drilling results, supply 
chain constraints and public opposition have all contributed 
to limited development. Poland and the UK are countries 
leading shale development in Europe, yet they are both a 
long way behind where optimists forecast them to be. Poland 
is the most developed in Europe, with 40 test wells drilled so 
far and the first producing shale gas well (drilled by San 
Leon); however, at production of only 8,000cu.m/day 
commercialisation is some way off. Although Poland still has 
a number of both independent operators and larger IOCs 
active in the shale sector, since 2012 Chevron, Talisman 
Energy and Marathon have all ceased operations. In the UK 
one shale gas well has been fracked, but operations were 
suspended after seismic activity occurred at the well site. 
Other sites have been met with protests, while in October 
2013 sector leader Cuadrilla Resources announced it was 
abandoning one of its primary well sites. 
Though European shale gas has of course not impacted 
gas markets in the way some forecast, US shale has had 
profound impacts across the continent. Though the impacts 
are in-direct in their nature, since the early to mid-2000s and 
the boom in US shale gas production, previously unforeseen 
structural changes to supply, demand, and pricing in Europe 
have occurred. 
The growth in shale gas production (from 0.39tcf in 2005 
to 5tcf by 2010) displaced LNG destined for the US, with the 
country previously forecast to have a 23% global LNG 
market share by 2010. A combination of this and a large 
volume of liquefaction capacity coming online (mainly in 
Qatar) led to an oversupply of LNG in the Atlantic Basin. US-
bound cargoes were redelivered to European and Asian 
markets, with US LNG import terminals substantially under-
utilised. Reflecting the shift in supply patterns, LNG spot 
sales grew from 10% of the global LNG market share in 2004 
to 25% in 2011.  
The loss of the US LNG market and redelivery of cargoes 
to Europe with associated growth in the LNG spot-market, 
placed pressure on the existing European gas pricing 
mechanisms. The increase of gas-to-gas priced imports and 
spot market gas entering European markets as LNG 
challenged the oil-indexation system of gas pricing - the 
mainstay of contracted Russian pipeline gas in Central and 
Eastern European. Gazprom’s European gas market share 
fell from 47% in 2003 to 34% in 2011 as a result of reduced 
gas demand and increased flexibility in gas supply. Over this 
period both Statoil and Qatar increased their market shares 
with predominantly spot or short-medium term sales.  
However the glut in LNG supply did not remain, with 
strong gas demand in Asia due to continuing Chinese 
economic growth and Japan’s shift to natural gas in the wake 
of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. In a short time 
period the LNG glut was replaced by a tightening of 
marketplace with greater demand in the higher-priced Asian 
market squeezing both gas supply and prices in Europe. 
US shale forced down the Henry Hub gas price from 
$12.69 in June 2008 to $1.82 in April 2012, resulting in the 
power generation sector shifting away from coal to cheaper 
gas supplies; consequently, high volumes of coal were 
exported to Europe, with the region’s US coal  imports in 
2012 29% higher than in 2011. Compounded by LNG sales 
to the higher-priced Asian market hubs, the high relative cost 
of gas in Europe compared to coal imports has seen the 
power sector make the opposite switch to the US - going 
from gas to coal. This switch underlies the perceived current 
poor market conditions for natural gas in Europe, with many 
a number of power generators delaying investment in new 
gas power plants or mothballing existing facilities.  
Shale-fed LNG exports from the US to Europe (expected 
from 2016) and new production from large fields in East 
Africa and Australia in the coming decade will greatly add 
liquidity to global gas markets and may reverse the current 
market tightness. As a result the future of oil-indexed gas in 
Europe is uncertain, with gas-to-gas priced LNG and hub-
based trading in Europe likely to increase. But in this future 
scenario the development of European shale is still very 
uncertain. US shale has fundamentally altered global gas 
markets, but these changes may well limit both the scale and 
necessity of any European shale production.  
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Oil refining in Russia – time for a change 
By Mikhail I. Levinbuk and Dmitry Yu. Murzin 
The Russian oil and gas sector will undergo a number of 
changes in the coming years. These changes are partly 
influenced by the shale gas revolution, general trends in 
global oil refining as well as some other reasons related to 
changes in the Russian federal law.  
The general trends in oil refining are related to processing 
of heavy oils and bitumen, increase of the refined amount of 
oil globally with a simultaneous decrease of the overall 
number of plants thus increasing the average capacity of an 
oil refining plant.  
Processing of heavy bitumen in USA and Canada along 
with utilization of shale gas will have an impact on export of 
oil to those countries from Middle East and eventually can 
decrease the price of oil.  
Among another trend we should mention a large increase 
of diesel cars in Europe, which should be reflected in the 
ratio between gasoline and diesel needed in Europe.  
These changes will have their impact on the Russian 
economy, which is based very much on exporting natural 
resources, such as gas and oil, giving 65% of all exported 
from Russia goods. One of the particular products related to 
oil refining, which is very profitable for Russian refineries to 
export is heavy, low quality fuel oil (called mazut in Russian). 
The taxation policy of the Russian government forced export 
mazut rather than high margin products of oil refining and 
petrochemistry due to differences in prices within Russia and 
in the international market. As the result masut is exported to 
Central, Eastern and Northern Europe where it is further 
processed. In addition it should be mentioned that almost 
70% of the oil and oil related products export from Russia is 
just low margin crude oil, which did not undergo any 
processing.  
Currently, Russia has 22 large refineries with the 
throughput exceeding 4 million t/year and 8 medium 
refineries with the annual capacity of 1 to 4 million tons and 
over 200 small refineries with the capacity significantly lower 
than one million t/year. The latter ones process ca. 5% of all 
oil.  
The plants are running with lower than name-plate 
capacity producing ca. 50% of more light products (15% of 
that in gasoline range) and ca. 27% of masut, while in the 
Western countries more light products constitute 75% and 
amounts of masut are just 5% in the USA and 12% in 
Europe.  
New limits set few years ago on the quality of fuels 
consumed in Russia and deadlines for the transfer to higher 
standards of fuel quality produced in Russia forced oil 
refineries to start modifications.  
In addition new export duties for heavy petroleum 
products (66% of the crude export tax in effect from October 
2011 and 100% starting from 2015) will also force refinery 
modernization. 
Such modernization would require a higher degree of 
processing calling for wider utilization of such processes as 
catalytic cracking and hydrocracking.   
Fluid catalytic cracking is one of the most important 
conversion processes used in petroleum refining and is 
applied to convert high-boiling, high-molecular weight 
hydrocarbon fractions to more valuable gasoline. 
Hydrocracking being also a catalytic process converts 
gas oil into distillate and jet fuel in the presence of hydrogen.  
Currently among the large Russian oil refineries only 13 
have catalytic cracking (only 8 of them are modern) and just 
5 have hydrocracking units.  
Such modernization is coming at a certain cost, which in 
fact is rather significant. Thus refinery modification with the 
aim to focus on gasoline would require investments at a level 
of approximately $4.3 bln. Such investments can lead to 
profitable outcome only for large refineries with the capacity 
exceeding 10 million t/year. 
Obviously smaller refineries with the capacity less than 
500 thousand t/year would not be able to compete with large 
ones without substantially increasing their capacity and will 
eventually have to shut down not being able to comply with 
stringent regulations and requirements related to higher 
product quality.  
Modification of all small refineries with their capacity 
increase to a minimum efficient one will result in twofold 
increase of oil refining output in Russia which is unrealistic. 
As a consequence small refineries will cease to exist unless 
they are able to increase their annual capacity to at least one 
million tons. The degree of oil conversion should be ca. 70%.  
Since small refineries contribute to ca. 11 millions of 
processed oil per year (ca. 5%) if any void is going to happen 
because of mini-refineries closure, it will be easily filled by 
big players in oil refining.  
Situation with medium-sized oil refineries (1-4 million t/a) 
is not that straightforward. Due to the fact that they contribute 
to ca. 10-15% of the total refining capacity and the 
geographical distribution of them, closing down some of such 
refineries can strongly influence the regional markets in 
Russia and could even affect the Russian market for 
petroleum products.  
Preliminary estimates for 2015 when new custom duty for 
heavy petroleum products is going to be introduced, indicate 
that a minimum annual processing capacity of a profitable 
refinery able to get to get return on investments should 
exceeding 8 million tons. Construction of heavy oil residue 
processing units would be needed requiring heavy 
investments for most medium refineries with the low level of 
secondary processes on a par with constructing a new 
refinery.  
Finally it can be stated that Russia can be a global player 
in the market of high quality oil refining products only on the 
conditions of substantial modernization of existing oil 
refineries or (which is less probable) construction of modern 
refineries. 
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Germany’s energy transformation and the coal ‘renaissance’ 
By Rafal Bajczuk 
Since 2010 Germany is pursuing an ambitious energy 
strategy which aims at increasing renewable energy sources 
in gross final energy consumption up to 60 percent by 2050. 
Parallel to that the use of energy should  drop by half (this 
should be achieved by increasing energy efficiency) and CO2 
emissions should go down by 80-95 percent in 2050 
compared to 1990 levels. Cutting consumption of fossil in 
power generation is the most crucial of all sectors involved 
as it accounts for almost half of all CO2 emissions generated 
by the German economy. The transformation of the energy 
system (German ‘Energiewende’) is strongly supported by 
the public opinion and watched closely by the international 
community. Despite the rapid deployment of wind farms and 
solar power systems in 2012 greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions have risen by 1,6 percent. This slight change is 
insignificant compared to the long-term trend (between 1990 
and 2012 emissions have fallen by 25.5 percent, exceeding 
the reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol). However it 
marks a return to coal as a fuel for power generation in 
Germany. 
When in March 2011, short after the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear disaster, German chancellor Angela Merkel 
announced nuclear power phase-out and support for 
development of renewable energy production natural gas 
was predicted to be the bridge-technology to the renewable 
energy future. According to the German energy strategy the 
share of renewable sources in power generation should 
increase gradually to 80% in 2050. While nuclear power, 
hard coal and lignite will lose their share in the energy mix, 
natural gas, as a flexible and low-carbon source of energy, 
will maintain its share in the power system. Crude reality 
verified the ambitious plans, however. As the share of RES in 
the power mix is steadily rising from 17 percent in 2010 to 22 
percent in 2012, so does the share of hard coal and lignite. 
The share of natural gas in turn has decreased from 14 
percent in 2010 to 11 percent in 2012. These numbers have 
a direct impact on natural gas imports. According to the 
Federal Office of Economics and Export Control between 
January and March 2013 German natural gas imports have 
fallen by 16.8 percent in comparison to the same period in 
2012. The declining demand has caused a price fall of 3.4 
percent compared to the previous year.  
Declining consumption of natural gas and an increased 
demand for coal is a trend observed in most EU member 
states. Besides Germany, in the last three years, use of coal 
significantly increased in United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and 
the Netherlands. This coal ‘renaissance’ was triggered by the 
shale gas revolution in the USA. Between 2007 and 2012 
natural gas production in USA has risen  by circa 25 percent. 
The industrial price fell by 50 percent. This in return 
prompted American power sector to switch from coal to gas. 
Surplus US’ coal substituted by natural gas has been 
exported to Europe and caused the global coal price to fall. 
As the German Coal Importer Association states, only in the 
first quarter of 2013, the imports of coal in Germany have 
risen from 8 to 10 million tons, in comparison to previous 
year. The import of coal for power generation grew by 15 
percent (around 70 percent of hard coal in Germany is used 
for power generation), biggest suppliers being the CIS states 
(27 percent) and USA (25 percent). Additionally Germany is 
using around 170 million tons of lignite per year for power 
generation. It is the only primary energy source which is 
produced completely from domestic resources. As a result of 
these developments the share of hard coal in electricity 
production has increased between 2011 and 2012 by 3 
percent and of lignite by 7 percent. 
So far this trend of a growing consumption of coal and 
declining use of natural gas for power generation is 
continuing. Currently there are eight power plants under 
construction that will use hard coal and only two gas fired-
power plants. Power companies in Germany are even 
planning to take their gas fired power plant offline as they are 
not profitable, taking under account the low wholesale prices 
of electricity and high prices of natural gas. Just in August 
the Norwegian utility Statkraft put two of four of its gas-fired 
power plants into cold reserve. However this situation should 
not last for a long time. As experts predict United States coal 
production will decline as the low price of coal makes exports 
unprofitable. On the other hand both the European institution 
and Germany will support measures to reduce its GHG 
emissions. In order to fill the gap left behind by coal with 
natural gas German politicians and energy experts are 
currently discussing mechanisms to support this technology. 
The most discussed option is the introduction of a capacity 
market, which would make natural gas-fired power plants 
again profitable. Germany will surely continue its energy 
transition as it creates positive effects on economic growth 
and is widely supported by society. 
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From the Varangians to the Greeks – critical infrastructures interconnector 
By Ionut Purica
In 1976 a Richard Dawkins has coined the name of ‘meme’ 
for the mind entities that generate collective behavior and 
change, similar to the evolution, induced by genes. Looking 
at the last years we think that there was a sort of collective 
behavior in concentrating on the East –West direction for gas 
pipelines under the meme name of ‘the silk road’. This is a 
good thing as long as one keeps in mind the big picture. The 
choice of TAP versus Nabuco has contributed to break the 
collective almost obsession of Nabuco form the last few 
years.  
Let’s get two steps back and look at the map of the ‘silk 
road’. There are several areas of North – South crossing 
roads: one is the Russian Federation to China, in the East; 
another one is the Norway to EU and the North Africa to EU 
in the West.  
Looking at the change of energy paradigm in the World 
today one may identify another North – South road, in East 
Europe. This is not a new road since the history mentions in 
this part of the World ‘the road from the Varangians to the 
Greeks’ – very popular at the end of the first millennium. 
Directive 2008/114/CE defines gas critical infrastructures 
along with other critical ones. The security of these critical 
infrastructures needs interconnectors (pipelines) that will be 
able to transport gas both ways. The discovery of non-
conventional (shale and offshore) gas reserves in Poland, 
Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria associated with the potential 
opening of both the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea for LNG imports from all over the World (e.g. 
Qatar, USA) supplies new gas sources for the countries on 
this ‘road’. Along with partial imports in the mentioned 
countries there is a need for gas in Finland, the Baltic States 
and Greece, leading to full imports. Diversification would be 
welcomed in order to increase security of supply. 
The table below shows an interesting story i.e. that with 
the nonconventional reserves the region may substantially 
extend its gas supply availability and its overall energy 
security. 
 Maybe it is time to take a 90 degrees rotation from the 
East – West line in this region and think of an interconnector 
of gas critical infrastructures along the old road from the 
Varangians to the Greeks. 
Finally, it is important to notice that such an 
interconnector should not be seen as an isolated project but 
included in the EU and international gas pipes network. Its 
main role is to increase security of supply in the region and 
through this to allow better competition with the associated 
effect on prices. To make such a project a reality a joint effort 
is needed to generate credibility that further on will attract the 
investments. It may not be easy but, we think it would be 
worth trying. 
 
 
 
Ionut Purica 
Dr., Senior Researcher  
Institute for Economic Forecasting  
The Romanian Academy  
Romania 
Expert article 1365  Baltic Rim Economies, 31.10.2013                                           Quarterly Review 5▪2013 
 
34 
 Pan-European Institute  To receive a free copy please register at www.utu.fi/pei   
Development of regional cooperation between South-East Finland and St. 
Petersburg and Leningrad Region  
By Päivi Ilves 
Past 
Finland entered the European Union in 1995. As a 
consequence in the eastern border regions three INTERREG 
programs began. And the regional cooperation between 
South Savo, Kymenlaakso, South Karelia, St. Petersburg 
and Leningrad region under the EU framework was formed. 
The program and method was INTERREG and the 
cooperation was at regional level. The first program period 
was not a full seven-year period but ending in 1999. In 
INTERREG programs the majority of project operations were 
carried out and majority of funds were used in the member 
state, in this case Finland. The decision-making was done in 
the member state. The funds were originating from the EU 
and the national co-financing from Finland. During the first 
program 1995-1999 there were a lot of new procedures and 
new methods in several levels. Learning and adopting of 
them was time consuming. From the first beginning the 
networks were not ready and existing but they have to be 
built gradually. The projects were planned in Finland and the 
needs of cooperation were based on the needs on Finnish 
side.  
The second period 2000-2006 was exceptional as an 
alteration was made in 2004 when an INTERREG program 
was changed to a Neighbourhood program in the middle of a 
program period. During the years 2004-2006 when the 
Neighbourhood program started cooperation moved a step 
forward as the selection of projects was made together with 
Russians. However, funding on Finnish side came from 
multiannual INTERREG and equivalent Finnish national co-
financing and in Russia from yearly allocated TACIS. As the 
whole decision-making process was not under the same 
authority the implementation of funded projects was not 
synchronized and there were remarkable deviations in 
schedules. Therefore the idea of mirror projects, on both 
sides of the border, could not be realized. However, 
cooperation deepened when selecting the projects together 
and trying to find projects which would benefit both sides of 
the border area.    
 
Today 
In 2007 a new seven-year period of cooperation began. The 
cooperation started under the EU’s External Action Services 
instead of DG Regio. The program name changed from 
Neighbourhood to ENPI. Based on the experience of the 
previous years there were expectations in both countries that 
during this period even better results should be achieved. 
Both participating countries admit the importance of 
cooperation in border regions. A remarkable sign of it was 
that the Russian Federation announced to invest their own 
funds to the programs implemented on the border between 
Russia and the EU. This information was surprising and the 
rules and regulations should be partly renewed and it caused 
an outstanding delay to the launch of programs. Thanks to 
project planners and all stakeholders the funds have been 
allocated during two years and it seems that all funded 
projects can be implemented in due time before the end of 
2014. The Russian funding guarantees equal participation 
and equal partnership of Russians to the program.  
The nature of projects has developed as the networks, 
knowledge and trust of partners have increased. As the 
global situation has changed, compared to previous years, 
there is a need of infrastructure related to border crossings. It 
was taken into account when allocating the program funds. 
Half of the program financing was directed to infrastructure 
projects. Besides concrete projects, on both sides of the 
border, the most important priority was determined to be 
economic development. Now, when we are at the stage 
where the program implementation is in the middle we can 
state that the measures have been more concrete than in the 
past. However, the new rules and regulations when changing 
to ENPI from INTERREG and when the final decisions still 
have been made in Brussels have caused exceptionally long 
periods between submission of the application and signature 
of the grant contract. This cannot be acceptable when 
thinking the applicants and the future. 
During the period there are some major improvements 
compared to the past. Firstly, there is “pooling” of funds. The 
funds are coming from three different sources (the European 
Union, Russia and Finland) but they are pooled by the joint 
managing authority and the projects receive the funds 
without a need to request them separately. Secondly, 
allocation of all funds is multiannual. Thirdly, the planning 
and implementation of projects have been made jointly on 
both sides of the border.   
 
Future 
The next programming period 2014-2020 is now under 
preparation. The experience of the previous and present 
periods will be taken into account and the difficulties can 
hopefully be avoided. The contents, priorities and themes of 
the program will be jointly selected during the coming months 
taking into account the needs, gathered background 
information and overall situation in the program area and 
naturally the objectives of the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) rules.  
All participating partners (EU, Russia and Finland) have 
announced their will to continue to finance the program as 
today. Hopefully, we can fit together the EU and national 
legislations and delete some legislative obstacles and 
hinders of cooperation and guarantee a smooth 
implementation of the future program. 
 
Experience and benefits of cooperation 
The benefits of this cooperation are stronger networks, better 
knowledge of each other’s culture, greater opportunities, 
more prosperity to border areas and a gateway for Finns to 
Russia and for Russians to Finland and to the whole Europe. 
Even though it takes years before the benefits and 
importance of cooperation can be seen, the results and 
impacts are clearly visible in South-East Finland and St. 
Petersburg and Leningrad Region. One obvious, but not at 
all insignificant and unimportant benefit is capacity building. 
During the coming years we should enhance the favourable 
development and cooperation in all areas, sectors and levels.  
 
Päivi Ilves 
Programme Director 
South-East Finland – Russia ENPI CBC 2007-2013 
Finland
Expert article 1366  Baltic Rim Economies, 31.10.2013                                           Quarterly Review 5▪2013 
 
35 
 Pan-European Institute  To receive a free copy please register at www.utu.fi/pei   
Bothnian Arc – vital cross-border area in northernmost part of the Baltic Sea 
By Heikki Aalto 
The Bothnian Arc is a coastal zone shaped like an inverted 
letter U at the northernmost end of the Gulf of Bothnia. The 
arc connects two countries; it begins in Skellefteå on the 
Swedish side, crosses the border at Haparanda and Tornio, 
and extends to Kokkola on Finnish side. The biggest city on 
Finnish side is Oulu and Luleå on Swedish side. The region 
is already marked by vitality and activity, but it holds the 
potential for much more. 
This dynamic northern cross-border area has a strategic 
location at the intersection of the Baltic Sea Region and the 
Barents Region. The Bothnian Arc can serve as a link and a 
meeting place between these areas, improving 
communications, and enabling social, cultural and economic 
exchange. At the same time this growing area can be part of 
the international area of operations, and act as one market 
area. 
The population of the northern areas of Finland and 
Sweden is concentrated in the Bothnian Arc region, which 
has around 700 000 inhabitants. The Arc has an abundance 
of young people, know-how, universities and other higher 
education institutions, large international companies, top 
technology, large ports, and international airports. 
Northern Sweden and Finland have many centers of 
education with a varied range of courses. Most educational 
facilities are centered on the coastal area of Bothnian Arc. 
The largest educational institution of the area in Finland is 
University of Oulu while the Luleå University of Technology is 
the largest one in Sweden. Together they have over 30 000 
students, more than 3000 researchers and teachers, and 350 
professors. Concrete example from cooperation between 
those two universities is Nordic Mining School. They agreed 
on the opening of the School which will offer a new degree 
program in the field of mining industry. The purpose of this 
project is to strengthen Nordic education cooperation, and 
support the competitiveness of the mining industry. 
Cross-border activity has increased significantly in EU 
and also in Baltic Sea area. There is more and more 
activities between the countries and across the borders. At 
the same time there is more developed financing instruments 
to be used in different kind of cross-border actions. 
The Bothnian Arc fits in well with this trend. Now we just 
have to come with modes of operating that benefit and 
interest the region’s companies and other operators and 
people as much as possible. It is quite often a question of 
knowledge and the opportunities to notice the benefits from 
cross-border cooperation. 
Many interesting projects and networks have already 
been made. Quite naturally universities and other education 
institutes participate to cross-border activities. Also same 
branch of industries have found each other and they have 
started networking. We have started many cross-border 
projects financed by EU. Effective examples can be 
mentioned from metal industry, audiovisual sector, ICT, 
logistics, tourism, culture and energy. In many cases these 
projects have been like pilots for cooperation and afterwards 
partners continue the activities. 
Long-term sustainability is a primary consideration in the 
development of the area. The attention of people must be 
drown to areas of natural beauty, heritage sites and other 
sights and attractions which are then to be used to develop 
tourism. At the same time, we must safeguard sensitive 
environments for the enjoyment of future generations. 
Business development agencies owned by municipalities 
are supporting companies’ internationalization. This is one 
reason why these municipalities wanted to establish an 
association called “Bothnian Arc” to support cooperation in 
Bothnian Arc area. During last 10 years Bothnian Arc 
association has encouraged and activated various parties to 
collaborate across borders by building networks, lobbing and 
creating new projects.  
Northern dimension is coming more important all the 
time. The Barents area is situated on both sides of the Arctic 
Circle and covers also the northern parts of Sweden and 
Finland. The development of the Barents Sea area and the 
use of its natural resources provide Northern Finland and 
Sweden with significant economic cooperation opportunities, 
such as transit traffic and the related economic activities, and 
new business activities and improved employment rates. The 
investments in north Scandinavia are almost astronomical 
and that gives huge possibilities for growth and development. 
Improved cooperation between different instances is still 
crucial in the Bothnian Arc area. A commitment to regional 
policies and extensive partnership is necessary in order to 
ensure development. This calls for active people and 
participation from businesses and organizations. This is the 
only way for cross-border activities to remain lively in the 
future. In recent years, new organizations and actors have 
joined in the cooperation, and they have taken charge of 
duties from various fields. In the future, more and more 
interested participants are required in the networks, in order 
to reach the desired objective, top-level growth and 
development in EU. 
It is not yet very widely known what a gold nugget the 
Bothnian Arc at its best could be, nor what opportunities it 
offers. So far, this is like a hidden treasure even to the 
people living in the Bothnian Arc. Cooperation is key word 
and as our slogan in Bothnian Arc says; Together we are 
more! 
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Cross-border cooperation in eHealth issues in the Baltic Sea Region – the 
eHealth for Regions Network as facilitator and booster  
By Roland Trill and Anna-Lena Pohl 
The Baltic Sea Region is a region with striking differences in health 
care systems, but nonetheless countries are facing similar 
challenges. This applies not only to the financing but to the 
organization of different health care levels, the integration of other 
stakeholders involved in health care issues and at the same time to 
the use and acceptance of eHealth. In Germany eHealth as an 
important facilitator of the whole health care-puzzle is rather seen as 
a marginal phenomenon than an appropriate and potential tool to 
deal with up-to-date challenges. In Estonia on the other hand the use 
of eHealth applications is much more common and accepted by the 
citizen. 
When it comes to a generally accepted definition of what eHealth 
actually is one is confronted with several sources trying to put in 
words what many of them are not able to define clearly. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) for example defines 
eHealth as “ (…) the transfer of health resources and health care by 
electronic means. (…)”
1
. It identifies access to the required 
technologies as one of the major issues for the distribution of 
eHealth applications.  
But eHealth does not only stand for electronic devices and the 
use of ICT in health care. Another objective is to increase efficiency 
in health care and decrease costs, a challenge all countries around 
the Baltic Sea are facing nowadays. Furthermore the empowerment 
of patients is a purpose when introducing eHealth applications. They 
are a proper tool to motivate people to take over responsibility for 
their own health. By making knowledge accessible via internet 
citizen are enabled to make own choices and to manage their health 
care on a self-determined basis. Patients are encouraged to change 
the relationship with their GDP to a partnership and take decisions in 
a shared manner.
2
 
This is not so much a problem of people being not interested or 
being just opposed without trying to understand what is meant. It is 
more a problem of an open dialogue and a more citizen centered 
approach of explaining.  And it is a question of how to integrate 
technical progress in such a sensitive field health care still is.  
People are often afraid of being left alone with IT and computer 
without having a real person to talk to. And it is a question of time 
since at least in Germany the health care system was something 
dominated by medical professionals being the experts the patient 
relies blindly on. The understanding of managing the own health 
instead of being treated when ill needs time to grow up from a vague 
idea to a common agreement between citizen, medical professionals 
and the political level. 
In Germany the discussion on the electronic health card, going 
on for several years now, show how tricky it is to achieve a fair 
balance between the regulatory framework and security concerns of 
citizen on the one hand and the need of a more technical advanced 
and more efficient health care system on the other hand.  
And again differences between countries are striking. Data 
security being one major issue in Germany has been one of the 
easiest solved questions in Denmark. 
But why do we need cross-border cooperation in eHealth 
issues? The field of eHealth has long been seen as having great 
potential in making health care more efficient. But eHealth has not 
developed as expected. It is referred to as a sick market and one 
which does not fully exploit its potential. There are many reasons for 
this and the EU Commission’s lead market initiative is focusing 
especially on this problem. The main factors contributing to the sick 
market perception are a lack of interoperability, obsolete and 
unharmonised laws and regulations and a lack of business 
plans to guarantee reimbursement for services offered. Finding 
solutions to these transnational problems requires transnational 
cooperation. 
                                                          
1
 See http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story021/en/, last access 
6. June 2013. 
2
  See Eysenbach, Gunther: What is e-health?, in: Journal of 
Medical Internet Research, Vol. 3 (2), 2001. 
Another aspect is the need for infrastructure and software 
applications to support health cooperation across borders. This can 
be seen as a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma. Making things happen 
might require two elements to co-exist and there are problems in 
pushing the development of one element before the other exists.  
The eHealth for Regions network is a platform for all the different 
stakeholders from all Baltic Sea Region countries to discuss eHealth 
issues, find project partners and develop project ideas up to concrete 
project applications. It aims at fostering the development of eHealth 
infrastructure and applications within in the region and beyond.  By 
promoting eHealth issues it serves as a link connecting eHealth 
actors to all other stakeholders and issues in health care and making 
it compatible to the surrounding pieces of the bigger puzzle of health 
care. The network strives to establish links to other more 
conventional approaches so eHealth is not seen as a separate but 
rather inclusive approach to the major challenges in today’s health 
care systems.  
The network initiated several successful flagship projects coping 
with up-to-date challenges in health care.  For example ICT for 
Health (2009 - 2012) worked to strengthen social capacities for the 
utilisation of eHealth technologies in the framework of an ageing 
population. Partners from eight countries in the Baltic Sea Region 
participated in the project: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden and Russia. 
PrimCareIT  (2011-2014) aims at raising the attractiveness of 
remote primary health care for medical professionals by the means 
of tele-consultation and tele-mentoring. Thereby the project 
counteracts brain drain and professional isolation in sparsely 
populated areas for more equal access to primary health care in the 
Baltic Sea Region. 16 partners from eight countries including 
Belorussia are part of this ambitious project.  
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Gdansk University of Technology and its cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region 
By Aniela Tejchman 
Gdansk University of Technology (GUT) as the most 
renowned technical university in Northern Poland, which 
educates more than 25 thousand students at the 
undergraduate, graduate and doctoral level, strives to 
provide high quality education for the needs of a dynamically 
developing  economy in the region and a knowledge-based 
society.  
GUT is expanding its study programmes and research 
activities in a number of scientific fields related to the Baltic 
Sea Region (BSR), including among others environmental 
issues, transport, economy, policy and also construction of 
vessels and ports. These activities are often carried out in 
cooperation with BSR institutions involved in education, 
research and innovation.  
The political and economic transition in Poland in the 
nineties boosted opportunities for new forms of cooperation. 
Financial founds accessible within EU Programmes 
stimulated the dynamic development of academic 
cooperation in various fields.  
Some of BSR Universities became our partners in 
TEMPUS Programme launched in 1990.  For our University 
TEMPUS had a significant impact on the development of 
new methods of engineering education, also with the use of 
modern laboratory equipment. It initiated the processes of 
harmonization of the Polish education system with EU 
partner countries’ systems, including also international 
relations, library service and university management.  
Since 1998, when Poland became a country eligible to 
participate in ERASMUS Programme, GUT has been 
receiving substantial funds to support the educational 
mobility of university staff and students. Till present more 
than 8 million EUR have been allocated to fulfil this aim.  
In the year 2000 our university was among 16 institutions 
from Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia and 
Belarus which signed an agreement on the creation of the 
Baltic Sea Region University Network (BSRUN) in Turku. 
The network aimed at facilitating and enhancing cooperation 
between its members, establishing a platform for new ideas, 
contacts and projects. Active participation in BSRUN enabled 
us to develop partnership with a growing number of member 
universities in various areas of cooperation, mainly in 
internationalization, regional development, management and 
administration, but also to exchange information and 
participate in seminars and meetings.  
In the year 2004 Poland joined the EU. The accession 
opened new opportunities for education and research for our 
country and the region. Poland became eligible for many new 
programmes on central and regional level. The staff of our 
university began to apply for new funds for education and 
research programmes, which was possible due to long 
lasting cooperation with partner institutions from the Baltic 
Sea area. An increase in funding is best reflected in 
ERASMUS expenditure. The funds allocated to GUT for 
2003/2004 amounted to 165 thousand EUR, for 2004/2005  
to over 320 thousand and for 2005/2006  to about 590 
thousand EUR.   
Cooperation with the eleven Baltic Sea Region countries, 
i.e., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Island, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden 
(classification by the Council of Baltic Sea States), which 
involves education mobility and research, is very essential for 
our University. On the basis of ERASMUS reports, mobility of 
outgoing students and staff to the Baltic Sea countries 
averages about 30%. However, in the years 2009-2011 due 
to support of the EEA & Norway Grants, mobility to BSR 
countries reached 40% of the total GUT mobility within 
education.   
An increasing interest in mobility, including student and 
teacher exchange, introduction of innovative actions as 
practical trainings for students and staff, allowed developing 
cooperation in the region and signing many new bilateral and 
multilateral agreements. Gdansk University of Technology 
currently carries out cooperation with BSR partner institutions 
within around 70 ERASMUS agreements. Since the year 
2000 GUT has spent around 2.5m EUR for the mobility of 
more than 1000 outgoing students and about 350 staff within 
educational programmes. 
In the year 2012 our University and BSRUN organized 
Baltic Seminar for University Administrators on “Knowledge 
Triangle: Education, Research, Innovation”, which gathered 
almost 80 participants from the region. The event created an 
opportunity for the participants to attend sessions and a 
round table discussion on new perspectives for the Baltic 
Sea community in education quality, commercialization, 
innovation, cooperation with industry, competences related to 
the development of the region based on cooperation 
between BSRUN Universities. 
Gdansk University of Technology and our partner Higher 
Education Institutions in the Baltic Sea Region are aware that 
the sustainable development of this area, its economy and 
environmental protection are our mutual interest and 
concern. 
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Russia’s small business tax regimes 
By Michael Alexeev and Robert Conrad  
In order to promote faster development of small business, 
Russia, like several other transition economies, has been 
using special tax regimes (STRs) aimed at reducing 
compliance costs and the tax burden on small businesses. 
Russia has four different STRs, including one for agricultural 
businesses. All small enterprises, including legal persons, 
are eligible for a so-called simplified tax system (STS). Under 
STS the business can choose to be taxed either on a gross 
revenue basis at a 6% rate, or on a profit basis at a rate of 
15%. Small businesses, again including legal persons, 
providing certain types of services may be taxed on a 
presumptive basis where the amount of tax is determined by 
activity-specific physical indicators such as the number of 
employees or the square footage of the trade area. (This tax 
regime is to be phased out by 2018.) Finally physical persons 
engaged in provision of certain services and whose gross 
revenue is below a specified threshold can be eligible for a 
“patent” system under which the entrepreneur pays a fixed 
amount independent of revenue or profits. As of 1/1/2013, 
the patent system has been modified giving the regions more 
autonomy in tailoring the charge to their own needs and in 
expanding eligibility. In particular, the maximum number of 
employees of a business using the patent system has been 
increased from 5 to 15.  All of these tax regimes replace 
either the profits tax or the individual income tax (whichever 
is relevant) and the property tax. The STS also replaces 
VAT.   All system are voluntary and small businesses can opt 
out of these tax regimes if they prefer to be taxed under the 
regular system. 
Justifications for STRs for small business include 
reducing compliance costs for taxpayers and reducing 
administrative expenses for tax administrators which might 
result in little net revenue gain. Unfortunately, Russian 
implementation of STRs has serious shortcomings and the 
latest developments exacerbate some of the problems by 
expanding eligibility. Optional participation (and optional tax 
base under STS) provides an incentive for taxpayers to self-
select into regimes that reduce tax.  That is, holding 
compliance constant, regime choice leads to legal tax 
arbitrage. For example, under STS, high margin businesses 
would choose the gross revenue as a tax base while low 
margin businesses would choose net profit, other things 
equal. Also, businesses just under a patent threshold would 
benefit from the patent system while those with lower 
revenues would be hurt by it because the average tax rate 
decreases with profit. The results in different taxpayers 
paying different effective rates leading to significant 
economic distortions. Moreover, STRs provide disincentives 
for enterprise growth by imposing extremely high marginal 
rates at the eligibility thresholds. The same consideration 
provides incentives for splitting businesses and registering 
them under different owners in order to preserve eligibility. 
The thresholds based on the number of employees and the 
existence of a patent regime also strongly encourage 
reclassifying workers as independent contractors.  
The eligibility of legal persons for STS and the 
presumptive tax regimes combined with difficulties of 
ascertaining true ownership of a corporation may result in 
large businesses taking advantage of tax breaks aimed at 
small businesses. This is exacerbated by the high eligibility 
threshold for STS in Russia (almost $1.9 million at current 
exchange rates).  Thus, a number of related parties, might be 
created all of which are small businesses, reducing total 
taxes for the owners. 
While the special regimes could indeed lower compliance 
costs of taxpayers who choose to comply, administrative 
costs might not be reduced. Eligibility thresholds need to be 
monitored and specialized skills need to be developed in tax 
administration because audit rules differ between regular tax 
regimes and special ones. Moreover, even significant 
improvement in compliance is not assured despite relatively 
low rates.  For instance, taxpayers with employees are still 
expected to withhold taxes on wages paid.  In addition, small 
taxpayers might be reluctant to be identified by the tax 
system no matter how low the effective rate.  This latter 
consideration is particularly relevant in a country with high 
degree of corruption. It is not surprising that despite a 
favorable tax regime, small and medium enterprise (SME) 
sector in Russia remains relatively small even after 20 years 
of transition. While SMEs account for two thirds of private 
sector employment in the EU, the corresponding share for 
Russia in 2010 was less than one half. The total SME sales 
revenue in Russia is approximately the same as in the 
Netherlands and only 50% greater than in Poland. 
We think the overall economic costs of STRs exceed their 
benefits. If, however, such regimes are to be preserved, they 
should target a much narrower group of taxpayers. Most 
important, the revenue threshold for STRs should be 
coordinated with the VAT threshold and legal persons should 
not be eligible for any STR. In addition, clear rules for 
distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors should be developed and transition rules should 
allow for a gradual transfer of growing businesses from an 
STR to a regular tax regime. Such reforms may be politically 
difficult as the recently reversed attempt by the government 
to bring social tax on individual entrepreneurs closer to that 
paid for employees has demonstrated. Nonetheless, we 
believe that such reforms are important in the long run for 
improving Russia’s tax system. 
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Science Link adds value to BSR's industry and SMEs 
By Johanna Aaltonen, Graham Appleby, María Fernanda Bocángel and Taina Laiho 
Science Link is a project based network operating in the Baltic 
Sea Region (BSR). The network’s function is to connect industry 
with science within Research, Development, and Innovation 
(R&D&I) of materials, to add to the competitiveness of the BSR. 
Within Science Link, the R&D&I of materials are based on 
applications of synchrotron and neutron radiation (a well known 
example of such a large-scale particle accelerator research 
infrastructures is CERN in Switzerland). In the BSR, they are 
located in Germany and Sweden. The main drive of the network 
is to make these German and Swedish top synchrotron facilities 
accessible for businesses and non-research users, and 
especially for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), from all 
over the BSR. The network’s ability to function has been tested 
by calling piloting companies in three open calls during 2012–
2013, with outstanding results.  
Science Link’s geographical coverage includes Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and 
Sweden, and there are a total of 17 involved organisations. 
Science Link is a multi-organisational performer, and operated 
by: 1) synchrotron and neutron facilities, 2) regional research 
infrastructures like universities, who support material science 
research and applications, and 3) Contact Points such as 
regional business development units, who know the contacts 
and needs of local industries. All of them are possible doorways 
into the entire expertise network.  
The network is also a multifaceted performer, and serves not 
only limited industries. The involved radiation facilities are DESY, 
Helmholtz-Zentrum Berlin, Helmholtz-Zentrum Geesthacht, and 
Max IV Laboratory. Each facility employs Industrial Liaison 
Officers, who are physicists with a wide range of expertise of 
industrial cases. The entire network has been able to match with 
the needs of the Calls’ applicants representing a varied range of 
industries, from life science, construction, automotive, personal 
care, chemistry, and engineering to agriculture. 
In the Calls during 2012–2013, Science Link offered 
companies free, high-level supporting services and intensive 
consulting during the application phase, and if the company was 
approved, pre, during, and after the measurements within the 
relevant research facility. The companies were appointed a 
maximum of two days of free measurements. More than 60 
companies from the BSR applied, of which 47 were approved 
and 70 % were SMEs. 17 approved companies have already 
performed the measurements with success. 
Science Link has already added value to companies at 
society, company, and personal level. The main added value at 
the society level could be the more competitive role of SMEs in 
the field of R&D&I, and the simplified access to measurement 
time for industrial users. The project has also produced better 
access to information about the existence and possibilities of the 
facilities; face-to-face at the project events and consultations, as 
well as in the media and social media, and has popularised it.  
At the company level, the relatively short manifestation time 
is important for companies such as SMEs who cannot wait for 
long-time profits. Pilot companies could simultaneously 
overcome the process of application for industrial 
measurements, their lack of workforce, and the financing, as the 
process were led and mostly resourced by the Science Link 
partnership. Most of the companies have been new users of 
synchrotron facilities, and the experience has encouraged some 
of them to continue the co-operation at their own cost, when they 
have realised how it works and what the facilities can do for their 
company, and manifold better and more cost-efficient than as 
´R&D&I as usual´. Importantly, the companies have been able to 
directly exploit the research results of their Science Link 
measurements. 
Furthermore, Science Link has offered companies tailored 
and personal consultations in their own native language, and 
face-to-face meetings with the personnel of regional contact 
points and research infrastructures. The Science Link network 
has been able to share the material science challenges with the 
companies and work side by side with them to develop better 
products and processes. The companies’ contacts with Industrial 
Liaison Officers at the synchrotron and neutron facilities have 
continued the individual learning processes of the company 
participants, when they have taken part at the measurements at 
the synchrotrons. Personal contacts construct trust and 
confidence, and new entries are always personal decisions in 
the end.  
The partnership has also shown success to the network 
operators themselves. This is why the goal for the near future is 
to make the network self-sustaining after the Science Link 
project ends in 2014, and develop a public-private financing 
partnership onward. Geographically, the area is also planned to 
enlarge, and will include the St. Petersburg region more closely. 
The network is looking after new leads of industrial users and 
SMEs. The network is looking after new high-performers, who 
are interested in corporate entrepreneurship. The network is also 
applying for supporting public finance for a number of spin-off 
projects.  
More information for example about the approved companies 
and their cases, and the Science Link project are available at: 
www.science-link.eu. The main part of the project finance is 
ERDF of BRS Programme 2007–2013. 
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Sustainable exploitation of the Baltic Sea fish resources require integration of 
thinking 
By Eero Aro 
We agree that fisheries are at first economic activities, which 
are very much dependent on and interact with the ecosystem 
and other exploitable resources. The volume of the total 
annual fish catch in the Baltic Sea has varied last fifty years 
roughly between 600 000-1 000 000 tonnes (value of 480-
690 million US$) This variation is caused by normal nature 
variation, population dynamics and by management actions 
taken. 
The Baltic Sea fish community is dominated by three 
species i.e. cod, herring and sprat. They form more than 90 
% of the total catch and round 60 % of the biomass in the 
system. The nature of the fishery of cod, herring and sprat 
consists mainly of single species fisheries. However, 
fisheries are closely connected as there are strong ecological 
inter-connections between the species. Cod is predating 
herring and sprat, and herring and sprat are competing on 
plankton food resources. Therefore, a management measure 
taken for one species will inevitably affect the other species, 
their abundance, distribution and economy. 
The necessary decisions for future sustainable 
management of fish resources are driven not only by 
changes in the environment and population dynamics but 
also by the economic activities. On the other hand 
environment- and fisheries management objectives are 
many, covering ecological, economic and social dimensions, 
which are often conflicting. 
Sustainability in fisheries management is a demanding 
goal for policy makers. It forms an integral part of maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY), which has become the chosen 
reference marker for European fisheries management under 
the new Common Fisheries Policy. 
Most of the European fish stocks are now managed 
according to harvest control rules (HCRs), one of the key 
questions for the future. HCRs should contain environmental, 
economic, and social sustainability as well as the further 
definition of sustainability objectives.  
As conservation targets of exploited fish populations are 
typically near those quantities that will maximize long-term 
sustainable yield (MSY) and best economic gains typically 
occur in the neighborhood of these same quantities. Thus we 
should not necessarily expect too much trade-offs between 
conservation and economic objectives, at least. 
The evaluation of the Baltic Sea natural resources and 
their sustainable exploitation call for a new integrated 
thinking to take into account ecosystem components and 
processes like various habitats and marine protected areas, 
interacting species, system productivity, biodiversity, other 
ecosystem services, and many human activities. 
Modern biological stock assessment models are rather 
sophisticated with regard to biological content, but they rarely 
account for economic objectives. On the other hand 
biologists have criticized traditional biomass models in 
fishery economics for being oversimplified and too general. 
There is a clear political agreement that sustainable 
development of aquatic sector requires a comprehensive, 
ecosystem-based approach that looks beyond the traditional 
focus on yields and profits. To move toward this goal, aquatic 
and fishery systems must be recognized as being comprised 
of at least four subsystems that are connected in a powerful 
feedback loop – the natural system, ecosystem services, the 
management system, and the relevant socioeconomic 
system. Each subsystem in turn consists of complex 
components that deal with everything from multi-species 
population dynamics to multi-fleet fisheries, social 
dependencies and ecological interactions. 
A next step in integrated assessment and management 
should be to include interactions between the fisheries 
sector, environmental issues and other sectors on a more 
regional scale. A global scale is not enough. This more 
regional evaluation framework of fisheries and ecosystem-
based management should inter alia contain models with 
varying levels of complexity of the ecosystem and the fishery 
and socio-economic systems that would increase the 
understanding of the feedback between subsystems.  
The goal of new integrated thinking should in the first 
place to alter the widespread present practice of assessing 
fishery biological subsystem in a very quantitative detail, 
while human dimensions and ecosystem services are 
considered only qualitatively. 
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Context matters 
By Henrik Meinander 
Two things are frequently in mind if you live somewhere 
around the Baltic Sea: Russia and Germany. This includes 
also the Germans and Russians, who measure themselves 
either against each other or search for their point of 
reference more far away.  However, for the rest of the Baltic 
people their lives between Russian-German poles have 
usually been exciting enough – to put it politely – and this 
bipolar world view has in much shaped also Finland and its 
people.   
After 600 years as a part of Sweden this region often 
called Finland was joined to the Russian empire 1809 as a 
consequence of the Napoleonic War. Due to its Swedish 
laws and values, which were Northern variations of the 
German Lutheran culture, the Grand Duchy of Finland would 
from the start begin to develop into a state within the state. 
And when the driving forces in geopolitics, world trade and 
technological environment in the 1890’s began to change the 
balance in European power politics more rapidly, this cultural 
gap between Finland and Russia widened swiftly and lead 
eventually to Finnish independency in 1917.  
The Republic of Finland will thus after four years rejoice 
its 100 anniversary as an independent republic. This is 
certainly something worth celebrating, not least because the 
country was able to maintain its political system and western 
values also during the Second World War and Cold War Era. 
But when we look at the Finnish path to national sovereignty, 
parliamentarian democracy and a generous welfare state it is 
much too easy to explain it as a straightforward outcome of 
wise decisions taken by good Finns. In fact they were equally 
much chain reactions of various developments on macro 
level in European power politics, trade and technological 
change. 
Take for example the declaration of Finnish 
independency in December 1917. The Finnish parliament 
would certainly not have taken this step, had it not been for 
two strong impulses from abroad. The first was the Bolshevik 
coup de etat in Petrograd, which sharply increased the 
criminality in the empire and raised fears of that the 
revolution would spread also to Finland. The second strong 
impulse came from the German government, which during 
the ongoing World War encouraged countries in the western 
parts of the Russian empire to declare their independency in 
order to force the Bolsheviks to peace treaty.  
The development in Finland during the next 18 months 
was a terrible mess. First a tragic civil war, then a German 
controlled government, and finally a swift normalization of the 
diplomatic relationship with the Western victors of the war.  
The development would most probably have been much 
graver if the Bolsheviks had lost their grip or Germany would 
have won the war.  
In either case Finland would have been dragged into a 
new empire.  But now the newborn republic got its chance to 
find its domestic balance as a parliamentarian democracy 
and strengthen its defense, which paid well off during the 
next war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another obvious example of how the societal 
development in Finland has been framed, formed and 
facilitated by external forces is the postwar era, the golden 
age of the European nation states. Although a wartime ally 
with Germany, Finland escaped a Soviet occupation and built 
up a good relationship with Moscow. This made it possible 
for Finland to recover swiftly, find markets both in the eastern 
block and Western Europe, and fund its transformation into a 
Scandinavian type welfare state. However, this evolution 
would not have been possible without the sharp division of 
Europe, which cynically speaking was rather favorable for the 
Finnish industry. The socialist Eastern Europe was out ruled 
from the competition, whereas the EEC- block again was 
keen to maintain Finland as a Western society and was thus 
prepared to ease its export westwards.  
The Cold War era was also in other respects a stable era 
for Finland. Never before or after has the Finnish culture and 
society been so strongly united around the imagined 
community called Finland. One reason for this was the fresh 
memories from the war, which made the Finns do whatever 
they could to avoid a new confrontation with the Soviet 
Union.   The media technology was also very suitable for 
this. As elsewhere in Europe the national message was 
cabled out through a couple of state controlled TV-channels, 
which served “correct” interpretations of the political life on 
both the domestic stage and abroad. 
There are many other examples of the strong impact of 
external driving forces in Finnish history.  When the country 
joined the European Union in 1995 a new era of Finnish 
dependency began, which nevertheless has many similarities 
with earlier experiences of how the context dictates much of 
the content. If you want to know more about this, please read 
my short cut book A History of Finland, which has been 
published also in a number of Baltic languages!
1
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 Finlands historia: Linjer, strukturer, vändpunkter, Helsingfors & 
Stockholm 2006, paperback 2010.– Translations: Suomen 
historia: Linjat, rakenteet, käännekohdat, Helsinki 2006, 
paperback 2010; История Финляндии, Moscow 2008; Історія 
Фінляндії: Лінії, структури, переломні моменти, Lviv 2009; A 
History of Finland, London 2011,; Soome ajalugu: 
Suundumused, pohijooned ja pöördepunktid, Tartu 2012;  
Somijas Vesture: Linija, strukturas, paversienpunkti, Riga 2013. 
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Finnophobia replaces finlandization  
By Veikko Saksi 
In their early history Finns were brave. In the twentieth 
century reigned Finlandization. By the early years of the 
twenty-first century a sort of Finnophobia began to develop. 
Finlandization was adapting Finnish domestic and foreign 
policy to the will of the Soviet Union, even though the outside 
appearance of independence was maintained. 
Finlandization was called by several names in the 1960s: 
silent “Satellization”, running for Moscow matters, time of 
self-censorship or incompetence to select their own political 
leaders. Some people looked at Finlandization positively: 
skillful promotion of our own benefits, proportional victory of 
foreign policy, cold-bloodedness and competence of the 
administration, or reduction of dependency. 
It does not pay to be proud of Finlandization. It was 
submission under the authority of a stronger state. A 
powerful example of this was the Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. 
A positive Soviet attitude was projected as the visible 
manifestation. Those politicians, people and representatives 
of the media who did not bow to the East, were anti-Soviet. It 
was an effective weapon that ended the careers of several 
people. 
Finlandization had greatly influenced Finnish society in 
almost all spheres, although its grip has diluted during the 
decades. First the shackles slipped from people’s grip, then 
gradually from the media. Lies or propaganda will not last 
indefinitely. The politicians in power are slow to become 
aware of this matter. 
Not even the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fully 
devastated Finlandization, although Finns dared to breath 
more freely and self-censorship weakened. 
Finlandization is no longer the sole right of the Finns. 
Some Estonian politicians are “Finlandized”, because they 
see that the Finnish politicians have managed to cooperate 
so well with Russia. 
Germans are strongly “Finlandized”. They are still 
whipping themselves because of crimes of the Nazi era, 
although they have apologized repeatedly for those actions, 
and compensated the victims. A German is afraid of political 
suicide, if he or she dared ask for a balanced treatment. 
The Soviet Union and Russia have never made a 
genuine apology for Soviet crimes, not to mention 
compensation for their actions to the victims or returning the 
occupied territories. Yet the Russian people are 
“Finlandized”. 
At first Homo Sovieticus was cultivated in the Soviet 
Union. Now Vladimir Putin leads Russians with a powerful 
stance to accept the atrocities of Stalin’s time as 
economically crucial. For instance, acceptance of the power 
vertical, widely spread corruption and managing by violation 
are part of this Russian “Finlandization”. 
“Finlandization” in Russia has not led to outside but inside 
bowing. The state leader is bowed to and feared. A Cossack 
leader was afraid of the collapsed Soviet Union so much that 
he refused to take back Cossacks’ own land, even though 
the government offered it to him. This Cossack leader 
behaved exactly as Finland’s president did in the 1990s 
because of the fear. 
Finlandization is a passing folklore. It has now been 
replaced by Finnophobia, which means the Finnish fear of 
advocating for own rights and legal benefits. It is to invalidate 
their own achievements and leads to feelings of guilt for 
those crimes that Finland never committed. 
Finnophobia is thus self-repression and claiming of guilt, 
the need to defend a stronger party’s right to use pressure 
and to accept aggression against oneself. It has similar 
characteristics as Stockholm syndrome, i.e., to identify with 
the will of the oppressor. 
Finnophobia as a concept is broader than Finlandization. 
It considers not only the Soviet or Russian attitude, it also 
insists Finns should support corrupt countries and financers 
of southern Europe. 
Finnophobic people accept that violent treaties bind them 
and do not consider that it is allowed to try to change them 
peacefully. This means that, for example, the war guilt 
sentences, which are against the Finnish Constitution, or the 
return of Karelia, could not be opened, not even as a win-win 
event. 
Englishmen have a good expression – chilling effect – 
which means ice cold and hamstring effect. This concept is 
often translated in Finnish as an atmosphere of fear. This is 
part of Finnophobia. 
In jurisprudence the chilling effect means preventing use 
of one’s constitutional rights. For this reason a significant part 
of the population do not dare to the use their freedom of 
speech. 
Finnophobia can be described as a concept or an 
attitude. Attitudes will change and other people can affect 
them. Change is always a possibility. A Roman poet Horace 
articulated immortal words: Sapere aude, i.e., dare to be 
wise. 
Using your own common sense to stop Finlandization 
and Finnophobia is a positive thing. It means adhering to a 
sound national identity that is ultimately possible only by 
accepting the truth. 
 
 
 
Veikko Saksi 
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Gender equality the Nordic way – an asset in soft diplomacy towards the Baltic 
Sea Region? 
By Helene Carlbäck 
In contemporary political global discourse and practice, the 
degree to which a nation recognizes human rights has 
become a measure of civilization and democracy. It is an 
asset with which states can compete through techniques of 
soft diplomacy. In this connection gender equality should be 
mentioned as one of the basic democratic and human rights. 
When the socio-economic and political systems of Eastern 
Europe and Russia were drastically changed after the end of 
the Cold War, Western actors could market values and 
transfer knowledge about human rights and democracy in the 
former communist states in a new way with fresh possibilities 
of exerting soft diplomacy. The Nordic countries have for 
long been regarded as maybe the most progressive among 
European countries in developing successful gender equality 
politics. Thus the new geopolitical situation in the Northern 
and Northeastern parts of Europe contributed to a niche 
opening up for the Nordic countries to work on the basis of 
cooperation with the aim of developing values regarding 
gender politics in their near abroad.  
Since the 1990s the Nordic Council and the Nordic 
Council of Ministers have sought to promote gender equality 
in the Baltic States and Russia, specifically in the region of 
Northwest Russia. Recently, scholars at the universities of 
Stockholm and Södertörn in Sweden have set out to 
investigate the outcome of these efforts through a research 
project named “Mourning becomes Electra. Gender 
discrimination and human rights”. The project asks questions 
to what degree influence can be attributed to the Nordic 
Council and its Council of Ministers in developing gender 
equality and if the methods applied are optimal in reaching 
the cooperation partners. According to the researchers, the 
Nordic countries have contributed much to the establishment 
of arenas for political recognition of gender equality, 
especially in terms of funding. Conferences and workshops 
have functioned as meeting places for scholars, experts, 
politicians, activists, trade associations and lobby groups on 
both the local and international level. 
Regarding e.g. Lithuania, one report notes that a 
widespread opinion can now be challenged that all 
democratic changes, including the establishment of new 
democratic institutions, have come about under strong 
pressure from the EU and transnational agencies in 
exchange for EU and NATO membership. Instead the 
establishment of the Lithuanian Office of Equal Opportunities 
Ombudsman (EOO) is an example of how the Nordic Council 
of Ministers has played a significant role in building bridges 
between women’s NGOs and local government. The same 
report concludes that Lithuanians have become more 
sensitive to public representations of gender, especially in 
commercial advertising. This is due to the EOO pressuring 
companies to change their portrayal of female inferiority, 
undue focus on physical appearance and women’s eroticism 
as opposed to moral and intellectual values. 
When it comes to Northwest Russia, a positive result of 
the Nordic-Russian cooperation is a growing awareness 
among local policy-makers and civil servants of the 
importance of gender equality and women’s rights. The 
cooperation has facilitated the founding of many new 
women’s rights NGOs, providing assistance with 
organizational management and encouraging political and 
educational activities. It has also helped increase the general 
public’s knowledge about the legal and welfare systems of 
the Nordic countries and the international system of 
safeguarding of women’s rights and gender equality. The 
report points to certain problems, however. In contrast to the 
intentions of the Nordic cooperation partners, most women’s 
NGOs in Russia have been focused on charity and policies 
for the survival of certain layers of the population that were 
hit hard in the transition politics more than acting as 
independent organizations within civil society. Accordingly, 
they have been more interested in defending social rights, 
and less focused on promoting (Western) democratic values. 
The local authorities in Russia have also shown scant 
interest in the development of civil society and even less in 
dealing with women’s NGOs. With the onset of a more 
authoritarian political regime in Russia during recent years, 
with attempts to reintroduce a more Soviet-style protection of 
women as mothers, the conflict between independent 
feminist organizations and local authorities’ policies for the 
protection of women has became more pronounced.  
Another problem being addressed is the somewhat 
asymmetric relations in the cooperation work in developing 
gender equality. Although statements to the effect that Nordic 
countries and the Baltic states and Russia shall promote 
jointly the Nordic dimension of gender equality, the 
underlying idea seems to be that the Nordic countries are 
best qualified to decide the political content of this Nordic 
dimension expressing their task in the following way: 
“Singled out as the most gender-equal societies in the world, 
the Nordic countries have contributed essentially to 
developing their Baltic neighbours’ understanding of the goal 
of gender equality so we can truly work together to achieve 
it.” Thus the mission of the Nordic countries in the 
cooperation reflects a certain effort to induce gender equality 
the Nordic way, a method that might be seen as 
counterproductive in the work of soft diplomacy. 
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Baltic States – choices on citizenship and Western integration  
By Li Bennich-Björkman 
More than 20 years ago, the political leaders in the two Baltic 
States of Estonia and Latvia in the process of transforming 
from being part of the Soviet federation made some 
formative constitutional choices that as a consequence 
disenfranchised large numbers of the Russian-speaking 
minorities residing in the countries. These constitutional 
choices have come to affect the societies and polities in 
terms of integration, in particular in Latvia.  In the process of 
moving from Soviet republics to independent states, these 
two – in contrast to the rest of the former Soviet republics – 
did not opt for what at the time was called the “zero-solution”, 
basically offering citizenship to all residents living in the 
territory at the time according to a jus soli principle. Instead, 
the political majority of Estonia and Latvia decided to restrict 
entitlement to citizenship to those who either had been 
citizens before 1940 or who had close relatives who had 
been. This jus sanguinis principle was justified by legal 
arguments pointing to that what was being done was a 
process of restoration, and not creation, of these states. The 
constitutional choices resulted in an electorate dominated, 
and still so, by titular Estonians and Latvians, since in both 
countries the largest numbers of Russian-speaking 
immigrants had arrived during the 1940 and 50s. However, a 
larger minority of Russian origin that had settled before 
World War II resided in Latvia, which resulted in a more 
substantial Russian-speaking electorate than in Estonia. In 
Latvia, party politics have thus come to revolve partly around 
an ethnic dimension which still persists. Lithuania, the third 
Baltic State, in the end opted for the jus soli principle. Given 
her divergent ethnic composition with over 80 percent ethnic 
Lithuanians at the time of independence and a much smaller 
minority of Poles (around eight percent), Lithuania´s 
geopolitical and cultural situation was much less 
complicated.     
The choice made by the then political leaders was clearly 
controversial at the time, and was questioned internationally 
if not from a legal then from a democratic point of view. In the 
years that have followed, citizenship and more broadly 
minority policies have belonged to the issues gaining most 
attention when the Baltic States are in focus, both in 
academia and in the more popular debate. The common 
knowledge regarding the motives behind the citizenship 
legislation has pointed out profoundly emotional 
considerations, a wish to revenge the Soviet occupation and 
to – at high costs –safe-guard national survival and culture.  
I maintain that a more accurate historical description 
takes into account the fact that it was a combination of 
"emotional" motives and motives involving purely political 
calculations concerning how Russian minority voters would 
view integration with the West, or "geopolitical" motives, that 
led to the provocative position adopted in respect to the 
question of citizenship. Western integration quickly became a 
central question of great priority for Estonian and Latvian 
politicians. However, they regarded the Russian-speaking 
population as having a different agenda that in large part 
involved continued integration, admittedly as independent 
states, with Russia and the former Soviet republics. The 
processes of state formation in both of these countries thus 
involved explicit considerations in which the end – Western 
integration – justified the means chosen – restricted 
citizenship. Both Estonia and Latvia started membership 
negotiations in 1997-1998, and became both EU- and NATO 
members in 2004.     
Was it right – in order, for example, to reach a goal that 
made NATO and EU-membership possible – to deviate from 
what many viewed as fundamental democratic principles? 
Did the exclusion of the Russian-speaking population work to 
prevent ethnic mobilization, such as the one that shook, for 
example, Moldova? The answers is not self-evident against 
the background of what we now know about the serious 
economic and political paths  and ethnic conflicts that have 
left their mark on the majority of the new states – including 
Russia – that emerged after the demise of the Soviet Union. 
The two Baltic States comprise a remarkable exception in 
this regard. Moreover, NATO and EU-membership has had 
clearly positive effects when it comes to human and military 
security, including the creation of new opportunities to work 
in Europe not least of all for young Baltic Russians. These 
are possibilities that Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova still 
strive after in vain. 
When judging the choices made at the time of transition, 
the easy option is to condemn as is often done by Western 
academics and observers. However, that is to look away 
from the complicated geopolitical and demographical 
situations that faced decision-makers in these two countries 
at the time, faced with large minorities who for historical and 
cultural reasons felt greater affinity towards the Russian 
civilization than towards the West. Today, however, the two 
countries could well re-consider and allow for more generous 
citizenship legislation. Old loyalties have transformed as time 
has passed, and both Estonia and Latvia are embedded in 
the European and Western structures that the leaders once 
desired. 
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How can the post-Soviet countries use the Belarusian subsurface regulations? 
By Oleg Bukhovets
In summer-autumn in 2013 an acute conflict blazed up 
between “Belaruskali” and “Uralkali” which  formed an 
alliance in 2005 to strengthen their positions in the 
international potassium market. The conflict has found a 
great resonance on the international level and it seems not to 
have been resolved yet. There are certain circumstances that 
make it difficult to predict if it can be resolved: “Uralkali” is a 
private company, run by Mr. Kerimov, a known Russian 
“oligarch”  and a high-powered politician; and “Belaruskali” is 
like a “nationwide property” and it is of strategic importance 
for setting the Belarussian budget. 
The latter circumstance has been the main reason for 
most Russians to support the Belarussian government taking 
a tough stand in the conflict. 
What is more important is that the present conflict 
attracted the Russian general public and the community of 
professionals’s attention to the way  Russia’s ample natural 
resources are being disposed of. In fact, most recently, in 
November 2012, there was held the VIIth All-Russian 
Congress of  Geologists attended by nearly four thousand 
delegates and guests from 83 regions of  Russian Federation 
and other countries. 
A large number of reports which were made in the 
congress focused generally on expressing alarm over the 
condition of  the Russian geology and subsurface 
management. Mr. V.Orlov, the President of the Russian 
Geological Society, described the major problems in the field 
to be solved as “black spots” for the country and the people.        
Mr. E.Kozlovsky, Honorary President of the Association 
of Russian Geological Organizations, wrote in his article after 
the Congress: “right now we are 15-20 years behind on 
critical areas of advanced mining countries in the scientific 
and technical developments”. (The Russian Resourses, №4, 
March, 5, 2013, Р.10).  This understanding provided the 
“joyless consensus” that emerged at the Congress on the 
current state and the future of the Russian resource-raw 
sector. 
The speakers were very tough about the current situation: 
“we are wasting resourses”, “the government is losing 
control”, “all gimmicks are useless”, “imminent danger”, etc. 
Mr. V.Orlov, the above-said President of  the Russian 
Geological Society is firmly convinced that “if we are  
thoughtful of the future of the country, the restoration of 
mineral resources, it is essential to invest public funds”. 
Mr. A. Natalenko, Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
NOVATEK, a highly informed member of the Congress, 
made a distinctive and dismal remark. In the situation, he 
said, when “the government is persistently late” with taking 
urgent measures, “the sector degrades faster than we make 
decisions (personal remark – O.B.)” (A.Fateev. Black Signs 
of Russian Geology. Tyumen news. Parliamentary 
newspaper. No 201 (5643). 09.11.2012). 
In connection with such a bleak diagnosis of the Russian 
subsurface use, there is a reason to look at the experience 
closest ally for Russia in the post-Soviet space – the 
Republic of Belarus. 
The Natural Resources Code of the Republic of Belarus 
was approved in 2008.  Its key point is proprietorship on 
natural resources. What is the importance of the modern 
Belarusian regulatory version determined by? The point is 
that still starting with the "perestroyka" times and the next 10-
15 years of independent existence of states USSR 
successors the idea of necessity and expedience of the most 
large-scale denationalization, in general and subsurface 
resources management, in particular has gained a vast 
ground in public opinion, expert groups and consciousness of 
élites in power. "Less governmental intervention!” - this is the 
lapidatory form the supporters of market fundamentalism 
have transformed the principle into. It's based on the idea 
that private proprietorship is the "heart" of the market 
economy widespread all over the world (especially in Anglo-
Saxon countries). The famous Russian economist R. 
Grinberg ironically said at the Belarus-Russia "round" table in 
2009 that the world financial and economic crisis has refuted 
this "general illusion". "Competition is the real heart of the 
market", he highlighted. (Belarusian Economic Journal. 2009. 
№ 4. P. 40). 
The Natural Resources Code 2008 has drawn a line on 
this legal matter which used to be long-lasting and has made 
people's mouth sore. Article 5 of the Code reads as follows. 
 
1. “Natural resources are exclusively state 
proprietorship. The state exercises his rights of 
ownership, use and disposal of natural resources 
via authorized state bodies. 
2. Resources can't be a subject to collateral, donation, 
purchase-sale, inheritance, contributions to charter 
fund and a subject to alienation in any form" 
(http://www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871<p0=Hk
0800406<p2= (NRPA). 
In 2013 Belarusian legislators continued improving 
Resources Code: on April, 2 the House of Representatives 
passed the draft of “Law about introducing amendments and 
additions to Resources Code of the Republic of Belarus” and 
on April, 18 the Council of the Republic ratified it. After being 
signed by the President the new law was registered in the 
National register NCPA RB №2/2017 06.05.2013. The law 
becomes effective on January, 1, 2014. 
Becoming effective this law will simplify both the 
procedure of allocating resources and using them. The law 
specifies the increase in terms of using resources for mining 
and using geothermal resources; cancels the limits to their 
mining, reduces the time and costs on execution of 
documents. The law pursues general reduction of the list of 
sites coming within industrial safety expert examination by 
the government.  
The law also specifies the reduction of job specification 
on geological examination of resources if state geological 
examination of their project documentation is carried out. 
This will allow cutting costs of the Republic’s budget. 
The law introduces the equality of opportunity while 
allocating resources sites for making both investment and 
concession contracts. In future this must ensure more 
investors getting involved in the exploitation of deposits, as 
nowadays investing activities based on making concession 
contracts are not in high demand as their terms are less 
beneficial as compared with the terms of investment 
contracts. 
The new law simplifies the process of geological and 
mining leases for legal entities formed as a result of the 
reorganization. If the firm had already acquired the right to 
mine minerals, newly reorganized company will continue to 
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do the same on the basis of the application of the legal entity 
in accordance with the transfer or separation regulations.  
After the entry into force of the Natural Resources Code 
2008, the executive and legislative branches of Belarus were 
constantly engaged in monitoring its enforcement practices. 
The executive and legislative branches of Belarus took into 
account the enforcement practices and the justified 
proposals of subsoil users and amended the law. The 
changes and additions of the above-mentioned law reflect 
the liberalization of the Natural Resources Code.  
However, in some important areas a legislator enhances 
the protective function of the government in the use of 
mineral resources. The government imposed restrictions and 
prohibitions on mining in the areas under special protection. 
The aim of such a protection is achieved by introducing a 
certain order of conservation and liquidation of mine 
openings because the procedures of liquidation and 
conservation of mines and underground facilities not related 
to mining and excavation differ in the nature and volume of 
work performed and in the possible impact on the 
environment. 
Such a balance between liberalization and protectiveness 
of legislation on mineral resources is justified in the light of 
current global trends. The basic principle of the exclusive 
state ownership on the subsoil helps to maintain this 
balance. The foregoing aspects of the Belarusian legislation 
on mineral resources are especially important for the 
functioning of the Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan, as well as for the future of Eurasian Economic 
Union. In fact, while these three countries produce now just 
2.6 % of world’s GDP and 4% of world’s export, there are 9% 
of world’s proven oil stock and 25% of natural gas on their 
territory (I.V.Khalevinski, V.B.Kudryavtsev 20 years of CIS. 
World and Politics. 2012. no 2 (65), February, P.53). 
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Belarus is pregnant with charity 
By Valentina Simkhovich 
Socially responsible initiatives have been known in Western and 
Eastern societies for many years. The first form of social 
responsibility that was widely spread out in antique Mediterranean, 
later – in European countries, was charity. The result was that 
private business responsibility acquired a free will character and 
became seen through the prism of charity. Even today corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and charity are often viewed as equal.    
The Belarusian CSR practice in this regard is not an exception. 
Priority given to charity by home companies has the rational grounds 
for: the UNDP documents appropriate charity the highest CSR level. 
Most Belarusian companies start their way to CSR with charity 
projects, i.e. the forms supplied with their resources available and it 
complies with the world CSR practice. 
Charity domination in Belarus has got another explanation. 
Socially oriented business was given the state support which was 
fixed by law acts and right there a growth of charity acts undertaken 
by businesses was noticed. The growth happened despite the 
economic crisis that according to the data of December 2011 poll 
revealed the businesses’ positive attitude to the CSR practice in 
general. It was proved by their higher corporate social activities due 
to available possibilities and resources and increased charitable aid 
to those who are in great need under the crisis.      
Figuratively one can say that Belarus is pregnant with charity 
and the latest realities prove its dominating position in Belarusian 
business social activity. Charity is realized in such forms as 
corporate philanthropy, charity marketing, social marketing, 
volunteering, sponsorship etc.  
Of highest popularity among them is charity marketing, often 
called “percent policy”. Many Belarusian companies transfer a 
certain percentage of their sales to accounts of various 
establishments – orphan or elderly homes, medical centers to buy 
drugs, equipment or cure the sick, help the disabled etc. The known 
examples of the policy are “Make good together!” act arranged by 
Master’s kitchen, a frozen foodstuff producer, “Rainbow of Hope” by 
Conte-Spa, a hosiery producer, “Red Dress Collection” clothes’ 
demonstration by Mobile Telephone System, a cellular operator, 
“Velcom Nice Numbers” charitable auction by Velcom, a cellular 
operator etc.       
At the same time lack of simple and convenient mechanisms of 
giving aid is a certain barrier to charity wider development in Belarus. 
Its first aspect is in the fiscal area: lack of privileges and access to 
soft loans for business, complexity of paperwork of arranging donors’ 
aid, indistinct understanding of whom and how to help etc. In 
particular, social projects are financed with the after-tax profits, and 
they are not the grounds to have any tax privileges or preferences. 
Moreover, due to mentioning in legislation the CSR events can entail 
different tax loading for the company. 
The other aspect lies in legislation. Due to lack of the systems 
approach to regulating different kinds of charity, charity and its form 
of sponsorship are regulated by isolated normative acts, realizing 
various, sometimes contradicting each other, approaches to 
regulating charitable activity. They do not give a mono-semantic 
interpretation of the terms relating with charity, but put an equal-sign 
between charitable (gratuitous) and sponsor aid. The donors’ right to 
render charity is restricted by a limited number of purposes. The only 
criterion is compliance with the purposes determined by law but 
often the purposes of gratuitous help do not comply with the 
purposes determined by law. The list of organizations in the 
development of which the state can see social benefit is too limited 
and includes only entities of culture, information, physical culture and 
sport. These and other restrictions mean that legislation more 
constrains than stimulates charity development in Belarus. 
Domination of charity may hide a number of other problems. One 
says that companies, willing to demonstrate their social orientation, 
render help to the needed ignoring their personnel interests. It is not 
the situation in Belarus and the 2011-2012 sociological research 
revealed home businesses’ understanding a connection between 
CSR and investments in personnel development (65%), bettering of 
working conditions (60%) and payment of high legal wages (49%). 
Willing to keep high quality employees under crisis Belarusian 
business did not apply to socially irresponsible restructuring, in 
particular to mass discharge of employees. Although large 
companies were the main source of unemployment in the republic, 
the prognostic indices of unemployment rate of 1.2-1.5% determined 
for 2012 by the State program of assistance of employment among 
the population were not exceeded.  
Another problem is social dependence caused by charity. The 
Belarusian mass media inform of the people whose children have 
recovered thanks to charitable help but the still arriving money is 
spent by them on their personal needs – car purchase, rest abroad 
etc. In other words, using humanity of our society, some citizens are 
able to make profit on their own grief. 
Despite its significance charity is a less favorable form of 
business and society interacting. As a rule, it is outside main 
business. For a company, it is costs in the short time while for the 
society it is money “fallen from the heaven”.  
But as a form of investing into a social idea charity reveals a 
certain economic benefit for business. A company’s participation in 
the social life via arranging charitable acts and projects is an 
additional stimulus for customers, investors, society of the whole to 
pay attention to its produce and results of activities that entail 
increased sales, stronger brand and reputation position, higher 
investments etc. As development of any business should be 
coordinated with solving social problems, CSR programs, charitable 
ones among them, should be integrated into its corporate strategy of 
sustainable development. If a company views its social programs as 
social investments, these programs have a big positive effect for 
both business and society. In particular, an enterprise’s aid to a 
profile educational establishment produces a higher effect than its 
support of education in general.  
There are examples of strategic charity in the republic, as well. 
EPAM SYSTEMS corporation interested in training Belarusian IT-
specialists equipped laboratories in Belarus State University of 
Informatics and Radio-Electronics and Belarus State Economic 
University with SAP software. In March 2013 TOMS Shoes 
corporation started a “Walk together” charitable project aimed at 
making shoes for the needed children in Grodno region. The project 
is part of the state program of creating the system of rehabilitative 
and preventive services to avoid social orphanage.  
At the same time corporate strategy does not deny charitable aid 
to those who are in need. In this regard priorities are coordinated in 
the dialogue with key stakeholders. Charity should promote initiative, 
intensify the stakeholder’s resources and, finally, change the 
situation but not create dependence. It should attract potential 
partners giving them a chance for participation. Anyway, it should be 
coordinated with priorities of the state policy.    
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NATO occupies a half of Russia’s foreign economic relations  
By Kari Liuhto 
The Russian military doctrine of 2010 identifies the expansion of 
NATO to Russia's borders as one of the main external threats of 
war (Moscow Times 8.2.2010). Contrary to Russia’s military 
doctrine, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO, 
said a year ago that the alliance does not present a threat to 
Russia, and furthermore, NATO currently does not consider 
Russia as a potential enemy (Sergei Vasilenkov, pradva.ru, 
20.11.2012). Less than half a year later, Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy 
Prime Minister of Russia, who oversees the country’s military-
industrial sector, stated:  “We really need to understand what our 
strategic threats are, clearly define who our adversary is, what 
kind of adversary, and configure our Armed Forces and military-
technical systems to counter those threats” (RIA Novosti 
20.3.2013). Russia's 2011-2020 arms procurement programme 
stipulates an annual upgrade of up to 11% of the military 
equipment (ibid). While Russia increases its military spending, 
several NATO members have simultaneously cut their defence 
budgets.  
As an economist specialising in the Russian economy, I try 
to find an answer to this imbalanced situation through analysing 
the current state of the economic relations between Russia and 
the NATO member countries. 
According to the statistics of the Customs Russia, the 28 
NATO members account for a half of Russia’s foreign trade. The 
majority of the Russian exports to the NATO countries consists 
of oil, natural gas, metals and other raw materials, and 
correspondingly, the NATO countries supply Russia with 
machinery and a great variety of consumer goods. Such an 
extensive trade would hardly take place among adversaries. 
Only the wildest conspiracy theorists suggest that the extensive 
trading is used as a means to destroy the counterpart.   
The data of the Central Bank of Russia indicates that the role 
of the NATO countries as a source of capital and an investment 
target is more modest than the trade ties. A quarter of Russia’s 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock originates from the 
NATO member states and a third of the country’s outward FDI 
stock has landed on the NATO territory. Before jumping into any 
conclusions, two essential issues should be kept in mind. First, if 
the tax havens and Cyprus, representing mainly the round 
tripping of Russian capital, would be excluded, the share of the 
NATO countries would be approximately 60% of Russia’s inward 
FDI stock. The NATO stake in Russia’s outward FDI stock would 
be even larger, close to 70%. Second, the capital inflows from 
the NATO countries to Russia are almost the same as the capital 
outflows from Russia to the NATO member states 
(approximately $ 120 billion each) i.e. both parties have equally 
gained in this money exchange. 
According to the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism, the 
NATO countries account for nearly a half of the outbound 
tourism of Russians. In 2012, over 7 million Russian tourists 
visited a NATO country. If we look the reverse side of the 
tourism, it becomes evident that only a bit more than one million 
tourists from the NATO area travelled to Russia last year. In 
relative terms, however, the NATO citizens cover a half of the 
inbound tourism to Russia. This statistical peculiarity is due to 
the fact that the outbound tourism from Russia is six times larger 
than the inbound tourism to Russia.  
The tourism flows, the emigration data of Russia, the 
information on Russians studying abroad and the location of the 
Russian businessmen’s and politicians’ residencies abroad show 
that Russians are not afraid of spending their time in the NATO 
territory or even sending their younger generation to be 
educated there. If NATO would be a genuine enemy, we would 
hardly witness such a widespread move of Russians to the 
NATO countries.   
Russia’s elder military staff and the personnel of security 
agencies have most likely spent less time in the West, which 
partially explains their reserved and antiquated attitude towards 
NATO. When the post-Soviet generation jumps into the boots, 
they will discover that the military threats have fundamentally 
changed since the end of the Cold War. A slight contradiction 
between the East and the West may still exist but they will find 
out that neither the West nor the East in particular is the same 
what it used to be during the Cold War. While having concluded 
so, one should be aware that there are strong interest groups 
inside Russia, NATO and elsewhere, which benefit from the 
NATO-Russia antagonism and hence are ready to a lot in order 
to preserve the illusion of adversary and by doing so maintain 
their revenues and influence.           
When the economic relations between Russia and NATO are 
analysed as a whole, it becomes evident that about a half of 
Russia’s foreign trade, foreign investment and foreign tourism 
are done with the NATO member states. The importance of 
NATO to the external economic relations of Russia is much 
stronger than Russia’s economic significance to NATO. 
However, NATO is dependent on Russia as well due to Russia’s 
large energy exports. Though the interdependency is by no 
means symmetric, it is hard to understand those views arguing 
that Russia and NATO are still enemies. One can ironically 
conclude: who needs friends if the economic relations with the 
foes are so good.  
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO would 
further increase the economic relations between the Western 
military pact and Russia, since Sweden is a notable investor into 
the Russian economy and Finland’s trade intensity per capita 
with Russia is the highest within the EU, excluding the Lilliput EU 
member states. Moreover, Finland is the 10th most attractive 
tourist destination for the Russians in the world. As Finland and 
Sweden are the most R&D-intensive economies in the globe, 
they could contribute to the on-going modernisation of Russia. 
Should Russia fail in its modernisation, the Russian Far Fast 
may turn into “a raw material appendage of China” as the 
Russian forefront professor Sergey Karaganov has phrased it 
(Russia in Global Affairs, 2.7.2011).   
The appendage path will be a probable outcome if Russia 
has only one centre of external gravity. In order to avoid the 
Eastern appendage scenario, Russia will need both the EU and 
NATO as its second centre of gravity. The Eurasian integration 
will paradoxically fasten Russia’s slide towards China, since 
most of the CIS states will decelerate Russia’s modernisation 
pace rather than accelerate it.  
It is easy to agree with Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister 
Rogozin concerning Russia’s need to understand its 
contemporary strategic threats and adversaries; sooner the 
better. 
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